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ABSTRACT 
 
This research interrogates a large population of shareholders, senior managers and 
company directors in New Zealand as to their reasons for considering board 
service, their competence in governance skills areas, their beliefs as to whether 
board room diversity is needed and their firms’ interests to recruit further 
independent directors to their boards. 
 
With a considerable deference to the contributions of agency theory as the 
conventional cornerstone to explain the connection of directors into organizations 
for the purpose of governance service, this work explores the extension of agency 
theory by adding an additional driver for governance engagement by company 
directors: Commitment. Based on this research, company directors in New 
Zealand appear to base their interest in serving as independent directors on 
company boards largely on the desire to “do good”. This raises the prospect of a 
deeper and more meaningful relationship with firms where they serve as directors. 
Ignorance of this important component of the director/firm relationship by the 
firms might render directors less willing to contribute and deprive firms of the 
strong support and engagement of their directors.  Lack of recognition of this 
additional component to the fabric of an enduring committed relationship between 
external directors and their firms may require a different behavior of firms during 
the recruitment, board induction training and maintenance of the director 
relationship. 
 
While the strong expression of interest by SMEs in additional independent 
directors is a welcome sign of rising governance standards in New Zealand’s large 
group of such enterprises, concern emerges about the potential lack of 
competence by directors in several areas of governance. While directors appear to 
compensate for deficiencies in skills with an extra dose of commitment, significant 
needs for upskilling exists in this sector. It is noted that the absence of well-
established, easily accessible and comprehensive director training schemes in New 
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Zealand conflicts with the expected large number of additional independent 
director recruitments in the near future. 
 
Shareholders, senior managers and directors report a need for diversity on boards 
in the area of business experience, but no specific concern is expressed as to how 
any specific importance of gender or age while other factors, such as work 
experience and global knowledge, are of much greater interest. This could indicate 
that the status quo of only a small number of women on boards in New Zealand is 
accepted, but in the context of this work more likely indicates that directors will 
not be recruited (or excluded from recruitment) in the future on the basis of 
gender. 
 
This research attempts to lay groundwork for a more intensive investigation into 
the true motivations of company directors when they think of an independent 
director mandate and while they discharge directorship duties. There now appears 
to be solid evidence that the historic application of agency theory does not 
completely describe the factors of motivation and relationship under which 
independent directors serve on company boards. 
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CHAPTER 1:  Introduction, Problem Statement and Research 
Approach 
 
  
1.1. Background to this Research Work 
In September 2008 the New Zealand economy, in common with others far bigger 
and significant, experienced a downturn, pushing some firms into liquidation and 
others into severe downsizing mode (Tosi, 2009). There are many hypothesised 
causal factors for this situation, but it cannot be denied that corporate governance 
plays a key role in a firm’s success or demise particularly during such challenging 
times (George, 2010). Thus, researchers are inclined to view corporate 
governance through a critical lens focused on how corporate governance impacts 
upon the market growth, profit maximisation and sustainability of a firm.  
 
Adding to the complexity of the current and future picture and further adding to 
the relevance of this research, governance of companies large and small in New 
Zealand is changing: “between 1995 and 2010, the average board size of NZ firms 
fell slightly, while the board representation of non-executive, independent and 
female directors all rose, as did the propensity of firms to establish separate audit 
and remuneration committees. Real chair and director fees rose sharply, especially 
in large firms.” (Boyle and Ji, 2011, p.19). This indicates a shift in composition of 
directors which needs an illumination as to rationale. For instance, is there a shift 
to a different set of expertise or is there a desire to change diversity? Do 
independent directors join as ‘agents’ for the shareholders or for other reasons? 
 
One of the most important aspects to good corporate governance is, no doubt, an 
effective Board of Directors. A prevailing view is that in order to be effective, a 
board should be populated by ‘independent’ directors although that in itself does 
not greatly assist any judgment of effectiveness. To better understand what makes 
a board effective, it is useful to understand what makes it ‘tick’: Why the members 
are there, how they got there and how they function. This work asks, among other 
questions, why independent directors would join a company board and contrasts 
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the responses  with those offered by established theories, i.e. Agency Theory, that 
presume a certain set of legal constraints within which company directors 
discharge their duties. 
 
In this case, my experiences during many directorships, Crown appointments, and 
leadership assignments to ‘rescue’ firms from poor leadership and governance in 
Europe, the US and New Zealand, have shaped the belief that the motivations, 
skills and attitudes of independent directors are not always  properly understood, 
especially in small and mid-size firms, where independents might serve alongside 
founders, owner/operators and large shareholders. 
 
It seemed to me both unrealistic and unsupported by practice that independent 
directors served solely on the basis of a tightly framed legal construct of agency 
theory to exclusively represent the interests of shareholders. When combined 
with the generally low pay of directors in New Zealand, many of whom serve 
without compensation on boards of companies owned by friends, or reflecting on 
the many thousand non-profit organizations in New Zealand where directors are 
generally under-/unpaid, it appeared that there were gaps in our understanding as 
to why company directors agree to serve. A compounding factor is the possibility 
of prosecution and personal asset forfeiture when directors allow their firms to 
trade while insolvent, combined with the negative exposure of a small-country 
media frenzy that makes it virtually impossible to escape from past failures at 
Feltex, South Canterbury Finance and Blue Chip.  
 
Under these circumstances, it is puzzling as to why seasoned business people with 
huge corporate credibility would risk their reputations and agree to serve on a 
board. During interactions with fellow directors in New Zealand it became 
apparent that they often believed they operated for some nebulous and undefined 
higher good, sometimes directed at the firm as a whole and at other times 
incorporating external and internal groups of stakeholders as their ‘principals’. 
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All these factors shape one of the two main problem questions to be addressed in 
this research: What motivates an individual to agree to serve on a board of 
directors, and is that motivation truly captured by a strict legal relationship 
between the board and the company? 
 
In addition, there a broader issue is worth considering: Whether the Anglo-
American big corporate model rules are appropriate or relevant to the wide 
diversity of company types, character and size in a country like New Zealand. 
Different cultures have different governance approaches and therefore literature 
based solely upon experiences with large publicly-listed firms in large countries 
may not be easily transfer into small country where the majoerity of firms are 
unlisted and thus regulated to a far lesser standard.  
 
With fewer than 200 firms publicly listed in New Zealand, the usually heavily 
regulated large-firm market represents only a small portion of all firms in the 
country. It is characterized by monopolies or duopolies in many sectors, where 
very few large firms hold a commanding market share. This implies that public 
regulation catches only few businesses and thus may be relatively ineffectual in 
changing the approach to governance and accountability of firms.  
 
The highly regulated and often widely publized governance approaches to the 
public sector entities reaches through the country and deeply into the smallest 
businesses, usually into non-profit firms supported by Governemnt or funded 
through Government-sponsored entities, such as health boards. Often the first 
organizations to publish performance data in new formats, such as the Triple 
Bottom Line approach to accountability, to mandate gender equality hiring and 
actively manage diversity on boards, sets standards throughout the country, 
although not necessarily through binding legislation. With the power of the public 
purse cascading financial support from the Government into the private sector, 
usually through contracts for infrastructure, non-profit work, and services of all 
kinds, government influence extends to the reporting quality of supported firms, 
their board composition and the demonstration of skills through performance 
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requirements under state contracts. This places the government in a position 
where it could indirectly change standards of performance in firms that are 
receiving state support. This happens in some situations, e.g.. where health boards 
mandate reporting from contractors that delineates governance structures and 
oversight, but is an under-utilized feature of government spending. In a largely 
deregulated economy where the Government crows over how easy it is to do 
business in New Zealand, it is unlikely that greater regulation will be imposed on 
the large number of non-listed firms in this country. 
 
This research is limited to the unique corporate setting in New Zealand where a 
large number of the many SMEs are focused on agriculture, often as family-
controlled firms, contrasted by the relative few 200 or so publicily listed businesses 
and several other large privately held firms. Although a large number of 
respondents in this work describe their experiences in SME-size businesses, the 
contributions from executives and directors in publicly traded firms, large 
businesses, government-affiliated enterprises and non-profit organizations, are 
valuable to review the current state of governance throughout the fabric of New 
Zealand’s economic activities. Especially the public sector, involving itself in most 
activities of life in New Zealand and often funding hundreds of non-profit entities 
for related activities, plays a huge role to set in motion the implementation of new 
approaches to historic views on governance, i.e. the reporting of Triple Bottom 
Line activities, the mandatory reporting of female representation on boards, and 
the mandatory disclosure of a ‘diversity plan’ for future governance roles. 
 
The number of SMEs in New Zealand has dropped for the first time in 2011 (MED, 
2011), but is still the single largest sector of the economy, by value-added output. 
In this source, the definition of SMEs includes firms up up to 19 employees, still 
producing aboput 40% of the country’s value-added product and employing 31% of 
the labour force. Eroding margins due to a high New Zealand Dollar appears to 
have affected the viability of several small business that folded after their export-
focused enterprise model was no longer financially viable. With intensifying 
competition both within New Zealand and from foreign-based competitors, the 
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health of SMEs is an important consideration as New Zealand powers forward to 
try to achieve an enviable GDP growth rate of more than 3% in 2014/2015, 
unachievable for most other OECD countries. 
 
In addition, New Zealand is home to a large number of SMEs, making it somewhat 
unusual among most industrialised countries with similarly high per capita incomes. 
In many industries, a few large and dominant corporate players participate with a 
myriad of these small entities in fragmented markets. Publicly mandated 
governance standards usually do not apply in these smaller enterprises, and 
commingling of interests between owners and managers is common. 
 
The large majority (89%) of New Zealand’s firms employ five or fewer people 
(Battisti, Lee and Cameron, 2009), and in New Zealand between 98% and 99% of 
businesses are SMEs, many of which are family businesses. Surveys tend to suggest 
that in around 25% of family firms, children work in the company, and firms often 
employ siblings and/or other relatives (Battisti, Lee and Cameron, 2009; Lawrence, 
Collins, Pavlovich & Arunachalam, 2006). An overall 89% of these employ five or 
fewer people (Battisti, Lee and Cameron, 2009).   
 
The largest number of SMEs cluster in the larger population areas, such as 
Auckland, Canterbury (Christchurch), Waikato (Hamilton) and Wellington, where 
there should be a sufficient level of resourcing available to strengthen governance – 
if that was desired. With the majority of SMEs being less than six years old 
(MED,2011), while larger enterprises being significantly older, the question arises 
whether these ‘young’ firms have grown sufficient talent to lead the business into a 
successful future. With a drop of high-growth enterprises (defined here as “Those 
enterprises with 10+ employees and average annualised growth greater than 20 
percent over a three-year period”), an especially important group of firms with the 
potential to create new high-value jobs, learning and competitive stamina for New 
Zealand, comes the reflection whether better governance, long-range strategic 
planning and leadership resourcing would have kept some of those firms alive. 
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Yet even for such SME businesses and despite the lack of any legal imperative, 
there would appear to be significant interest in appointing independent directors. 
The emerging strong demand by SMEs in New Zealand for independent directors 
demonstrates that businesses can indeed articulate their own preferences to 
create more independent boards – and have begun to do so (Mueller, Dana, 
Rennie and Ingley, 2010).  This interest in independent directors requires the 
consideration of both sides of the fence: From a perspective of prospective 
directors: Why would they wish to join a board? and from the viewpoint of firms: 
Do independent directors add value? The former connects to a discussion of 
theories under which directors are supposed to discharge their duties, contrasted 
by findings here what truly drives directors. The latter raises the matter of what 
expectations companies have of independent directors and what skills and 
transferable experiences are most desirable for shareholders and sitting directors, 
when looking for fresh blood around the board room table. 
 
With the extensive participation of senior-level managers in the leadership and 
governance of non-profit entities in New Zealand, where glory and monetary 
rewards are largely absent, the presumption emerges that other motivations must 
be in play here to engage the interest of these leaders. To test this paradigm shift 
from a dutiful servant director to an engaged one passing on the trappings of pay 
and recognition in lieu of some other satisfaction, this work will ask prospective 
directors for an extended set of motivations to join boards. 
 
It appears illogical that prospective directors, presumably executives in their own 
right with experience in business matters, would all want to join company boards 
for the same reasons, like iron filings snapping into one direction only when 
touched by a magnet, based on our current view of the formal, legalistic and 
narrowly defined theories of governance. It is much more likely that these 
seasoned performers have formed their own views on how and for which 
outcomes they wish to contribute on boards. It is important then to identify what 
such factors might be so that suitable conditions can be created both to nest-in 
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directors at the board level but also to create a pool of candidates with the 
matching sets of skills. 
 
It would appear that these independent directors are not only sought in order to 
fulfil a control function but also, and perhaps more importantly, provide SMEs with 
good quality advice on growth strategies (Read, 2007), and key skills those SMEs 
are otherwise lacking.  Given this, it is relevant to establish whether the message 
has been received by shareholders and directors of SMEs in New Zealand in 
general and whether they plan to act on it. More particularly, how can firms in this 
nation of ‘micro’ businesses’ (Devlin, 2004, p.22), effectively connect with 
independent directorship talent? 
  
Therefore, it is worth asking whether governance in New Zealand (a) demands a 
different empowerment structure for directors, (b) is more demanding regarding 
the qualifications and skills directors must bring to the firm, and (c) looks for 
independent directors to meet skills gaps? This research then proposes that a new 
theoretical model might exist, in which ‘commitment’ by directors to their firms is 
a central element. 
 
A further question then become relevant: What factors do SME owners and 
directors consider when planning the inclusion of independent directors on their 
boards?  
 
 
Specifically, this research attempts to answer the following questions: 
1.1.1. What is the motivation of independent directors to serve on a company 
board in New Zealand? 
1.1.2. Do independent directors contribute positively to company boards in New 
Zealand? 
1.1.3. Are independent directors sufficiently qualified to discharge their duties as 
company directors? 
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1.1.4. What are the characteristics and qualities of a ‘desirable’ independent 
director? 
1.1.5. Are New Zealand companies looking for additional independent directors? 
 
This work attempts to explain a perceived gap in the understanding expressed in 
the conventional literature about the foundations for the association of 
independent director with their firms, and the reality that many directors appear 
to serve more than a legal guardianship role on behalf of shareholders. As there 
currently is no widely accepted alternative theory under which such extended 
motivation of independent directors is defined, this research lays the groundwork 
for a more thorough investigations into the boundaries of the application of 
conventional agency theory – and the possible exploration of a frontier beyond. 
 
 
1.2. Research Approach 
Mindful of the range and complexity of the present body of research into 
corporate governance, this research applies a canonical development approach 
(Hindle, 2004) that involves use of the ‘canon’ of learning (or the authoritative 
statements of knowledge) for a particular discipline area as a reference point for 
the development of new knowledge or perspectives. It is based on the 
construction of hypotheses that flow from the problem statement and are 
interpreted in the context of a detailed literature review into director motivations 
and theories of engagement.  
 
Data is drawn from responses to a survey administered to several thousand 
shareholders, senior managers and directors in New Zealand, in-depth interview 
responses and survey replies by directors of several firms in New Zealand, and the 
responses to interview questions of candidates for ministerial appointments to 
District Health Boards in New Zealand. 
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Quantitative and qualitative analysis has been carried out on the data. In particular, 
detailed in-depth validation surveys have been conducted to confirm the findings of 
the large survey sample population, and the findings have been analyzed to support 
or not support the research assumptions. 
 
 
1.3.    Overview of the Work 
 
In order to reach a wider audience, this research presents by way of background in 
Chapter 2, an introduction to the concept of corporate governance and how and 
why the principles have been developed and adopted. This is followed in Chapter 3 
by an overview and justification of the principal theories that have been applied to 
describe corporate governance practices (the descriptive function) and to evaluate 
their effectiveness (the normative function).  
 
Chapter 4 provides more detailed and specific focus for the hypotheses explored 
through the empirical research; locating and justifying those hypotheses in a 
theoretical framework. Specifically, this chapter focuses on the board and its 
(assumed) dual role as shareholder-representative and management-monitor. 
Further, it explores the meaning and justification for independent directors, their 
motivation, skills and their selection.  
 
Chapter 5 introduces and describes the empirical research conducted into the 
motivation of directors and the demand by firms in New Zealand while Chapter 6 
reports on the findings from this research. Finally Chapter 7 offers some 
conclusions emerging from this research and avenues for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2:  Governance Background  
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
Up to relatively recently, corporate governance tended to emerge only in the 
academic sphere: “a relatively obscure concept with narrow legalistic 
connotations” (Seal, 2006, p. 389), or an arcane and economic theory-driven line 
of research that was, for most practical purposes, largely irrelevant. How times 
change: Seal (2006) cites Gordon (2002) in support of his point that it was not 
until the revelations during the Enron meltdown of widespread problems and 
criminal and negligent behaviour that serious doubts were raised over the value of 
the ‘myths’ (Seal, 2006, p. 390) of governance that were routinely taught at 
Universities: …auditor independence…  “Chinese walls”…and “efficient” capital 
markets’ (Seal, 2006, p. 390).   
 
Thus it is arguable that it is the intensified discussion of governance in the populist 
media since the turn of the century that has blurred the theoretical underpinnings 
of the governance theories, and which has tended to pillory directors as parties 
responsible for every corporate failure, including those involved in the sub-prime 
finance sector in New Zealand. 
 
Therefore, to gain an understanding of the principles and roles of corporate 
governance, it is vital to move beyond the populist view of accusation and fault to 
explore it and its theoretical underpinnings. First, what is corporate governance?  
 
A recent (and broad) definition is given by Colley, Stettinius, Doyle and Logan, 
(2005, p.5), “Today, the public corporation itself operates as a form of 
representative government. The owners (shareholders) elect directors as their 
representatives to manage the affairs of the business. The directors, who as a 
group are referred to as the board of directors, then delegate responsibility for 
actual operations to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO)/Managing Director (MD), 
whom they hire. The CEO is accountable to the board of directors, which, 
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collectively and individually, is accountable to the shareholders. In addition to its 
role in selecting the CEO, the board also advises on and consents to the selection 
of business and strategies of the firm, as well as oversee results. In sum, this system 
of authoritative direction, or government, is known as corporate governance.”  
 
More commonly and tersely, however, corporate governance is defined as “a set 
of relationships between a company’s management, its Board, its shareholders and 
other stakeholders…also providing the structure through which the objectives of 
the company are set and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined” (OECD 2004, p.11). If an important aspect of this 
definition is ‘a set of relationships’ then one should ask how such relationships are 
supported, key objectives attained and performance monitored? 
 
There has been a growing interest in corporate governance in the last decade 
(Tosi, 2008). The many recent bankruptcies and liquidations have highlighted the 
fact that there is no explicit contract to protect the interest of owners. Instead the 
interests of owners lie largely in the hands of managers (Heath, 2009). The well-
publicised downturns of purportedly stellar organizations worldwide, from Enron 
and WorldCom in the USA, Siemens in Germany, Satyam in India, San Lu in China 
through to South Canterbury Finance Corporation, Feltex Carpets and Crafar 
Farms in New Zealand has fed this growing interest in corporate governance and 
the accountability and importance of directors. Many of the arguments now 
proposed for a greater focus on governance were advanced long before these 
high-profile cases emerged, but governance has now moved to a more central role 
when debating firms’ performance and leaders’ accountabilities in the future. Aside 
from the popular headline-grabbing discussion, e.g. for Feltex in New Zealand 
(Gaynor, 2010), or what individual directors did or did not do to advance their 
firm’s fortunes in the case of the many failed finance companies around New 
Zealand and the criminal convictions for some of their directors, it is clear that 
directors occupy a central position in the development of long-term strategies for 
a sustainable future of enterprises.  
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However, it is important to distinguish between corporate governance per se and 
good corporate governance. As can be seen from such examples as Enron, Ansett 
and Parmalat, the term ‘governance’ is value-free. All these companies did have 
governance mechanisms in place: they all proved unequal to the task of achieving 
long-term firm performance in their particular contexts. The question then is: what 
constitutes good governance? Some indication can be gleaned from the following 
discussion. 
 
For many years, legislation around corporate conduct stipulated direct and/or 
indirect compliance requirements for businesses in many developed countries. 
These have increased in number since the accounting scandals at the beginning of 
the millennium (Abdel – Kahlik, 2002; Benston and Hartgraves, 2002).  Relevant 
legislative measures implemented by various jurisdictions have included 
adjustments to the auditing process, refinement of financial reporting standards, 
strengthened internal managerial controls, monitoring of compensation packages 
and development of online security and other technology standards (Bhimani, 
2008). In 2002, Canada’s Ontario Securities Commission passed Bill 198 aimed at 
achieving  “better corporate governance” (Ferris, 2007, p. 31). Generally, the 
requirements of corporate governance legislation are aimed at encouraging ethical 
corporate behaviour.  
 
Often, corporate governance addresses business practices are designed to protect 
the interests of passive shareholders (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). In fact, the 
protection of owners/shareholders interests is often woven into the definition of 
good corporate governance: “If we follow the traditional Anglo-American 
conception of the firm as a device to further the well-being of its owner-
shareholders, good governance is a matter of ensuring that decisions are taken and 
implemented in pursuit of shareholder value” (Keasey, Short and Wright, 2005, p. 
2).  
 
Most particularly, the degree of separation of ownership from control of the firm 
is frequently seen as an indicator of good corporate governance (Tosi, 2009), with 
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a too-close relationship seen as potentially impacting a firm’s profitability due to 
conflict of interest (Clark, 2009). Further, where the principal director or 
governing body (board) does not own the firm, the owner(s) must trust not only 
the firm’s management to act in their best interests, but also the directors. 
Unfortunately for business owners, this is not always the case, hence there can be 
tension between shareholders and boards (Shleifer and Vishney, 1997). Therefore, 
even for SMEs it is important to identify an appropriate and robust model for good 
corporate governance that will address issues of conflict and tension. As 
demonstrated by the historical literature, this search is by no means a recent 
imperative. 
 
Berle and Means (1932) argue that a separation between a firm’s owners or 
investors and a firm’s managers has significant positive implications for industrial 
capitalism. As firms increased in size with the advent of modern communication 
and manufacturing technologies, operating costs fell. As a result, many firms 
increased in size and scale (Coase, 1937). Further technological advances allowed 
for machine-based mass production, and firms’ outputs increased, causing the size, 
scope and scale of firms to grow even more (Clark, 2009). To address these 
increases in size, scope and scale, managerial organisations tended to employ a 
vertical integration business strategy. As a result businesses became driven less by 
market forces and more by administrative structures and managerial coordination 
(Clark, 2009). Increasingly, managers were allotted more decision making power 
and business owners and equity holders trusted managers to act in their best 
interests.  
 
However by the late 1950s, business theorists began to notice a divergence in the 
behaviour of managers and the expectations of business owners and equity holders 
as to how those managers should behave. Galbraith (1952; 1967) described that 
the aforementioned developments led to businesses competing for market share 
instead of profit maximisation. This was a direct result, he claimed, of managers 
being allowed more discretionary decision making. Baumol (1959) stated that 
managers measured business success in terms of growth in market share, whereas 
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owners measured success through sales revenue and profit maximisation. 
Accordingly, Marris (1964) and Williamson (1964) argued that long-term growth of 
a firm was the management’s priority, as opposed to profit maximisation. 
Managerial priorities could also include reputational success, job security, industry 
profile and other perks (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). (It is noted that absent from 
such priorities it is the now-prominent focus on sustainable operations that would 
bestow benefits on both operators and owners of firms and likely establish a more 
long-term valuation of a firm’s success.) 
 
Through effective governance strategies, owners seek to limit managerial 
‘opportunism’ and prioritise owner and equity holder interests that may have 
inherent conflicts due to differences in their prioritization of long-term stakeholder 
interests. A key strategy to marginalise potentially overbearing self-interest of 
management is for there to be a board of directors to represent the owners’ 
interests, and instruct and evaluate management performance (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983 as cited in Cocks, Rennie, Ingley and 
Mueller, 2010). It should be noted, however, that a firm’s owners may not be in 
one accord in terms of their priorities and interests (Cocks et al., 2010). 
Therefore, in their paper, Cocks et al. define the relationship as one where a group 
of heterogeneous owners, each of whom may have conflicting interests and 
priorities, entrusts the firm’s success to a managerial body. Thus, it is even more 
important that governance strategies are put in place to protect the interests of 
not just single owners but also multiple owners, each of whom may have 
somewhat different interests.  
 
On the basis of the various theories to describe governance as a part of our 
society, this work tests for the presence or absence of specific ingredients effective 
boards might need to improve performance. It recognizes that directors are drawn 
into their roles and then perform due to varying, and sometimes conflicting 
theories, none of which has proven to cover governance exclusively. 
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It then follows that various ingredients contribute to effective governance and 
board composition. This work tests whether some of these ingredients exist and 
to what extent they might affect the formation of our boards in the future: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jens Mueller “Movements in the Long White Cloud of Governance”  Page 24 	  
The following section provides an overview of governance as part of a functioning 
corporate society where organizations are governed effectively. There is a 
particular emphasis on the origins of our current understanding of what ‘good 
governance’ constitutes.  
 
 
 
2.2   Good Governance and its Role 
 
This definition of good governance is greatly influenced by US formulations of the 
term and there has long been driven by concepts of agency theory. This in turn 
raises the issue of the extent to which these governance-related rules are an 
appropriate fit for the rest of the world. It is perhaps relevant at this point to state 
that best practice standards of corporate governance in New Zealand tend to be 
heavily influenced by what is considered as best practice overseas, particularly the 
UK and the US, and by the OECD Guidelines on the subject (most recently 
revised in 2004). Therefore, principles of the UK combined code, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (US) and the OECD guidelines find their way into current literature on 
corporate governance in New Zealand. In addition, (as will be discussed at some 
length a little later) US definitions of corporate governance are based upon agency 
theory and managerial capitalism and are largely occupied with structuring 
governance codes of practice to ensure that managers act in the interest of the 
owners and shareholders rather than pursue their own best interests (Shleifer and 
Vishney, 1997).   
 
The following section introduces the historical background of governance 
standards and, due to the OECD standards commonly applied to economic activity 
in New Zealand, a discussion of the OECD principles and other sources that have 
shaped the framework.  
 
In 1991 in the UK, the Financial Reporting Council, London Stock Exchange and 
the accountancy profession moved to address low levels of confidence in financial 
reporting, control and standards and investor disillusionment after some enormous 
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and unexpected company failures. These included that of the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International (BCCI) that failed owing billions after an international 
investigation into lending practices and lack of regulation of its activities, the 
Maxwell group of companies where investigations revealed millions of dollars 
worth of fraud and misappropriation of pension funds and Polly Peck Ltd where for 
years financial records had been falsified. Consequently they set up a committee 
headed by Adrian Cadbury to report on how to improve corporate governance 
practices. This committee’s report (Report of the Committee on the Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance (the Cadbury Report, 1992) included a range of 
recommendations, the most important being the inclusion of independent 
directors principally to fulfil a control function in relation to decisions being made 
by the executive directors (Cadbury, 1992, p.21). As Jones (2003, p. 4) explains, 
this report was just the first of a series of reviews and studies of corporate 
governance in the UK but was probably the most important in establishing the 
approach to the issues not only for the UK but also internationally that lasted for 
more than a decade. In the UK, the recommendation of the Report was for a 
voluntary code. The Hampel committee followed in 1998 with a recommendation 
that the Chairman of the Board should act as a leader of the non-executive 
directors but did not alter the approach engendered by the Cadbury report.  
 
However, by 2002, scandals, including those of Enron, World Com and Tyco, put 
the issues of corporate misfeasance back into the sights of regulatory bodies in the 
UK. As the root cause for many of these was identified as poor corporate 
governance practices the Government initiated another report (the Higgs Report, 
2003) that, while supporting the maintenance of the “comply or explain” (Pass, 
2008, p. 291) approach instigated by the Cadbury Report, also advocated that 
Boards should be responsible for ensuring a proportion (at least 50%) of members 
are independent. Although there was some criticism that these recommendations 
were overly prescriptive (Jones, 2003, p. 8), they were incorporated into the 
combined code in time for the 2003 reporting year (FRC, 2003). Through all its 
revisions since 1998 (the main ones being in 2006 and 2009 with a renaming as the 
Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2010)) the Code continues to draw on the 
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main tenets of the Cadbury Report, the Hampel Report and the Greenbury Report 
(1995, on Directors’ Remuneration) and requires listed companies to disclose and 
justify how they formulate and structure corporate governance. The overarching 
principle behind the combined code is that there should be “a sound system of 
internal control to safeguard shareholders’ investment and the company assets” 
(FRC, 2006) with few changes to approach or criteria (FRC, 2010, p.12-13).1  
  
In 1999, and after examination of relevant practices and legal provisions in place in 
various member countries, the OECD published its first set of principles and 
guidelines for good corporate governance (OECD, 1999). These have been revised 
with a second version produced in 2004. These principles are described and 
analysed in terms of potential effectiveness for governance and company 
performance and, by way of illustration, mention is made of legislative instruments 
or provisions that reflect these principles in some way.  
 
According to the OECD (2004) corporate governance has two principal purposes: 
to improve economic efficiency and growth (the macro effect) and to promote 
improve investor confidence at a company or firm level (the micro effect). In the 
preamble, the OECD explains the intention of the document: to assist OECD and 
non-OECD governments in their efforts to evaluate and improve the legal, 
institutional and regulatory framework for corporate governance in their 
countries, and to provide guidance and suggestions for stock exchanges, investors, 
corporations, and other parties that have a role in the process of developing good 
corporate governance’ (presumably ‘good’ being a value to be conferred where the 
relevant structures and institutions achieve the desirable outcomes of shareholder 
and stakeholder welfare). It is arguable that corporate governance is only good 
where the processes, expectations and rules maximise the benefits that emanate 
from the range of relationships between the corporation and other interests (the 
range of whom depending on the theoretical construct) (effectiveness). The 
benefits should be greater than the costs of delivery – only then is the corporate 
governance regime efficient. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 It is important to note that this code refers to non-executive directors but clearly includes 
independent ones. 
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To this end, the document identifies and details six principles that should guide 
crafting and evaluation of corporate governance regimes. One of these applies on a 
national (macro) level (and therefore acknowledges the enabling function of 
political institutions) and the others on a firm or micro level. The next sections of 
this paper address these principles in turn and assess the extent to which they 
have been considered to contribute to the achievement of good corporate 
governance and thence maximum corporate performance. However, as a 
cautionary note, although they are discussed separately, there is a considerable 
degree of commonality and cross-relationship.  
 
The first principle (the macro) addresses the design, emphasis and focus of the 
legal and quasi-legal rules that apply to all corporations in a specific jurisdiction. 
  
‘The corporate governance framework should promote 
transparent and efficient markets, be consistent with the 
rule of law and clearly articulate the division of 
responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and 
enforcement authorities’ (OECD, 2004, p.17) 
 
It is important to note that this principle assumes that legal rules have a role to 
play, ranging from setting the ground rules to specific prescriptive expectations of 
behaviour or performance (Maher and Andersson, 1999). A prevailing imperative is 
that they be both clear and market-orientated. However, market failure has been 
identified as a strong argument in favour of policy intervention (Maher and 
Andersson, 1999). Therefore, while advanced economies such as the United States 
and Canada might have relatively light-handed regimes (that enable rather than 
control) others, particularly developing nations, may have far more mandatory or 
proscriptive rules (Harriss et al., 1997).  
  
Does this principle advance firm performance? Because it is at a macro rather than 
a micro-level the framework applies to all companies and therefore it could be 
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argued that the direct link to company performance is lacking. However, what is 
important is the implicit and explicit emphasis on  ‘transparent and efficient’ 
(OECD, 2004, p.17) markets and compliance with the ‘rule of law’. These 
emphases strongly suggest that market distortions such as bribery and corruption 
and other unethical and illegal management practices should be controlled or 
forbidden by the regulators. This in turn has potential implications for companies 
where management or the board takes steps to avoid the possibility of legal action 
or adverse publicity by controls and/or the creation of a compliant corporate 
culture. With fewer resources expended by the board on the proscriptive 
function, it is more likely that social benefit (the macro effect) will be maximised 
and that a broad range of investors will have confidence that their investment is 
safe (micro effect). 
 
In addition, the legal framework sets general rules for behaviour and structure at 
the company level. Obvious examples include the determination of general and 
specific duties for directors (discussed below) and accountability to shareholders 
(also dealt with below). These have implications for the other four principles.  
 
Finally, this principle refers to the division of responsibility between the 
supervisory, regulatory and enforcement bodies. The concept of  ‘separation of 
powers’ is a constitutional concept: the idea that the division of responsibilities 
between the legislative, executive and judicial functions of Government is 
necessary to ensure the legal system is robust and consistent, providing a system 
of checks and balances.  This part of the principle reflects this concept and implies 
that companies and society would benefit from a legal regime that was clear, 
consistent and fairly enforced.  
    
The next two principles are discussed together as they both refer to shareholder 
rights.  
 
“The corporate governance framework should protect and 
facilitate the exercise of shareholders’ rights” (OECD, 
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2004, p. 18). “The corporate governance framework should 
ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders, including 
minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should 
have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for 
violation of their rights.” (OECD, 2004, p. 20) 
 
The first of these two principles addresses the issue of protecting shareholders 
rights, including the right to purchase and sell shares, receive returns on shares, 
information relating to their investment and vote, both in general meeting 
(although this is often limited to certain shareholders) and in meetings on matters 
affecting their shares and rights attached to them. In general meeting, such votes 
include the right to vote for directors, dividend, receipt of the annual report and 
approval of auditor and may include the right to vote on proposals made by the 
board that significantly affect the company – the most obvious example being a 
proposal to put the company into liquidation. The underlying assumption is that 
shareholders do have such rights – and that the regulatory framework protects 
them. Part 2G.2 of the Australian Corporations Act 2001, for example, provides for 
meetings of shareholders and their conduct, a set of provisions reflected in many 
of the equivalent legal regimes such as that of UK (Companies Act 2006, Chapters 3 
and 4) and Delaware Code Title 8 Chapter 1, subchapter VII.  
 
The second of these principles addresses the issues of shareholder rights. It not 
only specifies that shareholders should be equitably treated, regardless of status 
but also that there should be mechanisms in place to permit them to take action 
should their rights (voting etc) be affected. It should be noted that regulation has a 
part to play in creating these rights but that the effect is felt at an individual 
company level. Most important amongst those rights in relation to corporate 
governance is to seek redress should the directors fail to fulfil their duties and 
functions, including their duty to monitor the actions of the CEO and other 
members of the executive. 
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Legislation again provides the basis for such redress (including those of a minority 
member (for example the Australian Corporations Act 2001 ss 232 (right to take 
action where there has been oppressive or unfair conduct) and 236 (the member’s 
right to take a derivative action on behalf of the company). Such provisions are also 
provided, albeit in different forms and with differing impact, in most jurisdictions 
including the UK and Delaware (as the exemplar for the United States).  
 
What is not normally reflected in companies’ legislation is the issue of foreign 
shareholders. This tends to be an issue left to other legislation such as laws relating 
to foreign investment and may differ across jurisdictions. In addition, social 
attitudes, political policy and business culture may deter or encourage foreign 
investment (Kalinova, Palerm and Thomsen, 2010), and the recent debate in New 
Zealand over foreign ownership of land-operating/land-owning entities, such as the 
China Government-backed purchase of 16 large farms on New Zealand’s North 
Island (Cheng, 2012), indicates this to be a sensitive issue. 
 
Do these principles advance company performance? Autore, Kovacs and Sharma 
(2009) examined investment analyst recommendations and concluded that 
stronger shareholder rights are associated with positive recommendations, a 
conclusion that appears to suggest that shareholder rights are an important part of 
corporate governance and company performance. Picou and Rubach (2006) also 
found large contributors of capital responded positively to companies adopting 
corporate governance guidelines. However, Durden and Pech (2006) warn that 
increasing shareholder protection through legislation increases the costs of doing 
business and have a counterproductive effect.  
 
More generally, for Kang and Sorensen (1999) the link between shareholder rights 
and company performance is not direct. They premise that the structure of 
ownership is related to company performance and even more, that the ideal 
structure for any one company depends on the ‘fit’ (Kang and Sorensen, 1999, 
p.140) between the owner types and the industry (also see Cheffins, 2002). In 
some cases and circumstances block ownership is better but not for all, despite the 
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suggestions by Stapledon (1996, p. 240-244) and Davies (1993) that at least some 
of those categories of shareholder are or could be good monitors of management 
performance.  
 
Given that, it is of relevance to refer to the debate surrounding News Corp (an 
Australian media company) and its proposal to move to the state of Delaware (Hill, 
2010). Hill (2010, p.13) explains that the company justified its proposal on the basis 
of legitimate commercial goals, including greater access to capital markets in the 
United States and the chance to enhance shareholder value. However, critics had 
another interpretation. They argued that the underlying reason for this proposal 
was so the controllers of the company could take advantage of the relatively weak 
shareholder protection provided by the Delaware code as compared to the 
Australian legislation, in order to strengthen managerial power at the expense of 
the shareholders.  
 
The broader message from this debate relates to the question as to whether 
shareholder rights need to be strengthened. Hill (2010, p. 46) identifies arguments 
against this idea that have been raised in the American context. Essentially, these 
arguments are to the effect that strengthening shareholder rights (as have been 
mooted by way of a Shareholder Bill of Rights and a SEC rule 14a-11, 39 that 
would permit shareholders to not merely vote on directors but actually nominate 
them (Hill, 2010, p. 10)) would not improve corporate governance and thence 
company performance but actually militate against it by encouraging shareholders 
to “engage in predatory and self-interested behaviour” (Hill, 2010, p.11). 
Therefore, so the argument goes, it is better for company performance to impose 
strict limits and controls on the exercise of shareholder power. 
 
‘The corporate governance framework should recognise 
the rights of stakeholders established by law or through 
mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation 
between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, 
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jobs, and the sustainability of financially sound enterprises’ 
(OECD 2004, p.21). 
 
This principle addresses the broader relationship aspect of companies as social 
actors (a concept reflected in institutional theory more than the traditional agency 
theory). However, and despite the broad wording of the principle, the guidelines 
that accompany this principle refer only to a relatively narrow range of 
stakeholders, these being first, ones whose rights are specified by law (such as 
employees (that may include the right not to be discriminated against, holidays and 
enforcement of employment contracts), creditors (the right to recover against the 
company for debt – normally provided under companies legislation or similar) and 
victims of tort committed by the company or an employee (under principles of 
attribution and vicarious liability).   
 
The second group of stakeholders according to this definition are those who have 
rights against the company created by mutual agreement or contract. Again, this 
group is likely to include employees and creditors but may also include customers, 
clients and sponsorship recipients (as part of the community activities or 
commitment of the socially conscious organisation). 
 
The stated objective of the principle is to encourage stakeholders and the company 
to cooperate in the creation and sustainability of a “financially sound enterprise” (a 
micro effect) along with jobs and wealth (a macro effect). 
 
Does this principle advance company performance? Intuitively and empirically, the 
answer is generally: Yes. In relation to employees as stakeholders, intuitively it 
could be argued that without a confident and loyal workforce the intellectual 
capital of the company is under threat. If morale is low and suspicion high, in-
demand staff members are likely to move to other employers and those who stay 
may indulge in sabotage and other counter-productive activities. This can also have 
a flow-on effect to the product market with negative perceptions as to the quality 
of the company’s products.   
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Appels, van Duin and Hamann (2006) map efforts by a company in Barloworld in 
South Africa to instil a commitment to corporate citizenship in its workforce. 
Although they do not consider the increase in financial wealth of the company, 
they do conclude that the process had a positive effect on organisational culture 
and management processes. Michlitsch (2000) too emphasises the importance of 
high-performing loyal employees in developing long-term relationships with 
customers, an essential part of successful strategy.  
 
As far as creditors are concerned, Stapeldon (1996) suggests that a poorly run 
company looking for capital would likely have to pay a risk premium (a require-
ment that would then send a signal to the market that things were amiss). Kang 
and Sorensen (1999) suggest that large block shareholders should demand the 
company be highly leveraged because that forces managers to be careful to adhere 
to budgetary, cash flow and informational requirements.  
 
Finally, the implications for directors and management alike should the company fail 
(Kulik, 2005; Nwabueze and Mileski, 2006), help ensure that the presence and 
powers of creditors will promote good corporate performance. As an interesting 
aside, D’Aveni (1990) finds that the market prestige and reputation of top 
managers may itself affect organisational failure: if creditors admire and trust 
managers, even though a company may be performing poorly, that are more 
inclined to make allowances and arrangements to permit the company to continue. 
Where such managers have left the company, this has a negative effect on creditor 
patience and support. 
 
‘The corporate governance framework should ensure that 
timely and accurate disclosure is made on all material 
matters regarding the corporation, including the financial 
situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the 
company’ (OECD, 2004, p.22). 
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The purpose of this fifth principle is transparency and completeness of information. 
In some jurisdictions, legally mandated disclosure requirements on financial 
position and performance (most rigorous for listed companies) extend also to 
information on charitable donations and directors and/or management 
remuneration (for example, Companies Act 2006 (UK) ss 412 and 413 and 
Australian Corporations Act 2001 s300A). The argument is that by reducing 
informational asymmetry, well-designed and adequate levels and forms of 
disclosure permits shareholders, investors and the market generally to make both 
quantitative (financial performance and position) and qualitative (to do with 
management and director qualifications and performance) judgments about the 
advisability of investment, overall financial well-being of the company and ethical 
and social responsibility (Bartholemeusz, 2002).   
 
Does this principle advance corporate governance? There is some criticism of 
present requirements on several grounds.  First are those who argue that increases 
in the rules and expectations placed upon management, including increased levels 
of disclosure (Durden & Pech, 2006), reduce the effectiveness of managers and 
therefore, by analogy, the performance of the companies they manage. Other 
criticisms are directed at mandatory standards and measurements for financial 
reporting that, because they are at odds with financial reality, are of little or no use 
to investors or managers (Anderson, Herring and Pawlicki, 2005; Rayman, 2007). 
The other main set of criticisms relate to the growing emphasis on triple bottom 
line and balanced scorecard, the “other” aspects of a company’s performance that 
are claimed by some as of equal or more importance to the markets than are 
financial indicators (these other including social and environmental policies and 
strategies) (Gelb and Strawser, 2001).  
 
‘The corporate governance framework should ensure the 
strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring 
of management by the board, and the board’s accountability 
to the company and the shareholders’ (OECD, 2004, p.24). 
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This sixth principle is arguably the one that has attracted the most attention in the 
governance literature, to the effect that one might be forgiven for thinking that it IS 
corporate governance. The basic purpose of this principle is to ensure that the 
rights of the relatively weak owners or shareholders are looked after by the board 
in its joint role as monitor and employer of the CEO. It is also important to note, 
however, that the board occupies something of a hybrid position: not only as the 
safeguard for the interests of the owners (director primacy; Bainbridge, 2008)) but 
also as fiduciaries having direct responsibilities and accountability to shareholders 
(but see Alces, 2008 for a critique of this assumption). Therefore, the legal 
framework commonly identifies duties directors must observe when making 
decisions on strategy and direction of the company. Briefly, such duties include a 
duty to act for a proper purpose, a duty to act in good faith and a duty of care and 
diligence as well as specific duties in particular situations or contexts such as a duty 
not to misuse position or information, a duty not to allow the company to trade 
while insolvent and a duty to avoid conflicts of interest. Such duties have been 
codified in the Australian Corporations Act 2010 under Chapter 2D and the UK Act 
under chapters 2-3 but most (the general ones) are based on a long history of case 
law, an approach that is maintained in Delaware.  
 
Does this principle advance company performance? Research on the link between 
board monitoring of CEO and company performance and the link between the 
make-up of boards and company performance do not produce consistent results 
with Fama and Jensen (1983) (yes if independent); Baysinger and Butler (1985) (yes 
if independent); Coles and Hesterley (2000) (yes if independent); Beasley (1996) 
(yes if independent); Petra (2005) (maybe); Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) (no); 
Ghosh and Sirmans 2005 (no). Overall, the conclusion seems to be that the extent 
to which adherence to this principle advances the performance of the firm depends 
on more than just structural or “tick the boxes” style compliance – instead it is 
important that the structure is a good fit with the industry and corporate culture 
(Borokhovich, Parrino and Trapani, 1996). 
 
 
 
Jens Mueller “Movements in the Long White Cloud of Governance”  Page 36 	  
Finally and in conclusion, does corporate governance, in accordance with the 
principles outlined above, improve the performance of companies? Korac-
Kakabadse, Andrew and Kouzmin (2001) do not think the structures are too 
narrowly defined. Maher and Andersson (1999) warn that taking a single model of 
governance and applying it to all companies in all cultural contexts is unlikely to 
achieve desired results – a point supported by the growing number of researchers 
looking at the issues associated with comparative governance systems (e.g. 
Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Li and Harrison, 2007). Instead they suggest that the 
effectiveness of different corporate governance systems is influenced by differences 
in countries’ legal and regulatory frameworks and historical and cultural factors, in 
addition to the structure of product and factor markets.   
 
From there it can be argued that while corporate governance might be designed on 
an international (or more accurately an Anglo-American) framework, it is of no use 
unless it works (Erturk, Froud, Johal and Williams 2004) – within the institutional 
and cultural framework. This is of importance not only to nationally based 
companies but to TNCs that look to expand into other jurisdictions (Kiel, Hendry 
and Nicholson, 2006; Yui and Makino, 2002).  
  
So how are these guidelines and overseas ‘best practices’ reflected in the New 
Zealand governance framework? Generally speaking, the present framework for 
corporate governance is in line with those operating in other similar economies: a 
combination of statute, codes (quasi-law) and common law principles. The 
Companies Act 1993 provides for shareholders’ rights (ss 120-125 reflecting 
Principle Two (OECD, 2004), protection of dissenting shareholders (Principle 
Three, reflected in such provisions as s110 (buyout for minority shareholders), 165 
(right to take a derivative action), 169 (right to take a personal action) and 175 and 
176 (the rights of an affected shareholder to take action over prejudicial conduct)), 
disclosure (Principle Five as reflected in, for example, s211 of the Companies Act 
and many provisions of such other Acts as the Financial Reporting Act 1993, the 
Securities Markets Act 1988 (as amended) which applies to companies listed on 
the NZX and the Takeovers Act 1993) and, finally, Directors’ fiduciary 
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responsibilities to shareholders (Principle Six as reflected in the Companies Act 
ss131-138). 
 
Common law principles mean that a company can be liable for contracts entered 
into on its behalf by directors or employees (such as in Hely-Hutchinson v 
Brayhead Ltd [1968] 1 QB 549 and Story v Advance Bank Australia Ltd(1993) 11 
ACLC 629), and be liable for crimes and torts committed by a director or 
employee by way of vicarious liability and attribution (see, for example HL Bolton 
(Engineering) Co Ltd v TJ Graham and Sons Ltd [1957] 1 QB 159 and Meridian 
Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [1995] 3 NZLR 7). In 
the present context the application of such principles strongly suggests that 
governance structures be put in place to safeguard the company and its members 
from the damaging financial and reputational impacts such liability may have.   
 
However, it is the quasi-law aspect of the framework that is most important as it is 
this aspect that draws most closely from the UK, US and OECD principles, and 
that is found in the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) listing requirements and 
in a Handbook on Corporate Governance in New Zealand, Principles and 
Guidelines (New Zealand Securities Commission, 2004) that was based on a 
Report by the New Zealand Securities Commission (now the Financial Markets 
Authority) in 2004 (New Zealand Securities Commission 2004a).  
 
The Report of the Commission was an attempt to address the particular needs of 
New Zealand in relation to corporate governance. Briefly, the principles and 
guidelines included in the Handbook (Securities Commission 2004) are as follows. 
They are briefly described and related to the equivalent OECD principle(s) 
(discussed above). To avoid confusion, the principles set out in the Handbook have 
the letters NZSC attached.  
 
NZSC Principle One: ‘Ethical Standards. The board of each entity should adopt a 
written code of ethics that affects not only the members of the board but also the 
entity as a whole’ (New Zealand Securities Commission, 2004, p.7) and NZSC 
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Principle Nine: “Stakeholder Interests,. The board should respect the interests of 
stakeholders in the context of the entity’s ownership type and its fundamental 
purpose” (New Zealand Securities Commission, 2004, p.24). These related 
principles arguably reflect the OECD (2004) Principle One (which emphasises the 
need for legal compliance and transparent markets - note in particular the guideline 
to this NZSC principle that states that the code should deal with issues of the 
“giving or receiving gifts, facilitation payments and bribes” (New Zealand Securities 
Commission, 2004, p.7)) and Principle Four (that addresses stakeholder rights).  
 
The guidelines to NZSC Principle One refer explicitly to “customers, clients, 
employees, suppliers [and] competitors” (New Zealand Securities Commission, 
2004, p. 7) when describing stakeholders who should be treated fairly, while the 
NZSC Principle Nine describes “employees, customers, creditors, suppliers [and] 
the community” [whose interests should be considered by reference to] “legal 
obligations and relevant social, ethical and environmental factors” (New Zealand 
Securities Commission, 2004, p. 24). Overall, it is reasonable to assume that the 
Commission expects entities to consider the role and position of a range of 
stakeholders when making decisions.  
 
NZSC Principle Two: “Board Composition and Performance. There should be a 
balance of independence, skills, knowledge, experience, and perspectives among 
directors so that the board works effectively”. (New Zealand Securities 
Commission, 2004, p.9). This is a reflection of the expectations implied in the 
OECD (2004) Principle Six (that the board should give strategic guidance, be 
capable of monitoring management and be accountable to shareholders) because, 
as discussed elsewhere at some length, such functions cannot be satisfactorily 
fulfilled if the board is not capable, independent or answerable. In addition, clarity 
of information is essential for affirming managerial trust. Often reports can be too 
technical and the language used obfuscates the content of the report. This principle 
tries to eliminate this hindrance to communication.  
 
 
 
Jens Mueller “Movements in the Long White Cloud of Governance”  Page 39 	  
 It is important to note that this NZSC principle refers to both ‘non-executive’ and 
‘independent’ directors (New Zealand Securities Commission, 2004, p.11), defining 
a non-executive as independent only where “he or she does not represent a 
substantial shareholder and where the board is satisfied that he or she has no 
other direct or indirect interest or relationship that could reasonably influence 
their judgment and decision making as a director” (New Zealand Securities 
Commission, 2004, p.11). For many theorists and writers in the field of corporate 
governance, and for policymakers, significant independence in members of the 
board is a critical measure of good governance (see also the discussion in  
Chapter 3).  
 
The next series of principles included in the Handbook can all be considered 
reflections of the OECD Principle Six as they all provide explicit guidance and 
direction for boards in the conduct of meetings and decision making. The specific 
principles are as follows. NZSC Principle Three: “Board Committees. The board 
should use committees where this would enhance its effectiveness in key areas 
while retaining board responsibility” (New Zealand Securities Commission, 2004, 
p.13). As the Securities Commission says, “committees can significantly enhance 
the effectiveness of the board through closer scrutiny of issues and more efficient 
decision making in key areas” (New Zealand Securities Commission, 2004, p.13). 
NZSC Principle Four: “Reporting and Disclosure. The board should demand 
integrity both in financial reporting and in the timeliness and balance of disclosures 
on entity affairs” (New Zealand Securities Commission, 2004, p.15), makes it clear 
that financial information is fundamental to accurate and timely decisions for the 
board and also arguably enhances shareholder rights, the implicit theme in Principle 
Two (OECD, 2004) and is further endorsed by NZSC Principle Seven: “Auditors. 
The board should ensure the quality and independence of the external audit 
process” (New Zealand Securities Commission, 2004, p.20).  
 
The fifth NZSC Principle deals with payment for directors and management: 
“Remuneration: the remuneration of directors and executives should be 
transparent, fair and reasonable” (New Zealand Securities Commission, 2004, 
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p.17). This principle follows from the underlying assumption that the people that 
control a firm will have a tendency to act according to their individual interests. 
Thus, these actions need to be tempered by incentives to maintain the firm’s high 
performance within the parameters of what is desired by owners and shareholders.  
The sixth NZSC Principle warns boards of the need for on-going control 
processes to manage risk: “Risk Management. The board should regularly verify 
that the entity has appropriate processes that identify and manage potential and 
relevant risks” (New Zealand Securities Commission, 2004, p.19).  
 
Finally, NZSC Principle Eight (New Zealand Securities Commission, 2004, p.22) 
explicitly addresses the issue of shareholder rights (the tenor of the OECD (2004) 
Principles Two and Three) thus: “Shareholder Relations. The board should foster 
constructive relationships with shareholders that encourage them to engage with 
the entity”. Interestingly, the narrative that accompanies this principle seeks to 
encourage entities to be proactive rather than passive in this context – actively 
encouraging participation in meetings and increasing awareness through making 
information on the entity easily and widely accessible.  
 
The connection between NZX standards and SME governance activities is that 
NZX standards are publicized as being the “New Zealand” standard of governance 
and are thus understood to represent a somewhat more amplified group of 
companies than the mere 200 listed firms in NZ. This affects New Zealand firms 
interested in exporting, through the NZ Trade and Enterprise system or on their 
own, as they will be pushed to perform to those NZX levels of governance 
performance to not appear deficient in their quality of corporate governance. NZ 
being an export country opens new markets through free trade agreements and 
other government-supported activities and holds itself out to be quality trading 
partner, with good governance clearly being one of the factors a firm would 
advance to impress a foreign buyer or seller. 
 
Devlin (2004) argues that there is little in the report (and therefore the handbook) 
that is tailored uniquely for the local context and leaves largely unaddressed the 
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need to develop relevant best practice standards for corporate governance. 
Amongst his concerns is that the Commission rules typically only affect the larger 
and listed firms in New Zealand directly, and provide only guidance for smaller or 
privately-held entities. This limitation is implicitly recognised in the handbook 
(Securities Commission 2004) where the Commission emphasises that while by 
virtue of requirements laid down by the NZX, listed companies are likely to be 
already addressing all the issues laid down by the Principles, it would ‘expect’ (but 
not be able to require) (New Zealand Securities Commission, 2004, p.4) entities 
that are accountable to the New Zealand public - including public issuers 
(companies and other entities that issue securities to the public but are not 
necessarily listed on the NZX (Securities Markets Act 1978 s2(1)), state-owned 
enterprises and community trusts - to observe relevant Principles and all entities 
to work towards their implementation.  
 
It also acknowledges the limitation for New Zealand firms that arises from the lack 
of a ‘market place’ for independent directors – a place where firms can easily 
identify talents that will satisfy their needs. It should be noted that this shortcoming 
has been addressed in part outside the context of quasi or real law. Indicatively, 
the www.finddirectors.com net-based independent director self-listing service 
(developed after the first year’s data of this current research) identified the need 
for a director marketplace by way of the fact that nearly immediately on launch of 
the webpage, more than 300 prospective independent directors registered their 
contact details. Other similar listing services exist with the Auckland Chamber of 
Commerce, limited to Auckland-based candidates, the Ministry for Women Affairs, 
limited to women candidates, the Institute of Directors, limited to IOD members, 
and the Crown Ownership Monitoring Unit (COMU).   
 
Given the framework for Corporate Governance that applies in New Zealand, it is 
now appropriate to examine the governance issues that face SMEs, most 
particularly those in New Zealand. These are discussed below. It should be noted 
that there is little in the international refereed literature that specifically addresses 
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the issues facing New Zealand SMEs; hence references are made from time to time 
to discussion in other publications.  
 
 
2.3   SMEs in New Zealand and in Governance Literature 
 
Generally speaking, SMEs remain underrepresented in research into corporate 
governance. This is startling considering that research indicates that they 
contribute significantly to the economy, GNP and national employment 
opportunities (Beckhard and Dyer Jr., 1983; Shanker and Astrachan, 1996). 
Furthermore, family owned and/or operated firms dominate the business sector in 
most major countries (Klein, 2000; Heck, 2001) and two-thirds of all firms globally 
are thought to be family owned and/or operated (Gersick, Davis, Hampton and 
Lansberg, 1997).  Most of those are SMEs.  
 
This dearth of research may be explicable in various ways, including access to 
relevant data, resistance on the part of those involved and inconsistency of 
management practice.Whatever the reason, while the focus on large firms has 
raised the public profile of good governance practices generally and has usefully 
highlighted the many failures, it crucially has not yet induced many smaller firms 
(where most of the corporate wealth of New Zealand is concentrated), to 
improve their approaches to governance.  
 
Furthermore, particularly in their infancy, small and medium sized businesses in 
New Zealand often do not distinguish between management and governance. As 
the business flourishes and grows, multiple owners may gain more control over 
the business as their shares in the company increase. It is only once the business 
has matured that formal governance structures such as the implementation of a 
board of directors is typically established (Devlin, 2004). Thus, the principles we 
obtain from overseas, such as those in the combined code, may have little 
relevance to New Zealand SMEs until the firms are well established. This may take 
many years. Moreover, many businesses never achieve the size that renders viable 
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such governance structures such as those set out above (Devlin, 2004). Thus, 
Devlin writes, we have a strong need for a framework for what he terms an 
‘emerging’ governance framework in New Zealand (Devlin, 2004, p.22).  
 
In addition, as a multi-cultural country we need to take into account the 
differences inherent in between Pakeha (European NZ-origin), Maori (indigenous) 
owned and/or operated firms.and those owned and/or operated by those from 
other ethnic groups represented in New Zealand society (such as European and 
Asian). It is argued, for example, that Maori approaches to governance tend to be 
different to the usual Western approach. Maori academic at Victoria University, 
Ralph Love, claims that New Zealand firms under Maori management tend to have 
a longer-term focus, be more engaged with and committed to the community, and 
employ higher levels of caution and consultation than do those under non-Maori 
management. Furthermore, Maori governance tends to involve greater interaction 
with employees and clients than does governance in non-Maori firms (Love, as 
cited in Devlin, 2004). Love comments, “The fundamental difference between a 
Maori firm and a ‘random’ [presumably non-Maori] business is that Maori ones 
then to have a long-term strategy and a particular ability to innovate ... Maori 
business people are able to think ‘outside the box’ [and] Maori businesses are not 
constrained by a permanent drive to maximise assets” (Love, as cited in Devlin, 
2004, p. 22).  In addition, Devlin notes that, in most Maori firms, family needs, 
potential environmental impact and sustainability issues take priority over 
shareholder value.  
 
Therefore, a set of best practice standards for corporate governance in New 
Zealand should reflect multicultural approaches to business governance that 
address the needs of all firms, including those that are family-owned. It would be a 
mistake to impose governance practices formulated within one culture upon a 
culture with supported practices of their own (Erturk, Froud, Johal and Williams 
2004), even if the normative preference would be to create singular and uniformly 
applicable governance standard nationwide and globally. Rather, best practice 
principles could be formulated to incorporate Maori business strategy (if it can be 
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shown that it does indeed provide for a better sustainability outcome in 
governance) and governance practices as well as Western ones (assuming they are 
compatible). To justify and validate such an approach, however, there is a need for 
research into governance and managerial principles observed by Maori boards. As 
Devlin (2004, p.22) summarises: “If these claims are true, then governance and 
management according to "Tikanga Maori" could herald a new dawn for the 
teaching and practice of governance both within and beyond New Zealand”.  
Similarly, if superior aspects of governance practices existed amongst the norms of 
of other cultures well represented now in NZ, then the best of these could be 
extracted to help formulate a new set of best practices governance principles 
suited to New Zealand’s SMEs, regardless of the narrowness or breadth of cultural 
diversity influencing these firms.   
 
In conclusion, New Zealand seems ill-suited to the current “one-size-fits-all” 
approach that resulted from favouring corporate governance practices from 
Western countries like the USA. In New Zealand a much larger share of firms are 
“enterprises” than in larger industrialised countries such as the UK or the US. 
Thus, governance practices should now be revised to ensure they are appropriate 
and effective (i.e. applicable, realistic and user-friendly) here.  This research thus 
focuses on governance findings in the New Zealand environment, with a heavy 
emphasis on small enterprises.  
 
Furthermore, the emphasis in classic governance literature on the importance of 
separation between management and the board and between management and 
ownership is problematic. As stated above, many SMEs in New Zealand are family 
owned and/or operated. Family ties, friendship and firm loyalty naturally feature in 
their governance relationship, but while they are overlooked in evaluation of 
governance, their presence should reduce the divergence between the conflicting 
interests of the manager(s) and those of the owner(s).   
 
That said, these arguments should not be misconstrued as an endorsement for 
reduced governance in these SMEs.  This research shows that considerable interest 
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(and need) in formalised board structures exists in small and young firms.  Given 
this, it is imperative that the same challenge previously identified by Devlin (2004, 
p. 22) is addressed:  “It is only when a company matures and stabilises that a board 
of directors is practical”.    
 
The all-important and more overarching question then is: what shape should a 
New Zealand model for governance take and what factors should shape it? This 
question demands a consideration of alternative ways of looking at issues of 
accountability and monitoring in the context of corporate governance. This 
discussion is the focus of the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3: MAIN THEORIES OF GOVERNANCE 
 
As a reminder, ‘agency theory’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Ghosal 2005; Kang and Sorensen, 1999; Lockhart, 2007), together with other 
contractually based theories such as transaction cost economics (Fiss 2008), has 
for many decades come to dominate Governance literature, particularly in relation 
to the Anglo-American model of corporations and their management structures 
(Bainbridge, 2008; Daily, Dalton and Canella 2003).  
 
Consequently, the overwhelming majority of outputs on governance research is 
based upon the main tenets of agency theory and its predecessor, managerial 
capitalism (see, for example, sources cited and points made in Eisenhardt, 1989a) 
with analysis of agency problems and their solution premised on the large Anglo-
American corporation model. This includes New Zealand, a Commonwealth 
country with many of its corporate legislation adopted from the UK, Canada and 
the United States, the prevailing basis on which governance is judged for its 
effectiveness. However, this is not the only form, nor is agency theory universally 
deemed the only option for dealing with those issues. This part of the chapter 
contrasts agency theory with the main alternative theories that rely on two basic 
assumptions: that the firm or company has a much broader social function, and the 
principal expectation for directors is that they use their talents and skills to 
maximise firm performance. It is those two assumptions that should shape 
corporate governance structures. Stewardship theory is one such theory, but 
attention will be paid to others (including stakeholder and institutional theory) as 
the grounding for structures, rules and guidelines for corporate governance 
 
To properly contextualise the discussion in the next chapter dealing with the 
position and responsibilities of directors, this the chapter explores the issues 
associated with traditional governance theories, particularly agency theory. Section 
3.3.1 provides a legal and theoretical grounding for the theory and its etymology, 
and its history and prominence in the field of corporate governance. A second 
section critiques some of the major mechanisms that are used to minimise agency 
costs and maximise alignment between principal and agent (in this context, 
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normally the CEO) objectives in the context of the large corporation. In this 
section, and given the focus in other parts of this work on the issues around 
governance of SMEs in New Zealand, questions are put as to the applicability of 
traditionally formulated governance theory to organisations classified as such. The 
third section introduces some of the key criticisms made against agency theory, 
and alternative models advanced for effective corporate governance. The fourth 
section expands further on one such model, institutional theory, as a contra to 
agency theory. The final section examines the extent to which corporate 
governance contributes to the performance of a business entity.  
 
 
3.1 Agency Theory as a Grounding for Governance 
 
3.1.1 Agency Theory: Its Legal and Theoretical Basis 
 
The term “agency” emerges from law, where it is used to refer to any situation 
where one person (the Principal) appoints or otherwise has another person (the 
Agent) acting on his or her behalf. The agent cannot do more than the Principal, as 
his or her legal capacity is bounded by that of the Principal. The Agent’s capacity 
will usually be further restricted by the terms under which the Agent is authorised 
to act. There are other controls also, e.g. because the Agent almost always will 
have access to monies or valuable information belonging to the Principal, he or she 
occupies a fiduciary position: A position that carries a range of duties, including the 
duty to place the interests of the principal before those of the agent, (b) to 
account or disclose to the Principal movements of those funds, (c) a duty to avoid 
conflict of interest, (d) a duty to use expertise for the benefit of the Principal, and 
(e) a duty to be diligent.  
 
As Eisenhardt (1989) explains, agents bearing such duties emerge in a range of 
social and contractual contexts, including land (land agents), insurance (insurance 
agents), goods (mercantile agents), partnerships (all partners are agents for their 
fellow partners) and contracts of service (employees) (also see Kang and Sorensen, 
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1999).  It is particularly in the context of companies and some other organisations 
where agency has become a prominent and, for some, the only available 
framework for assessing and measuring the resilience of structures for governance.   
 
In the case of companies, the relationship between manager and owner is a classic 
example of agency (Campbell, 1995; Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Therefore the 
theory implies that the relationship between the “principal” (owner) and the CEO 
(agent) must involve control over the behaviour and decisions of the “agent” 
(normally through the medium of the Board of Directors). The theory is also 
applicable to the relationship between the directors and the shareholders. On first 
glance this seems both logical and a good fit – after all, separation of ownership 
and control has and remains the standard shape of many organisations in both the 
commercial private sphere and, in some cases, the public sector.  
 
The underlying justification for agency theory in the context of corporate 
govenance (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen, 1983; Spence and Zeckhauser, 1971; 
Ross, 1973) is that if managers have a significant level of control over a firm, and 
are unrestricted by market forces or internal governance mechanisms, they will 
tend to promote their own interests rather than those of the equity holders 
whenever the interests of the firm’s equity holders and the managers diverge (Tosi, 
2008).  This conflict of interest may undermine the effectiveness of management 
for the enterprise. In cases such as in Enron’s demise, agency theory has helped to 
identify which moral obligations were violated and contributed to the downfall of 
such firms, and the misuse of company funds by managers is a good example of 
violations of the moral code that binds business owners and managers. In this light, 
agency theory has been useful as a framework for the relationship and obligations 
between owners and managers. 
 
Support for this position originally comes from Berle and Means (1932) who were 
influential (particularly in view of their timing - shortly after the Wall Street crash 
of 1939 and in the midst of the financial and social struggles that followed) in their 
exposition of the modern company and its growth. They traced the emergence of 
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the large company with diffuse shareholding to the beginning of the European 
industrial revolution in the late eighteenth century as a consequence of the fact 
that, for the first time, it was no longer possible for an individual, rich though they 
might be, to provide the resources necessary to maximise investment in the new 
technology. Instead, the money had to come from somewhere else - often those 
with money but lacking the technological know-how, business expertise, desire or 
enthusiasm to be directly involved (Kang and Sorensen, 1999). However, the very 
indifference of such investors had the potential to cause problems because, as 
Adam Smith had put it earlier (1776, p. 31):  
 
`The greater part of these proprietors seldom pretend[ed] to 
understand any thing of the business of the company; ... giv[ing] 
themselves no trouble about it, ... receiv[ing] contentedly such half 
yearly or yearly dividend, as the directors think proper to make to 
them‘.  
 
Although such an arrangement set up a nexus of interest – profit, it also raised a 
critical issue:  how investors could rely on the management to look after their 
interests instead of merely maximising their own. The answer was essentially that, 
in the absence of incentives and monitoring, they were forced to rely on goodwill, 
trust or confidence, and scarce resources, as such phenomena as the South Sea 
Bubble and much later the Great Depression of the 1930s were to attest (also see 
Holderness, 2003).  
 
From the creation of the first statutory framework for companies, there was 
evident concern as to how activities of management could be policed (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2003).  Consequently, as pointed out previously, legislation has 
recognised and attempted to address the split between the powers of the board of 
Directors and those of the shareholders in the General Meeting (SGM). Legislation 
has also sought to ensure that certain powers of the Directors could not be 
performed without approval of the shareholders, and that shareholders must be 
given access to important information. This has continued into the modern era and 
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applies even to small organisations. It is likely that it is exactly these powers 
granted to directors that contribute to the hesitancy of shareholders in SMEs to 
appoint independent directors, fearing an abuse of authority. However, history also 
demonstrates that merely providing a means for the SGM to balance the powers of 
the Board is not necessarily adequate in terms of ensuring that the interests of 
management and ownership are aligned. The pattern of management as business 
organisations grew in size was the delegation by the Board of day-to-day decisions 
and implementation of strategy to executive managers – most prominently the 
CEO. The further diffusion of shareholding in many of these larger corporations 
has emphasised the important role of the Board as the monitors of the CEO 
(employed by the Board), on behalf of the shareholders, yet financial scandals and 
notorious collapses have exposed the failures of some of these boards to carry out 
such monitoring or ignore the messages emerging from such monitoring. 
Ultimately then, is there some means of providing confidence to relatively 
powerless and ignorant shareholders that they need not watch with dismay as their 
investments suffer while CEOs and/or directors fiddle – or worse, float off under a 
golden parachute leaving the shareholders to crash and burn? 
 
Further complicating the situation is the fact that "a corporation cannot laugh or 
cry; it cannot enjoy the world or suffer with it.  Most of all a corporation cannot 
love" (Loy, 2001) – it is a fiction, enabled and shaped by law to permit a wide range 
of commercial activities impractical or impossible for more restricted 
organisational forms.  As it cannot make its own decisions or institute its own 
processes, its actions are totally reliant on human intervention.  
 
Economics found the answer, again drawing on the contractual principles 
underpinning agency: rather than a firm or company being an active player or 
participant in its own right (involving treatment of its internal processes as a “black 
box” (Campbell, 1997, p. 357; Chhotray and Stoker, 2009, p. 60), the modern 
corporation (or firm) is merely an efficient creation (Coase, 1937;  1960) that 
brings into “equilibrium” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, p.9), through a series of 
implied contracts, a range of individuals with a variety of objectives, expertise, 
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business knowledge and attitudes to risk taking (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Letza, 
Kirkbride, Sun and Smallman, 2008; Bainbridge, 2008). This not only allows 
consideration of the contracts that fall within the legal entity that is the company 
but also those between the company and other players (Campbell, 1997). This 
research then is concerned with how these various players, specifically directors, 
shareholders and management, are held together through a mutually negotiated 
mechanism of tangible rules and intangible emotions, relationships and 
commitments. 
   
Agency theory (its application to companies credited originally to Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Blair, 1995) is thus used to describe and evaluate the mechanisms 
applied in companies, particularly large and listed ones, to ensure that the 
members of the Board of Directors and senior management (most particularly the 
CEO) apply their expertise, judgment and business savvy to maximise the benefit 
for the owners or shareholders rather than for their own. It is notable that in New 
Zealand, contrary to the United States, no “business judgment rule” exists (with 
the exception of being applied to the duty of care but outside specific legislation to 
govern its application), i.e. whether directors make savvy or non-savvy decisions 
with a genuine intent to perform well, is irrelevant. Directors are held to a rigid 
standard and will be liable where  ‘trading while  insolvent’ and to disclosure rules 
more sourced from fair standards in advertising than the realities of a business 
environment. This research shows however that not only these legalistic rules 
govern the behaviour of directors; indeed, things have moved far past this point. 
The theory has been and, at times still is, of significant importance in grounding a 
normative structure not only for business corporations (Rossouw, 2009) but also 
for reform of public and even certain non-profit sectors (Wallis, 1997: Hazeldine 
and Quiggan, 2005; Bale and Dale, 1998; O’Neill, MacIntosh and Hall, 2006).   
 
Briefly, and very much a product of its economic parentage, agency theory requires 
certain assumptions to be made (albeit overlapping ones, Eisenhardt, 1989). One is 
rationality:  All other things being equal, any person will make a decision that 
maximises his or her return on investments like time or money. The second such 
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assumption is that everyone is motivated by self-interest (although it does not 
necessarily mean they make decisions with selfishness or guile; McCure and Prier, 
2008, p. 47). Consequently (and again assuming all other things are equal and no 
economic distortions are imposed), a person will work to benefit him or herself 
the most. Thirdly, because interests of principal and agent diverge, there must be 
conflict between those interests and thus a process to resolve those frictions. 
Fourthly, a person who is overly focused on their own benefit will have an aversion 
to risk. Fifthly,	  the theory assumes that shareholders are imperfectly informed as 
to the work of management. Because it is impossible for shareholders to 
personally observe all actions, they must incur the costs involved in ensuring the 
manager neither shirks his or her responsibilities or acts in his own self-interest. 
These costs are most often associated with monitoring, bonding, and the design of 
managerial incentive contracts (Brockman, Brooks and Long, 2011). Finally, on the 
collective level a “univocal” (Letza, Kirkbride, Sun and Smallman, 2008, p. 23) 
interest for shareholder/owners is assumed, meaning that any individual differences 
or contextual diversities are ignored.  
 
 
3.1.2 Agency Theory: The Research 
 
A veritable torrent of publications has been produced on the effectiveness (or not) 
of various monitoring and market mechanisms within the framework of agency 
theory. What follows is a discussion of a selection of these pieces and what they 
reveal regarding the importance of agency to corporate governance. The place to 
start is Eisenhardt’s (1989) comprehensive review into the theory and the 
approaches/contexts in which it has been studied. The first important point she 
makes is that there are two approaches to the theory – the first being that of the 
positivists who focus on the role of the theory in management of large corporates 
(Berle and Means, 1932; Eisenhardt, 1989, pp. 59 - 60). The second approach 
involves a focus on the principal-agent relationship in a wide range of contexts. 
Eisenhardt considers the two approaches complementary rather than as 
alternatives.  
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The reason for Eisenhardt’s view comes from another fundamental aspect of 
agency theory, i.e. the fact that an agent must be appointed by a principal to act on 
his or her behalf or be recognised by law as having that role. Agency theory 
assumes a series of contracts, either express or implied, that determine how the 
parties are to act and why (particularly in respect to outputs). Eisenhardt (1989) 
explains that while positivist researchers identify various contract alternatives that 
might be used, principal-agent ones focus on their relative efficiency under different 
conditions. This series of contract relationships may not be well understood by 
directors and thus could lead to conflicts. Directors may believe that they serve 
under rules established by thelaw, and not as per the directives of shareholders. In 
addition, it is also inherently inconsistent that nominee directors take directions 
from their ‘principal’ shareholders while they are supposed to act on behalf of all 
shareholders of the business. 
 
As mentioned above, the positivist approach reigns supreme in the context of 
corporate Governance. For this reason, the survey of studies and critiques will be 
limited to those utilising such an approach.  The exploration that follows discusses 
the studies in reference to the fundamental premises on which the positivist 
approach relies.  To make it complete, the criticisms raised regarding their validity 
and other issues are highlighted. 
 
First, it is assumed that there are three types of costs implicit in an agency 
situation, namely (a) monitoring costs (incurred by or on behalf of the Principal), 
(b) the agent (bonding – expenditure on resources to ensure that what he or she 
does accords with the wishes and benefit of the Principal) and (c) residual costs 
(the remaining dollar cost of divergence between principal and agent objectives 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976)). Therefore, for the principal and agent to maximise 
the efficiencies involved in their relationship, and efficiently reduce agent 
opportunism and conflict (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), an effective mix of control 
and incentives must be present. The ideal mix depends on factors such as the 
environment (e.g. government policy, market forces and/or prospects) and the 
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structure of the organisation (including the structure and nature of ownership, and 
the make-up and size of the board and the characteristics of management.). In this 
context it is noteworthy that the New Zealand environment of predominantly 
small firms and the informal structure of many SMEs may not be adequately 
explained through this agency theory. 
 
Insofar as the cost of monitoring is concerned, the research tends to focus on 
three main aspects: one, the monitoring mechanisms themselves (and that can be 
employed to minimise the costs involved - effectively to maximise the efficiencies 
of the process) and two the problems associated with the implementation of the 
process. The third goes more to the root of the theory - criticisms have been 
largely directed at the economic assumptions that underlie it. The most important 
of these are (a) the premises on which it relies are too narrow, (b) the theory 
neglects the salient non-economic influences on management decisions and actions 
(Mason, Kirkbride and Bryde 2006; Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Davis, Schoorman 
and Donaldson 1997), (c) it implicitly assumes the manager is untrustworthy and 
therefore must be controlled (Mason, Kirkbride and Bryde 2006; Campbell 1997), 
(d) the focus on overall shareholder value ignores the reality of a highly complex 
corporate picture of investment (Smallman, 2007) and (e), for stakeholder 
theorists, it denies the important role corporations play in the wider social and 
economic settings (Donaldson and Preston, 1995).  It also does not offer any 
explanation how the element of sustainability of a firm is covered through the 
agency costing mechanism. 
 
 
 3.1.3. The Monitoring Mechanism 
 
By way of introduction, monitoring mechanisms as described as an inherent part of 
the agency model can be divided into external (provided through the markets for 
capital and control in which investors and finance professionals have a role to play 
and regulators) and internal mechanisms (financial and internal monitoring 
procedures, normally via the Board). It should be emphasised that these two 
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categories are cross-influential as well: Internal mechanisms are highly likely to 
affect the markets for capital and control for the company and employment 
prospects for members of management, while external monitoring mechanisms 
(such as forced disclosures and limits on decision making by CEOs) may well 
eventuate from perceived shortcomings in internal systems.  
 
External Monitoring 
 
The markets for capital and control are seen by theorists (Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Smallman, 2007) as being the most efficient external means of monitoring the 
internal management of a company because, they argue, the status and reputation 
of the executive, both in the present company and on the wider employment 
market, is sensitive to the wider market and therefore they would make decisions 
that would enhance that reputation or their position. This raises issues in New 
Zealand, where the public market is small with about 200 firms listed on the New 
Zealand stock exchange. The market required to ‘monitor’ company performance, 
its governance and quality of directors is thus so small that the vast majority of 
business activity in new Zealand will not be captured by any rule-making that 
originates in the public share market. 
 
Question: Does such an approach only work where such a “wider market” exists? 
In New Zealand, in many industries a few large and dominant corporate players 
rub shoulders with myriad small enterprises in a fragmented market environment.  
If such a wider market does not exist, therefore its power to hold executives 
accountable is also absent. The question that arises then is: By what standards are 
executives/directors of New Zealand SMEs held to account?  
 
Takeovers are the main means for obtaining control and serve as the only effective 
market mechanism to demonstrate to incumbent directors that their firm could do 
better in the hands of more competent leaders.  For example, the results obtained 
by Franks and Mayer in two studies (1985 and 1986) suggest that unsuccessful 
hostile takeover bids produced management dismissals, and this was explicable 
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from the point of view of the board either as a reaction to failure of previous bids 
or because of connections between management and the bidder or because of a 
realization that external parties value the company higher under theirn own 
management. Takeovers are the last frontier of holding management and directors 
accountable to perform at least to market averages because a takeover bid 
indicates that other market participants believe the firm could do better than it 
does.  
 
Even successful hostile takeover bids can lead to executive dismissals, not just 
because of perceived or real past failures, but because of the potential for 
improvement achievable from upgrading the management team.  The point is that 
it is in a manager’s best interests to thwart hostile takeovers, and this is an 
incentive to achieve better-than-average market performance such that firm is 
valued at a sufficient level to discourage takeover attempts.  They would simply not 
be economically feasible. 
 
Capital markets are also identified as an efficient means of providing external 
monitoring of the CEO and Board. Stapeldon (1996) suggested that a poorly run 
company would find it hard to raise finance on the market and therefore would 
have to pay a risk premium, thereby reducing the return to shareholders and 
causing them to bail out, or at least ask awkward questions. Arguably too, with the 
shift by investors from reliance on the expertise of insiders to the market as the 
indicator of corporate prosperity and performance (Gordon, 2007), i.e. the 
efficient market hypothesis or efficient market model (Blair, 1995, p. 107) these 
markets serve as objective observers, undistorted by human frailty or preference, 
with information available to all and costs evenly distributed.  
 
Hence, the price paid for a company’s freely traded shares is considered a good 
and efficient proxy indicator of its financial health, provided there is a regulated and 
transparent market for those equities. Financial advisors and other professionals 
can contribute to the efficiency by way of reducing search and informational costs 
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for investors while knowledgeable (powerful and large!) investors can readily move 
money around in response to market signals.  
 
However, in the context of New Zealand it is relevant to note the recent 
replacement of the prior financial market watchdog mechanism with a new 
government-controlled Financial Market Authority. This  new and independent 
Crown Entity introduces a new level of oversight in New Zealand and a new 
regime requiring a demonstration of competence by anyone wishing to be 
registered as a financial advisor in New Zealand.. 
 
This reliance on an investor market then raises additional issues in the context of 
New Zealand SMEs, where no objective and transparent market exists for small, 
unlisted and untraded firms. In this environment few shareholders would be able to 
price their equity on a market, due to the absence of a transparent valuation 
through daily market bargaining, and thus forces them to rely on representations 
from the directors that the entity is managed to a high performance standard. 
With most SMEs placing owners and managers into the role of directors, is this 
dialogue of accountability likely to be accurate or, given the self-interest of such 
directors, less-than-truthful or ill-informed? 
 
The popularity of market-based mechanisms does not infer there have been no 
critics. Letza et al (2008) refers to the “competitive myopia” implicit in agency 
theory (Letza et al., 2008, p. 19) and its “preoccupation with short-term gains in 
return, profit, stock price and other performance measures” as discouraging 
managers (including the CEO) and the Board from concentrating on longer term 
strategic issues and competitiveness. This in turn forces them to act in a way that 
is inconsistent with the future wealth maximisation of shareholders – the very 
outcome agency theory is determined to achieve. It could also be argued that such 
a focus may serve to alienate the “big five” stakeholders (Freeman, 1984)  - 
shareholders, employees, customers, suppliers (including capital) and communities, 
again having direct and indirect implications for shareholders.  
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The other main form of external monitoring of management is via regulation. 
Starting with the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act (UK) 1845, rules relating 
to shareholder rights were introduced (in this case via the external audit (ss101-
108) and the power of general meeting to elect directors (ss90-91).  This has 
grown over time to include such requirements as periodic and continuing 
disclosure (reporting to SGM and to the Stock Exchange), disclosure of directors’ 
interests, expanded audit requirements and the burgeoning push for the presence 
of independent directors on the Board in an increasing range of jurisdictions 
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 -USA) and Listing Rules (NYSE 2010), and principles of 
corporate governance in the UK (Financial Reporting Council, 2010), Australia 
(Corporate Governance Council, 2010) and New Zealand (NZX, 2010).  
 
Guttentag (2007) identifies several purposes of mandatory disclosure of 
information. In offering justification for this discussion he quotes from Healey and 
Palepu (2001, p. 414) that although financial reporting and other disclosure are 
required in most markets, “surprisingly little is known about why”. Guttentag sets 
out to address this gap in knowledge with a detailed examination of two types of 
information that a company might choose (or in some cases be required) to 
provide. The first of these is agency information (information on executive 
compensation and other transactions between the executive and the company that 
does not affect the stock price) and the second accuracy information (other 
information that does affect the stock price). Benefits he identifies in mandating 
information disclosure of the agency type include a reduction in agency costs, and 
ensuring that all those who benefit from the disclosures share in their provision 
(thereby eliminating the problem of the free rider). The other benefit he identifies, 
particularly where the public ownership increases, is an increase in total social 
utility because, by eliminating the informational asymmetry between external and 
internal players, mandatory disclosure not only permits investors and other 
interested groups to judge that company, but also to compare it against the overall 
market.  
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Guttentag (2007) calls for some caution in relation to mandatory disclosure. Most 
particularly for him, a broad based and extensive regime is never costless. 
Therefore, he advocates that regulators should assess the company and its 
characteristics, including the number and spread of shareholders, in considering the 
need for and nature of disclosure required from that company.  
 
Unfortunately regulators do not necessarily get so specific – a problem hinted at by 
the use of the term “calamity model” to describe the tendency by regulators and 
policy makers to increase the rules as a reaction to scandals and failures (Smallman, 
2007, p. 239). Although the use of the term does not necessarily imply that such a 
reaction is necessarily hasty or ill considered, it does suggest it may not be as 
carefully devised as it could be given more thought or consideration.  
 
Indicatively in this regard, Laufer (2006) expresses his concern over the expanded 
“compliance” reaction of legislators, investigators and prosecutors to 
“unprecedented” (Laufer 2006, p. 239) scandals such as WorldCom and Enron, 
when consequential reforms are promoted as a prescription against the  
“pathological mutation” of capitalism and a seismic shift from owners’ capitalism” 
(Laufer, 2006, p. 240). He concludes that such increases in regulatory requirements 
(and the costs they involve) often do not work, finding that the amount spent on 
compliance by corporations may have little to do with legal adherence, let alone 
ethical practices or integrity, and with regulators and prosecutors relying on 
simplistic legal rules that fail to address the complexities involved in monitoring 
failures (Laufer, 2006). This implies that in the New Zealand environment, where 
regulation is lax or non-existent in the SME markets, future compliance and 
transparency improvements may not be a result of tighter regulation but of other 
mechanisms that resolve the reporting differentials between management, board 
and shareholders. 
 
Finally, Tomasic (2006) emphasises that with the burgeoning demand being placed 
upon the public purse, it makes little sense and achieves little in the way of 
significant outcomes to rely on the regulatory and enforcement bodies to provide 
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comprehensive monitoring. In addition, such external measures can unnecessarily 
increase the “friction” (transaction costs) faced by an organisation. At the same 
time there has been a shift in various jurisdictions (admittedly supported and 
enabled by changes in regulation and rules) away from manager-dominated 
governance to Board-dominated (director primacy; Bainbridge, 2008, p. 11 and pp. 
155-200). It is therefore from both a theoretical and a practical perspective that 
internal monitoring mechanisms are preferred by agency theorists to achieve the 
alignment as identified by the imperative in accordance with the theory. This raises 
issues as to the understanding and acceptance of these monitoring regimes when 
outside directors join a firm. 
 
Internal Monitoring 
 
By way of reflection, these internal mechanisms can be financial (including 
compensation, the term used to refer to the total package of fixed and variable 
incentives for performance and position that are offered to management, 
specifically for our purposes, the CEO), and other  mechanisms that persuade the 
CEO and Board members to direct their actions to address the desires and 
objectives of the shareholders (Principals) and non-financial internal monitoring 
(referring to the mechanisms and processes put in place by the shareholders/Board 
to scrutinise, control or map the decisions of the CEO/Board or the outcomes 
from them).  These are considered in turn.  
 
The one that has attracted a lot of attention in the governance and agency 
literature is that of compensation (Matsumura and Shin, 2005) - in other words: 
What structure of pay, bonuses and other incentives best ensure that the 
members of the board, CEO or other executive of a company maximise the 
benefits for the owners or shareholders? This research attempts to identify to 
what extent compensation is a driving factor behind the motivation of external 
board members to serve. In the context of New Zealand SMEs, the fear of owners 
that external directors would need to be paid what shareholders might regard as 
large compensation might deter the inclusion of external board members or 
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reduce the number of independent directors contemplated for addition to the 
board. Since directors and aspiring directors in New Zealand rank compensation 
lowly as a motivator for accepting a directorship, pay and tangible benefits appear 
to be somewhat poor tools to assure a specific performance from company 
directors. 
 
The underlying assumption involved in answering this question is that the bigger 
the disconnect between ownership and control, the more likely it is that the 
“controlled” is left free to pursue their own aims and serve their own interests: 
Hence the importance of aligning their rewards as closely as possible to those of 
the organisation. That at least is the theory. What forms do and should such 
rewards take? Jensen (1994) discussed this question and, while emphasising that it 
is “inconceivable” (1994, p.2) that a person will not act in the absence of 
incentives, he argues that those incentives do not have to be in a monetary form. 
On the other hand, and as an indication perhaps of the domination by economists 
of the field of positivist agency theory, it is frequently assumed that these 
incentives must be money or monies-worth (some mixture of salary, performance 
bonuses and stock or equity options (the last in particular being “commonly 
thought” (Ramsay, 1993, p.359) to align management and shareholder interest)). 
Others might take the form of specific benefits – including severance payments, tax 
reimbursements and signing bonuses (Matsumura and Shin, 2005, p.102). 
Therefore, the research conducted on this question has involved examinations of 
one or more aspects of these incentives and has attempted to assess how effective 
or otherwise they might be in aligning the interests of the board and/or CEO with 
those of the owners. This research offers independent directors a choice between 
several compensation schemes, including non-monetary compensation, to test 
whether the money or money-like compensation is indeed the vastly preferred 
one. 
 
The one category of compensation that has probably attracted the most attention 
is equity options or grants because these are seen as the best ways to relate CEO 
risk and return with that of shareholders (Business Roundtable (2003) Principles of 
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Executive Compensation 1, as cited in Matsumura and Shin, 2005, p.109)), and thus 
are used increasingly to also connect directors through an alignment of benefits. 
Mehran (1992) in his study of investment funding policies concluded that there was 
a higher debt ratio amongst those companies with insider equity holdings. He 
interpreted this as an indication of such agents’ preparedness to take risk in the 
interests of growing the business (thereby avoiding or neutralising the aversion to 
risk identified by Eisenhardt; 1989). Fama and Jensen (1983) agreed that there was 
a positive link between incentives and performance on the part of the executives 
of companies.   Jensen and Meckling (1976) found that managers with substantial 
equity positions were less likely to resist takeover bids, a conclusion that could 
also apply to directors.  As noted above, under the finance model, takeovers are 
seen as positive for investors and the economy more generally in that they both 
punish managers who achieve poor returns on investment, thus encouraging assets 
to move to the most efficient user.   
 
However, Matolcscy and Wright (2007) consider that there are no demonstrable 
differences in outcomes for companies offering cash-based packages as opposed to 
those involving equity as well as cash. And Ramsay (1993) and Tevlin (1996), when 
discussing some of these earlier findings, also make the point that the evidence that 
incentive-based packages improve firm performance is weak. Ramsay (1993) 
further argues that a CEO with equity holdings is more risk averse than one who 
does not because his or her financial assets rise and fall with the fortunes of the 
company. This reluctance to take risks increases as that CEO nears retirement. Of 
relevance, too, is the point made by Gordon (2002) that, even if it is assumed that 
stock options are appropriate in addressing agency problems, “frankly, no-one 
really knows what is the optimal level of option grant” (p.1246). To this can be 
added the difficulties involved with valuing such grants (Australian Council of 
Superannuation Advisors and ISS Governance Services, 2010). 
 
Despite such uncertainty, it has become the norm for CEOs and other managers 
to negotiate performance-based packages from their employing companies 
(Bebchuk, Fried and Walker, 2002). While they see this rise in terms of 
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strengthening managerial power, Murphy (2002) sees it as far more a reflection of 
(wrong) perceptions on the part of employing Boards of the cost of stock options 
in comparison to set remuneration packages. Findings on the relatively low 
confidence of Australian and New Zealand directors (55%; Insync Surveys Pty Ltd, 
2009, p.9) that the remuneration package for their CEO was appropriate suggest 
also a level of ignorance of how they should be determined. 
 
Whatever the reason for their growth, it is apparent that many of those packages 
have been unreflective of the company’s size or the CEO’s performance (The 
Economist, 2003). In addition, statistics indicate that the rewards claimed by CEOs 
under contract in some places and companies have grown astronomically. Murphy 
(2002, p.847) offers data showing that from 1992 to 2000, median total 
compensation for CEOs of S and P Industrial companies in the United States grew 
from $3.3 million to over $6.5 million (in 2001 figures). More significantly, over the 
same period, stock options swelled from 27% to 51% of total compensation. 
Throw into the mix a lack of adverse consequences for underperformers, the 
trend towards independent directors as the majority on Boards and the issues that 
may arise over their ability or inclination to monitor and control the CEO (LeBlanc 
and Gillies, 2005; Matsumura and Shin, 2005; Smallman, 2007), the advocacy under 
statute and/or listing requirements for a majority of independent directors if not 
the sole membership on selection committees (Smallman, 2007) (and the 
difficulties faced by those committees in obtaining comprehensive market or 
company information), and the effectiveness of incentive-based reward structures 
as a means of minimising agency costs for owners is put under serious strain. 
 
There is also the issue of correlation – a positive correlation between CEO pay 
structures/size and firm or management performance does not necessarily mean 
that the package improves performance (Leonard, 1990). Neither does a negative. 
Letza at al. (2008) cites several studies (Conyon, Gregg and Machin, 1995; Gregg, 
Machin and Syzmanski, 1993) that failed to find anything more than a very weak 
link between executive pay levels and management performance. Core, Holthausen 
and Larcker (1999) conclude that overall CEO compensation packages (including 
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payment for performance) are larger where governance is weak and agency 
problems greater than in the case of where the Board is strong and able to 
implement effective governance without resorting to large financial incentives. 
More generally, compensation may be strongly influenced by the labour market for 
CEOs (The Economist, 2003), a strategy to avoid the negative feedback from 
shareholders and/or the media should CEO compensation be regarded as 
obscenely high and inappropriate, while performance may be affected by events 
outside the CEO’s control, including technological advancements, economic 
climate, regulatory initiatives and competitor actions (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
 
The other aspect of financial control comes via the argument of self-interest. 
Stapeldon (1996) describes it thus: left to themselves, managers have an incentive 
to maximise their consumption, including power, leisure and other benefits (that 
might include subsidised living, golden parachutes and large severance payments 
unrelated or even negatively related to performance). In this context, Matsumura 
and Shin (2005, p.102) offer the example of L. Dennis Kozlowski, ex CEO of Tyco 
who purportedly spent tens of millions of company money on himself, including 
settling his $80,000 American Express bill and the acquisition of a $6000 shower 
curtain. 
 
Eisenhardt (1989, p.61) also refers to “moral hazard” that comes from a situation 
where the agent (CEO) does not do what is expected of them – in other words, 
they shirk their responsibilities (also see Bainbridge, 2008; Core, Holthausen and 
Larker, 1999; Heath and Norman, 2004). Such strategies clearly increase the costs 
of agency borne by the company and contribute to a significant disconnect 
between the shareholders’ and CEO’s objectives. It may also ultimately have a 
negative effect on the market (as in the case of WorldCom, for example).  
 
For New Zealand SMEs, the matter then arises how much to pay their CEO (or 
manager, or other term, depending on its size). It is not necessarily a function of 
performance or of prospects offered in the broader market. Where the CEO (or 
manager or other term) is a member of the family, as is often the case, what is 
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being paid in other firms is of little moment. It may well be that this individual 
recommends (or tells) members of the board what salary he or she is going to 
draw. What role does or should the power to set remuneration have on the 
relationship between CEO and board in a SME, and to what extent should or can 
the members of the board refer to performance in settling that remuneration?  
 
The other internal mechanism under the agency model is internal monitoring of 
management behaviour (in a world of director primacy; Bainbridge, 2008). Such a 
strategy will reduce the incentives that need to be provided to CEOs and other 
managers (reducing direct agency costs for the company) and at the same time 
reduce their freedom of action and autonomy (reducing their risk). However, it 
should be noted that this mechanism relies heavily on the availability to the 
monitoring (normally the Board) of reliable and complete information. Eisenhardt 
(1989) makes this point clearly: the more complete the information, the more 
positive is the relationship to behaviour-based contracts. In addition, the Board 
needs to be strong in relation to the CEO (Borokhovich, Parrino and Trapani, 
1996) and, perhaps more importantly, to be able to obtain and use the information 
in an efficient and effective way (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Jensen, 1994; 
Coles and Hesterley, 2000). 
 
As indicated previously, agency theory posits that the company or corporation is a 
nexus of contracts between a range of people and groups with widely diverging 
desires, purposes and abilities (both inside and outside) and those managing the 
company or corporation. Some researchers have studied the extent to which the 
structure of shareholding might affect the efficacy or otherwise of internal 
monitoring (Bricker and Chandar, 1998; Holderness, 2003).  
 
There is general agreement that where the shareholding is diffuse (widely held), 
shareholders have little or no real power (Kang and Sorensen, 1999) and it is 
difficult if not impossible for such shareholders to verify that the CEO is acting 
appropriately (Matsumura and Shin, 2007; Letza et al., 2008). The problem is 
exacerbated when those at the management level own large blocks of shares as 
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then the diffuse (and minority) shareholders incur high agency problems and costs 
(Chen and Yu, 2011).  Their only option is the Board. Therefore huge reliance is 
placed on the Board (on behalf of the shareholders) to establish the rules of 
behaviour and the outcomes to be achieved by the CEO who, in turn, determines 
the means of such achievement. With boards of companies such as Enron and 
Tyco held up for their failure to formulate and/or enforce standards of conduct for 
management (Matsumura and Shin, 2007; Kulik, 2005; Nwabueze and Mileski, 
2008) and “shareholder activism” (Daily et al., 2003, p.373), in part responsible for 
the move under law (the Sabine Oxley Act 2002 in the United States), codes and 
listing requirements to independent directors, and with limits placed on their age, 
tenure and multi-board involvement, the Board, at least in theory, is even more 
emphatically the monitor of record.  
 
There is some suggestion that the institutional or block shareholders (trustees, 
fund managers and the like) are in a stronger position and have more incentives as 
fiduciaries themselves (Stapledon, 1996, p. 240-244; Davies, 1993), to closely 
monitor the CEO, a reflection of  “shareholder primacy” (Bainbridge, 2008, p.201 
sees this as a flawed model). There is indeed some support for Bainbridge’s view. 
Using New Zealand data, Nicholas, Sisira and Abeyratna (2011) claim that contrary 
to expectations, firm performance actually increases where there are low levels of 
block ownership and vice versa.  
 
It is interesting to note that while Bainbridge (2008, p.13) points out that a 
“control block” suffices to give one or two large shareholders effective control of a 
company, he also concludes that most institutional investors remain passive due to 
the costs of direct involvement in corporate governance (also see Monks and 
Minow, 2000) for a similar conclusion in relation to United States institutional 
investors). Kang and Sorensen (1999) on the other hand, consider large-block 
shareholders as better monitors than dispersed ones, explaining this superiority by 
reference to the returns sought by such owners to cover the costs of monitoring 
(a more positive interpretation than Bainbridge’s). Therefore, Kang and Sorensen 
(1999) suggest that such companies should be highly debt-leveraged as the 
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demands of accountability and repayment to creditors force managers to maintain 
good cash flow and budget carefully for each new capital venture or, more directly, 
persuade a manager of a particular company to act in a certain way for fear of 
losing a substantial shareholder or in the hope of gaining one (Kang and Sorensen, 
1999).  Davies (1993) goes even further in making a broader positive theoretical 
point with his suggestion that the growth in pension funds challenges Berle and 
Mean’s (1932) portrayal of the agency problem of monitoring in a world of 
dispersed shareholders. Instead, he suggests, institutions are in a good position to 
claim an increased role in internal monitoring of CEOs.    
 
However, not all investors are the same (Bricker and Chandar 1998; Stapledon, 
1996; Davies, 1993; Holderness, 2003). In New Zealand where the vast majority of 
businesses are small, it is arguable that the board is not the only conduit through 
which shareholders can express their opinions. Shareholders in SMEs normally 
have ample opportunities to interact with management directly, frequently being 
part of the management team themselves.  
 
At the same time, members of that greater family willingly or necessarily maintain 
their financial interest. Although some of these members may know the business 
well, others may not – what then is the role or influence of the shareholders of 
SMEs on the decisions of the CEO or equivalent?  
 
The above discussion focuses on the role of agency theory in conceptualising and 
formulating the actual and “metaphorical” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.58) contracts 
between the CEO and the Board/shareholders as monitors and the external 
market environment as providing discipline. This focus was in response to a point 
made in the introduction - that agency theory “dominates” the field of corporate 
governance literature, particularly in relation to the Anglo-American model of the 
large corporation. However, as also mentioned earlier, agency theory as a 
normative reward and control structure is not limited to the public, commercial 
corporation but has underpinned fundamental restructuring in the public and in 
some cases the non-profit sectors in certain jurisdictions (Wallis, 1997; Dale and 
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Pale, 1998; Mason, Kirkbride and Bryde, 2006; Millar and Abraham, 2006; Chhotray 
and Stoker, 2009).  This is partly attributable to what Irvine (2007, p.1) termed 
“corporate creep”, as reflected in the growing use of professional consulting 
providers in the non-profit sector and the growing pressures on such organisations 
to adopt corporate systems (Irvine, 2007, p.27) and in the push in the public sector 
for restructuring and reform based on agency principles.  
 
By way of illustration of the effect of this push, and in part a further critique of 
agency theory in a non-large public corporative context, the next section describes 
its impact in the New Zealand public sector.   
 
 
3.1.4 Agency Theory and its Application to the New Zealand Public Sector 
 
Under the Labour Government 1984-1990 and steered by a small band of 
reformers wielding a neo-liberal economic philosophy,  New Zealand embarked on 
a fundamental and “ferocious” (Hazeldine and Quiggan, 1997, p.18) restructuring of 
the public sector (also see Wallis, 1997; Bale and Dale, 1998; Farrar and McCabe, 
1997). Basically, the theme underlying this restructuring was that there should be 
no distinction between the forces driving public versus private sectors, i.e. that 
both structures should assume managers were “self-seeking individual agents 
operating with relentless opportunism in an environment fogged by uncertainty 
and private information” (Hazeldine and Quiggan, p.18). These reforms created a 
new drive towards a governance structure that could accommodate these 
imperatives. 
 
The consequences of the process were similarly fundamental. All operations 
deemed more efficiently or effectively carried out by the private sector were sold 
(including Telecom, 1990 and New Zealand Rail – subsequently bought back at a 
hugely inflated cost). Those deemed able to be run as commercial enterprises 
were moved to a for-profit corporate format (the first seven under the State 
Owned Enterprises Act 1987).  Those avoiding this fate were considered either 
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politically sensitive or judged as a public service appropriate to keep under 
government management (e.g. health services, electricity industry), albeit with their 
operations and decision-making procedures subject to variously upgraded agency 
principles. Regulation was deliberately designed to be “light-handed” (most 
importantly via the Commerce Act 1986).  Monitoring of SOEs was placed in the 
hands of a monitoring Board designed to mimic the role of the board of Directors 
in a privately held company.  A deliberate strategy was installed with the intention 
of preventing the shareholding Ministers of the Crown from meddling in the 
business decisions so that the market forces could be permitted to work more 
strongly and efficiently.  
 
The application of governance to the Public Sector in New Zealand is relevant to 
the private sector as often the public sector is the first to experience rule changes, 
which then may be extended to firms outside the public arena. By way of example, 
the private sector was sluggish in adopting the Triple Bottom Line reporting 
standard where not merely financial parameters are reported to stakeholders, but 
also social connectivity and environmental stewardship. Only after this standard 
was mandated for all public sector enterprises did its application creep into the 
annual reports of privately-owned firms. In a small country like New Zealand, 
public sector enterprises are often used to gauge the effect of experimental 
policies, such as non-smoking rules on the property of public hospitals, extended 
parental leave payments and the insistence on parity in pay between genders for 
equal work. 
 
This solution for increasing accountability has not been without its critics. 
Hazeldine and Quiggan (1997), for example, point to the large numbers and layers 
of extra managers that have been employed under this corporate structure as 
adding costs without commensurate benefits - the very problem agency theory 
seeks to address.  Advocates for privatisation argue that state owned corporations 
are neither subject to market discipline (because for political reasons they would 
not be permitted to fail) nor are very efficient providers of public goods (McKinlay, 
1987). With the exception of Terralink (the only state-owned enterprise or SOE 
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ever bankrupted by its own directors and subsequently liquidated to avoid having 
to carry out obligations under an oppressive and ill-advised commercial contract 
[Note: This author was a Terralink director, brought in by the Government after 
that unfeasible contract had been entered into, to help design an exit strategy]), no 
SOE in New Zealand has ever closed shop, so it is remains unclear whether 
commercial reality does indeed apply to SOEs. Although arms-length commercial 
conduct was prescribed throughout this round of reforms, the Government has 
continued to use its public purse to bail out needy organizations it deems 
deserving or necessary, such as Air New Zealand into which the Government 
injected more than NZ$800 Million of equity to keep it operating as an 
independent airline (Braddock, 2001). 
 
In summary then, it is clear that a significant body of governance research revolves 
around agency theory and its implications, not only in terms of its descriptive 
power (does the governance structures fit with agency expectations) but also its 
normative values (only if the structures satisfy those required by agency theory will 
they be adjudged ‘good’). However, a major criticism of the theory in the context 
of governance stems from its tendency to view parties as self-interested and acting 
from purely egotistical motives. This endorses and encourages a kind of moral 
scepticism towards management (Heath, 2009).  
 
It could of course be argued that such a criticism is uncharitable. Perhaps managers 
and owners simply have different interests, and how they manage and reconcile 
those interests is at the heart of agency theory (Dees, 1992). As Buchanan put it: 
“If, in applying principal/agent theory, it were necessary to assume that motivation 
is exclusively or primarily self-interested, this would greatly reduce, if not vitiate, 
the enterprise. However, we need not do so. Instead, we can proceed on the 
assumption that the conflicts of interest that give rise to agency-risks may result 
from a variety of motivations, on the part of agents and principals. All that is 
necessary is that there be conflicts of interest” (Buchanan 1996, p. 421).  
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Nevertheless, even if we do view agents as Buchanan suggests, agency theory still 
raises issues of particular importance for SMEs and family-owned/operated firms. It 
overlooks subjective factors such as company loyalty, familial ties and bonds of 
friendship, those factors identified earlier as being at the heart of SMEs and family-
owned enterprises. Such loyalties may infringe on agency theory’s assumption that 
an agent will at every chance behave opportunistically, i.e. in their own best 
interests regardless of what they are obliged to do (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). 
This rather Machiavellian view casts human nature as largely socially unreliable. It is 
perhaps true that humans have a tendency to act in a way which furthers their own 
interests above all others, but these are only tendencies. As a version of game-
theory, agency theory is subject to the same counter-evidence produced by 
experimental game theorists. Most notable is the large number of individuals that 
will cooperate in a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma scenarios in the knowledge that 
there is no chance of reciprocation (Dawes and Thaler, 1988; Isaac, McCue and 
Plott, 1985; Kim and Walker, 1984).   
 
It has also been argued that governance processes that involve a too rigid 
adherence to the principles of agency theory also increases the costs associated 
with employment contracts for the CEO and other members of the top 
management team, as well as of inter-party contracts where other potential agency 
relationships exist, such as between directors, shareholders and internal and 
external stakeholders (again of particular import for SMEs and family 
owned/operated companies).  However, it does not necessarily provide equivalent 
benefits in the form of improved performance or growth. Good governance, 
Lockhart argues, ought to be grounded in such good outcomes. Therefore, rather 
than being “besotted with the explanatory power of agency theory” (Lockhart, 
2007, p.69) New Zealand’s SMEs should focus on governance mechanisms that can 
sustainably deliver high quality performance, good rates of growth, and balance the 
interests of stakeholders, employees, buyers, suppliers and the environment.   
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In summary then, business ethicists have argued that, as a framework for examining 
governance, agency theory has limited value given its contextual reliance (Heath, 
2009; Muth and Donaldson, 1998).  
Nevertheless  much more research is needed to determine the extent to which 
agency theory based research will be of use in the New Zealand context given the 
large proportion of SMEs and/or family owned and/or operated firms. Moreover, 
SMEs in New Zealand ought to ensure that the control exerted by boards of 
directors is balanced with maximising performance. 
 
The second theory (or rather two related ones) stems from agency theory and 
highlights the importance of costs and their calculation in identifying efficient and 
effective governance structures while relying on the same assumptions of self 
interest as does agency. These are introduced below.  
 
 
3.2 Transaction Cost Economics 
 
A theory that has influenced corporate governance research (and that is a child of 
Agency Theory) is transaction cost economics that emphasises governance 
structures. Proponents argue that the contract between principal and agent 
(owner and manager) cannot be complete and without cost (Williamson, 1984). 
Therefore, governance structures can and should put into place mechanisms for 
instances of decision making that are not catered for in explicit contracts (Hart, 
1995).  
 
New Institutional Economics or NIE is a variant of transaction cost economics or 
TCE (van der Steen, 2006). Although this focuses on the range of institutions 
affecting organisations, it also involves the same fundamental assumption as does 
agency – that of the self-interested, rationally maximising individual measured in 
economic terms (Rutherford, 1995). It merely relaxes some of the assumptions. 
For NIE, institutions themselves are and should be responses to economic stimuli, 
the outcome of the drive for efficiency, not of other social or political concerns. 
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On a state level, this is necessary because a high cost institutional structure will 
discourage economic growth and positive social change. Therefore, a rational 
regulator – responsible for setting the rules - will create a regime to allow 
individuals in the market to maximise their own benefit – and that can only be 
achieved via an efficiently operating market (the “light-handed” approach; Jwa, Seo 
and Choi, 2000).  On an organisational level, focus on objectives; rituals and 
practices at the expense of performance will ultimately punish the organisation and 
its management in the market.   
 
NIE has been criticised from several angles (institutional theorists and agency 
theorists being two) for not adding anything useful to the debate – an “empty” 
theory (Chhotray and Stoker, 2009). Rutherford (1995) explores some of those 
criticisms, principally its assumption of economic rationality as the driver of 
decisions. Van der Steen (2006), while applauding the ability of NIE to allow 
universalisation of individual political actions and its acceptance of “bounded 
rationality” (van der Steen, 2006, p.10-12) as a more realistic expectation than the 
perfect rationality assumed under agency theory, also points out its applicability in 
research is limited due to its failure to address process – that is, how an 
organisation arrives at the optimum governance structure.  In New Zealand, this 
theory is of limited applicability as it presumes the ready availability of alternative 
types of performance which can then be priced out to determine whether the 
internal effectiveness is sufficient to trade competitively. Such a ready market does 
not exist in many industries in New Zealand, where very few large firms exist in 
some industries, immediately followed by SME-size firms in fragmented markets. 
 
The next sections explore alternatives to agency theory and its close relatives, 
with particular focus on ways in which writers in these traditions address what 
they see as the shortcomings in agency theory in the context of governance. As a 
preliminary point, in contrast to agency theory, all of them see the firm (or 
corporation) as a player in a broader social context rather than as a nexus of 
logical (and limited) relationships (Christopher, 2010). This broader role implies 
first, that the range of relationships for a firm is both complex and subject to 
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constant change in a volatile market environment (Clarke, 2007).  A second 
implication is that good governance is contextual: dependent on such factors as 
culture, size, ownership and the wider environment (OECD, 2004, Sison, 2000).     
 
 
 
3.3  Alternatives to Agency Theory: Stakeholder Theory 
 
By way of general introduction, advocates of stakeholder theory propose that 
instead of the firm being seen as having one overarching objective (the 
maximisation of shareholder wealth (Coelho, McClure and Spry, 2003), it should 
instead be located as a social actor responsible either legally or morally (or both) 
to a range of internal and external constituencies.  These stakeholders can be 
human or non-human; direct or indirect and herein lies one of the major problems: 
the location and ranking of such stakeholders.  
 
In addition, although the term stakeholder is used extensively by a wide range of 
organisations even outside business (public sector, local government and central 
government being only three), the broad range of definitions offered (see, for 
example Brenner and Cochran, 1991; Clarkson, 1995; Donaldson and Preston, 
1991; Freeman and Reed 1983; Freeman, 1984; Mitchell, Agle,and Wood, 1997; 
Tsogas, Komives and Fuller, 2005; Waddock, 2002) it has been criticised (for 
example Kaler, 2002; Waxenberger and Spense, 2003) as vague and uncertain; 
doing little to assist organisations in evaluating and balancing conflicting demands 
that might be placed upon them.  
 
Writers such as Donaldson and Preston (1995), Freeman (1994) and Freeman, 
Wicks and Parmar (2004) have addressed this particular problem; Freeman, for 
example, classifies shareholders, suppliers, employees, customers and the 
community as ‘the big five’ (Freeman, 1994) members of the category of “those 
groups and individuals who can affect (or be affected by) [business activities]” 
(Freeman, Wicks and Parmar, 2004) while Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) 
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propose a multi-faceted theoretical framework to establish the “principle of who 
or what really counts” (Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997, p.853).   
 
In the context of corporate governance, advocates for stakeholder theory claim 
that "it is the firm’s objective of unalloyed shareholder value-maximisation that 
leads primarily to a micro failure of governance arrangements” (Keasey et al., 2005, 
p.3).  The stakeholder perspective recognises that there may be multiple principals 
(shareholders) with heterogeneous interests and objectives. This raises concerns in 
New Zealand where many of the small/mid-size have few shareholders, mamyn of 
who, are aligned in their outcome interests through family bonds. In addition, 
proponents consider the range of stakeholders to include, but not be limited to, 
owners or investors, thus offering a Pandora’s Box of multiple stakeholders with 
divergent interests, including employees, customers, suppliers, creditors and 
lenders and the wider community (Jensen, 2007). Given the difficulties inherent in 
implementing governance strategies that protect each and every one of these 
divergent stakeholders’ interests, the stakeholder perspective requires that, rather 
than remaining preoccupied with protecting shareholder interests, governance 
structures ought to focus instead on the long-run value of enterprises (George, 
2010; Bhimani, 2008).  This assumes, somewhat speculatively, that long-run 
sustainability of an enterprise in itself is proof that stakeholders have become 
unified in their support of the firm.  
 
Of interest in this context is the recent reporting by Brammer, Jackson and Matten 
(2010) of evidence emerging from a European retail context that stakeholder-
driven initatives are threatened by what are described as “business-led” initiatives. 
This might at first sight suggest that agency theory and its implicitly shareholder-
interest supremacy approach is the best approach to governance. Yet, as these 
authors go on to explain, “business-led programmes are often and increasingly 
dependent on the involvement of external stakeholder groups in order to bolster 
their external legitimacy” (Brammer et al, p16).This finding suggests that , while 
some firms may firmly adhere to the contractualist approach that also apply 
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stqakeholder principles as a means of expanding and securing their wider support 
base.  
 
However, critics have identified problems with the stakeholder approach, most 
specifically with the fuzziness and uncertainty implicit in recognising and managing 
the various interests . Illustrative of such  difficulties in identification and 
management of multiple and potentially conflicting stakeholder demands is the 
particular challenge of  governance in the non profit sector, a sector populated by 
organisations (NPOs) having a certain fundamental character that shapes the range 
of claimants to whom the organization is or should be accountable. This is a 
matter explored below.  
 
The Non Profit Sector: Character 
 
Two major aspects of character should be mentioned here. The first of these is the 
underlying social culture of the organisation (Millar and Abraham, 2006) – 
religious/secular; national/international; charitable/non-charitable; human/non-
human focused being just some of the possible dichotomies. This categorisation 
can be significant when it comes to governance as the social norms and 
expectations can be powerful disciplines on those involved or affected.  
 
It is arguable that “stakeholders” are of particular importance in the NPO context, 
justified as follows: NPOs by virtue of their definition do not have “owners” or 
anyone entitled to receive residual profits (LückerathRovers et al 2009; Jamali et al, 
2010). Consequently, one of the pivotal foundations of the major alternative 
agency theory is absent (Millar and Abraham 2006). It is also arguable that the 
fundamental tenet – that an agent (or in the corporate context, the CEO or 
Manager) is self-serving – runs contrary to the traditional perception of the leader 
in a NPO as a person wanting to do good rather than do well, and that there are 
good reasons why a Board (if it has one) should wish to collaborate with a CEO or 
Manager rather than control (Hough et al, 2004). 
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Lacking a paramount objective of profit maximisation, the strategy, objectives and 
behaviour of NPOs are multifaceted and fluid as they respond to social and 
political change in an attempt to remain relevant and functional. Where, for 
example, a Government assumes responsibility for public health, an NPO 
previously active in that area might turn its attention to providing support for the 
families of the sick, or where tenant participation in community housing schemes is 
actively encouraged by Government as a weapon against local authorities 
(McDermont, 2007), so those affecting or affected by the NPO and its objectives 
(Freeman, 1984) also changes. 
 
It is assumed that NPOs have a mission or missions (Millar and Abraham, 2006; 
Mueller, Williams, Higgins and Tou, 2005) or some other homogenous value(s) 
(Auteri and Wagner, 2006) that provide a focus for those involved at various levels 
and in different ways both materially and otherwise; funders, workers and users. 
As part of that it can be argued that for many of those individuals and groups there 
is a greater personal connection and even a sense of loyalty to the NPO than may 
be the case for commercial corporations.    
 
However, the non-profit sector (and by analogy the stakeholders) is far from 
homogenous (Millar and Abraham, 2005; Pascoe, 2008; LückerathRovers et al, 
2009). In addition, the characteristics of the individual organisations and the nature 
of the sector itself can shift over time and place. As discussed below, the resultant 
complexity and diversity (and the implications for stakeholders) also have 
implications for governance.  
 
 
 
The Non Profit Organisation: Diversity and Complexity and the Stakeholder 
Purpose 
 
There are almost as many purposes as number of NPOs. However, and in the 
interests of clarity, in their study of the New Zealand NPO sector, Sanders et al 
(2008) classify NPOs by reference to two functions: a service function (involving 
the delivery of such direct services or facilities as education, health, housing, 
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community development and the like and an expressive function (supporting 
advocacy for and promotion of culture, religion, professional development and 
policy values).  
 
Service organisations normally have quite clearly defined roles and functions, 
including providing health care, managing or providing accommodation, education 
or some other community-based support. As the providers of funds (such as 
Government, local authorities and charities) often look to fund on the basis of 
specified outcomes, their assessment of any finding application or 
renewal/extension of funding will most likely take into account the extent to which 
the organisation has and/or can fulfil those roles and functions (that can be very 
specific, such as number of people settled, number of operations in particular 
categories performed, number of meals provided to the homeless). However, the 
expressive function is less easily quantified and outcomes potentially hard to assess. 
In addition, their sources of funds can be affected by changes in the way donors 
and regulators perceive them (for example as charities or as political 
organisations). What makes the situation more unclear is the fact that many NPOs 
pursue a range of activities where the boundary between them may be quite 
blurred (such as health and social support services as well as advocacy).  
 
Frequently, even single purpose NPOs have at least two principal stakeholders or 
claimants. First, there is or are the funders who at the very least expect the NPO 
to do an adequate job in spending the money. However, potentially in conflict with 
this stakeholder is the membership and/or workforce (who may also be involved 
directly or indirectly in determining how the money is to be spent) (Auteri and 
Wagner, 2006) and/or those who benefit from the work of the NPO (Krashinsky, 
1997). Where the NPO has multiple purposes, the complexity becomes greater as 
stakeholders with different expectations and demands cause attention of those 
involved to “drift” (Jamali et al 2010: 592), muddying the waters, creating tensions 
(Krashinsky, 1997) and reducing trust and loyalty on the part of those who 
consider the NPO has lost direction 
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Funding 
 
Funding for non-profits comes from a variety of sectors, and can differ dramatically 
depending on the jurisdiction, focus (purpose) of the NPO and its size. By way of 
indication, Sanders et al (2008) report that in 2004, 32% of Australian NPO funding 
came from Government sources in the form of either grants or contract monies 
and for New Zealand, 25%. Other sources of funds include foundation and other 
large private sector donors as well as one-off or on-going individual public 
donations, fees or subscriptions (again for Australia and New Zealand those figures 
are 10% and 20% respectively from “private philanthropy” (Sanders et al, 2008: 19) 
and 58% and 55% respectively from fees and subscriptions. 
  
Providers of funds to NPOs are clearly potentially important stakeholders as their 
decisions as to the level of funds (if any) and the purpose to which they must be 
put may be crucial to the viability and on-going success of the NPO (Mueller et al, 
2005). Where Government is a major contributor, and with the emphasis in new 
institutional economics on the contractualisation of the relationship with the NPOs 
(as in the instance of corporatization of the public sector as discussed earlier), high 
levels of accountability and transparency will be expected (Steane and Christie, 
2001). This requirement challenges to some extent the notion that NPOs are 
independent of government, (State Services Authority of Victoria, 2007). Large or 
significant donors are also arguably in a position to influence governance practices 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Williamson, 1983) while small donors and members may 
not be (depending on the size, operation and form of the organisation).  
     
Size 
 
Non-profit organisations range from very large and/or multi-national structures 
(the International Red Cross and World Vision being two obvious examples) to 
very small, this latter group potentially involving only a very small number of active 
individuals (also often volunteers) (sometimes referred to as “micro” (Clark, Kane, 
Wilding and Wilton, 2010)). Although detailed statistics on the size range of NPOs 
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is scarce, some indication of size can be obtained from the percentage of NPOs 
staffed entirely by volunteer labour – a predominant state of affairs - (and based on 
the assumption that a small NPO is likely to be in this position whereas a larger is 
more likely to have paid staff). In New Zealand some 90% of the 97,000 NPOs rely 
solely on voluntary labour. In Australia, the percentage is even higher, with only 5% 
of the approximately 700,000 organisations with paid employees. Finally, in the UK, 
Clark et. al. (2010), report that 22% of 171,074 voluntary (NPO) organisations in 
2008 employed staff – most of those in the organisations classified by them as large 
or major.  
 
The overwhelming implication from this predominance of volunteer participation in 
NGOs (that often includes members of the board, if there is one (Steane and 
Christie, 2001)), is that those involved are committed to the ideals or objectives of 
the organisation – why else would they give their time and expertise? (Taylor, 
Chait and Holland, 1996). Such individuals are stakeholders because they are 
interested in the survival of the organisation. In addition, because those volunteers 
have chosen to be involved in the organisation for reasons other than 
remuneration, it is arguable that they are motivated to monitor the organisation to 
ensure that it fulfils its objectives. However, not all volunteers are the same and 
their motivation may be a function of the nature of the organisation itself. They 
elect to join an organisation for a variety of reasons, including the desire to do 
good for society, family involvement (eg children or partner), social reasons or for 
other personal purpose.  
 
More directly relevant to the issue of governance, it is likely that only larger NPOs 
are likely to have a board or equivalent with smaller ones relying on a committee 
structure at the most. Even where the NPO has a board, membership per se is no 
good indicator of either commitment or value. Election can be a result of 
demonstrable contribution but can also be a function of personal relationships, 
popularity or power. The talents and expertise of members may be poorly used 
and governance concentrated in the hands of a few or one (Taylor et al, 1996).  
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AIso critical to governance is regulation. Obviously, the rules applying to listed 
companies are not relevant; nor are members of a board or committee subject to 
statutory rules re directors’ duties or liabilities. However, although it is estimated 
that less than half of all NPOs in Australia are incorporated (some 380,000 out of a 
total of 700,000 (Lyons, 2009)) and only around 20% of the 97,000 in New Zealand 
(Statistics NZ, 2005), the larger NPO is very likely to be structured as a separate 
legal person (in Australia most commonly as an Incorporated Association (under 
the various state-based Acts having that purpose and focus)) and in New Zealand 
an Incorporated Society (under the Incorporated Societies Act 1908) (one good 
reason being that tax advantages and Government funding opportunities normally 
require incorporation). All these statutes require that incorporated organisations 
operate under a constitution (that, inter alia, spells out the procedures to be 
followed in making decisions) and, in the interests of accountability, have their 
annual accounts independently audited. Members then have access to those 
audited statements which are also filed with the responsible statutory body such as 
the Office of Fair Trading (NSW) or Consumer Affairs (Victoria) (both Australia) 
and the Registrar for Incorporated Societies (New Zealand).   
 
As well as organisational-oriented regulation there is regulation affecting activities 
of NGOs (including that specifying obligations of those running events, those 
protecting the safety and rights of employees and volunteers, specific requirements 
over fund-raising activities etc (Pascoe, 2008). There have been concerns 
expressed over the burden posed to small business and small NPOs in particular as 
a result of this regulation (Pascoe, 2008). In addition, such regulation can pose a 
challenge for governance as small NPOs may lack the expertise, funds and 
strategies to manage the consequential legal risk.      
 
As a final note, and by way of addressing the perceived shortcomings of 
stakeholder theory in this context, various researchers have proposed a range of 
alternative frameworks for evaluating governance in NPOs. Although these other 
frameworks will not be explored, by way of an idea of the range, Millar and 
Abraham (2006) discuss and offer critiques for four of these, including the 
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integrated model proposed by Zahra and Pearce (1989), the conceptual framework 
devised by Bradshaw, Murray and Wolpin (1992), the Six Dimensions Framework 
formulated by Jackson and Holland (1998) based on research by a team from the 
University of Georgia, and Nicholson and on Kiel’s Intellectual Capital framework. 
Also, Cahill, Armstrong and Storey (2001) propose a framework to foster social 
capital formation, while Mueller et al (2005) offer the Gap Evaluation Tool or GET 
as a self-evaluation tool for NPOs to test themselves on their governance and 
management practices.    
 
Somewhat compatible with the stakeholder perspective is stewardship theory. 
Stewardship theory emphasises that those responsible for managing an enterprise 
should (and largely do) see themselves as stewards entrusted with the ambitions, 
needs and wants of those who rely on their expertise and knowledge. This theory 
and its implications are explored below. 
 
3.4 Alternatives to Agency Theory as a Framework for Governance: 
Stewardship 
 
In  many ways this theory stands in contrast to the more prescriptive nature of 
agency theory, and has had little impact upon corporate governance research or 
measures designed to improve it when compared with agency theory and 
transaction cost economics (Cadbury Report, 1992; Combined Code 1998, 2003, 
2006; Greenbury Report 1995; Hampel Report 1998; Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002). 
However, it is useful to compare its approach in terms of what it implies for 
governance of companies. 
 
Basically, in accordance with this theory, structures should allow executives to act 
more autonomously towards maximising the owners’ financial gains than is 
currently the case (Donaldson and Davis, 1991), thus giving wider latitude to 
operators of the business when they act in the interests of the owners.  
More specifically, Muth and Donaldson (1998) describe the stewardship model as 
one “based on manager as “steward” rather than the entirely self-interested 
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rational economic man of agency theory” (Muth and Donaldson, 1998, p.5-6). 
Mason et al. (2007) agree, explaining stewardship theory as “present[ing] a view of 
governance that diverts from economic interpretation of relationships within an 
organisation” (Mason et al., 2007, p.290). Instead, it recognises physiological and 
situational factors. Physiological factors include identification and power while 
situational ones include management philosophy and power. Mason et al. (2007) (a 
view echoed by Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997 and Lockhart, 2007) stress 
that trust is implicit in such a model because managers are assumed to take the 
necessary steps to maximise the interests of the organisation, and Donaldson and 
Davis (1991, p.51) state that it also assumes that generally managers aspire to do a 
good job. It is doubtful that the Stewardship theory finds a lot of support in SMEs 
in New Zealand as it presumes a relative independence of the operators from the 
shareholders. In the largely family-controlled organizations such a separation does 
not exist and thus an autonomous management only survives the next family outing 
where the patriarch/matriarch instruct the next generation managers as to the best 
and only way to run the business. 
 
Finally, Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson (1997) place stewardship in a completely 
opposite ideological position to agency – a steward, they say, is one whose 
interests align with those of his or her principal while an agent is one whose 
interests are at odds with those of his or her principal. 
 
Arguably too, such an approach envisages the organisation as an organic being 
reflecting a nexus of interests (as opposed to a structure offering a nexus of 
contracts as in the instance of agency theory). It is the responsibility of 
management to recognise and mediate between those interests so as to maximise 
overall satisfaction.  
 
Stewardship theory therefore premises that structures within the company should 
be designed not so much to control but to enable (Olson, 2008). This requires the 
understanding by various participants of the respective interests and the 
development of a coping mechanism by which those interests are recognised and 
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harmonised.  Admittedly, this is a challenging presumption during time of 
governance stress, i.e. when complex governance decisions about cessation of 
trading, changes in shareholdings and other material corporate events are made, 
although Segaro (2012) argues that in the case of family-run and owned SMEs, 
stewardship principles “moderate the curvilinear relationship between family 
ownership and internationalisation. Specifically, higher levels of stewardship 
orientation strengthen the relationship” (Segaro, 2012, p.155).  
 
The above is perhaps an important point given the critique levelled against 
stewardship theory by Albanese, Dacin and Harris (1997) in the course of a debate 
with Donaldson et. al, in which they argue that stewardship assumes that content 
of preferences for actors is more important than the principle of rationality itself 
and that rationality as defined by stewardship advocates is a bounded concept 
remote and unaffected by any other considerations or factors (such as trust, 
relationships or underlying ethical constructs) and therefore inevitably assuming 
narrow, self-serving and extrinsic outcomes for such actors.  
 
Instead, they suggest, the robustness of agency theory lies in its determination to 
assume individuals make decisions about preferences in a rational fashion (ie, make 
those choices that maximise individual utility). However, this does not preclude or 
deny that the factors that shape the utility are subject to other factors such as 
personal preference, relationships or ethical beliefs. 
 
However, an alternative viewpoint on the relationship of these two theories is to 
see them not as opposities but as complementary, or as Elsayed (2010) explains: 
 
the assertion of both agency theory (CEO non-duality structure) and 
stewardship theory (CEO duality structure) may be valid under certain 
conditions. Thus, existing theories might need to be treated as 
complementary viewpoints, each of which draws upon a part of the 
whole picture, because depending on just one single perspective is 
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more likely to result in misleading conclusions about the structure as a 
whole” (2010, p. 80) 
 
This perspective is interesting as it throws open the entire question as to whether 
and in what circumstances is the mantra of separation between board and CEO 
truly valid and necessary.  
 
 
3.5. Alternatives to Agency:  Institutional Theory 
 
 Despite the recognition by advocates of agency theory that incentives and other 
control/monitoring mechanisms must reflect the wider context in which they are 
implemented (Li and Harrison, 2008 and 2008a), they still seem to have some 
degree of sameness to them. For example, as discussed earlier, reform of the 
public sector in New Zealand and other jurisdictions involved clear delineation 
between “ownership” and “management” of public sector commercial and non-
commercial government activities (Wallis, 1997; Hazeldine and Quiggan, 1997; 
Farrar and McCabe, 1997; Bottomley, 1996 (referring to Australia)). Agency 
structures are implicit in funding of public sector organisations in the United States 
(Provan and Milward, 2001), and there have been moves to see them embedded in 
corporate governance guidelines and rules in a range of different jurisdictions. 
However, at the same time, governance practices, structures and organisations still 
develop and operate in different ways in different jurisdictions.  
 
If the assumptions underlying agency theory are pure, how are these differences 
explicable? More importantly, are alternatives to structures of control and 
monitoring based on the concepts of agency theory valid and supportable of good 
governance?  
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3.5.1. Institutional Theory: Philosophy and Justification 
 
In institutional theory, “institutions consist of cognitive, normative, and regulative 
structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour. 
Institutions are transported by various carriers—cultures, structures, and 
routines—and they operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction Institutions are 
composed of cultural-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements that, together 
with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life” 
(Scott, 1995, p. 48). 
 
More specific to the application and relevance of this theory to corporate 
governance, Morgan, Campbell, Crouch, Pedersen and Whiteley (2010) explain 
that: 
 
The field [in which] we are interested can be defined in how the 
forms,outcomes, and dynamics of economic organisation (firms, 
networks, markets) are influenced and shaped by other social 
institutions . . . and with what consequences for economic growth, 
innovation, employment, and inequality. Institutions are usually defined . 
. . as formal or informal rules, regulations, norms, and understandings 
that constrain and enable behavior. 
 
By way of further introduction to the discussion of the theory and its relevance to 
governance, Kulik’s (2005) discussion of agency theory is helpful, since it refers to 
Enron as an example of what can go wrong. Kulik spent over half a page listing 
accolades received by the “highly respected” company (Kulik, 2005, p. 349) and its 
CEO (Ken Lay), including awards for innovation and media attention and then 
asked how this was explicable given the simultaneous “excessive non-sustainable 
acquisition of pay and perquisites” (Kulik, 2005, p. 350). He offers two 
explanations.  The first is that the executive used agency to determine and validate 
the self-serving behaviour. Basically then, provided members of the executive 
observed the boundaries set by the board and responded to the signals identified 
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by incentives (in which they played a major part on designing), they had no cause 
or motivation to consider the wider implications of what they were doing. His 
second reason is that agency reasoning contributed to an agency culture – the 
means whereby the flawed incentives and monitoring mechanisms became 
“instilled in members’ values, beliefs, assumptions and expectations” (Kulik, 2005, 
p. 353). Thus behavioural standards and self-aggrandisement attitudes of the 
members of the executive percolated all the way down.  
 
Ironically this picture (of a failing company wedded to principles of agency) may 
well demonstrate that governance is often not just about economic rationality. 
Institutional theorists would critique agency principles to maintain that it is not 
possible to appreciate corporate governance at all without also appreciating the 
broader economic, social and political environment. In Enron’s case those broader 
economic (deregulation of the electricity market and lax audit requirements); 
social (within the organisation a culture of greed, laissez-faire leadership and 
outside it an atomistic focus) and political (celebration of the market, political 
cronyism and the value attributed to the large business organisation) 
characteristics of the environment allowed and encouraged the rot to set in. 
 
  More broadly, Li and Harrison (2008, 2008a) in their papers on corporate 
governance of multinational companies, argue that research into the subject has 
failed to consider the wide variation in governance structures across countries and 
by assuming consistency fail also to offer useful insights into how governance can 
be improved. This vexing issue of comparison across different systems has also 
been raised by Li (1994, 2007), Cioffi (2000), O’Sullivan (2003) and Aguilera and 
Jackson (2003).  
 
One obvious example of such variation is implicit in the two tiered board, common 
in Germany, to insider dominated boards in Japan to mixed ones in the United 
States, the UK and other members of the Commonwealth. To this range, outsider 
dominated boards could be added (increasingly the tendency in the United States 
as a consequence of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 and changes to the listing 
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requirements of the various major exchanges (NYSE and NASDAQ (Alces, 2010))) 
and in the UK (after the Cadbury Report), Australia and New Zealand, as well as 
those dominated by lending institutions (Li and Harrison, 2008) or those with 
employees as mandated members (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Buher, Rasheed and 
Rosenstein, 1997). The limitation of this approach in New Zealand is, again, found 
in the largely fragmented market of privately held firms where many of the public 
company regulatory interventions do not apply.  
 
In an attempt to address and clarify the comparative picture, Millar, Eldomiaty, 
Choi and Hilton (2005) classify governance systems according to a ‘triad’ (Miller et 
al., 2005, p. 163). They document the differing roles, behaviour and influence of 
players, including financiers, regulators and markets within these three categories 
and stress that these non-economic influences significantly affect the capabilities 
and behaviour of companies. Specifically, the three types they identify are the 
Anglo-American (the focus of much of the agency theory oriented corporate 
governance literature), the Communitarian (European dominated) and Emerging 
Market (covering much of Asia and Eastern Europe).   
 
Shareholding patterns also differ. In some countries such as the UK and the United 
States they may be dispersed or diffuse (Coffee, 2005) or in some cases in the 
hands of large institutional shareholders (pension funds and the like). This pattern 
is different in other countries such as Japan (Coffee, 2005), France, Finland and 
Sweden with banks (Buher et al., 1997; Aguilera and Jackson, 2003), families and 
‘core investors’ (Li and Harrison, 2008, p. 608) playing major roles.  
 
Thirdly, different jurisdictions may not have the markets that are deemed requisite 
for agency theory to work well. Although active and significant markets for 
control, stock and management are highly developed and generally free in 
countries in the west, the same cannot be said for developing and transition 
economies where governments are moving from interventionist to regulatory 
regimes but are also wrestling with issues of flawed or absent market mechanisms 
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and potentially anti-market histories and attitudes (Harriss et al., 1997; Kirkpatrick, 
Parker and Zhang, 2003; North, 1997). 
 
Finally there are the manifest differences in CEO package design and size that are 
not totally attributable to relative pricing structures in the wider markets. Cornish 
(n.d.) reports that in the United States the mean mix of fixed, short-term 
incentives (bonuses etc) and long-term incentives (stock options and the like) is 30, 
24 and 46% respectively, far more inclined towards long term than the other two 
jurisdictions in the survey, the UK where the percentages are 42, 19 and 39 and 
Australia with 52, 17 and 31. Although the detailed breakdown for New Zealand 
companies is not available, Jiang, Habib and Smallman (2008) report that for these 
CEOs the average fixed component in 2004 was 58%.  
 
As for size, Jiang et al. (2008) report that the mean cash compensation (including 
bonuses and other short-term incentives) paid to New Zealand CEOs was 
NZ$524,340, a far cry from the Australian average a mere year later of Aus$2 
million (Australian Council of Superannuation Advisors and ISS Governance 
Services 2010) and in the United States of around US$11.2 million. It might be 
crude analysis but these figures and proportions suggest that some of the 
expectations as per the agency model do not work universally and therefore, 
perhaps the model itself does not have universal application. 
 
 
3.5.2. Institutional Theory as a Contra to Agency 
 
For those seeking an explanation of such variations and a means of assessing 
relevant structures, institutional theory seems to offer some answers. What is this 
theory? Selznick (1996) explains that it is “a voice of resistance to [a]…culture of 
short-sightedness, offers guides to thinking about corporate responsibility, and 
brings into question the goal of maximising profits or returns on capital” (Selznick, 
2006, p. 272). Instead of treating the corporation (or company or firm) as a passive 
nexus for enabling contracts between self-interested economically rational beings 
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(the basis of agency theory), institutional theory gives it a much broader role as an 
adaptable social system (Mason, Kirkbride and Bryde, 2007), thereby also 
empowering those involved in such organisations to respond to other groups 
within that organisation and outside. The theory subsumes stakeholder theory 
(Parkinson, 2003) with its assumption that stakeholders of various types, power 
and location affect both formal and informal processes within the organisation, and 
further acknowledges that stakeholders (or more generally participants) have a 
culturally-oriented impact on the institutions that control behaviour and reward 
outcomes. Before exploring this theory further, some preliminary questions need 
to be addressed. 
 
In what respects does this theory differ from agency? The first departure is in 
respect of some of its fundamental assumptions and ideas. Briefly, in this context 
(and depending on which strand of the theory), “institutions” refer not only to the 
organisations themselves (Selznick, 1996) but also to those social concepts that 
underlie them or as North (1995, p.23) explains, they are “the rules of the 
game…they are comprised of formal rules (statute law, common law, regulations), 
informal constraints (conventions, norms…and self-imposed codes of conduct) and 
the enforcement characteristics of both”. Chhotray and Stoker (2009, p. 64) 
specify that those rules and constraints have three key characteristics: they have 
the ability to govern relationships between individuals and groups, are either 
voluntarily accepted or enforced by some external agency and are predictable.  
 
North (1995, p. 23) describes “neo-classical economists [including those wrestling 
with issues of agency]…  impliedly assum[ing] that institutions …do not matter, 
and that static analysis embodied in allocative efficiency models should be the 
guidance to policy” (also see Chhotray and Stoker, 2009, p. 159 for their point that 
economic theory often overlooks the relationship between the legal system and 
economic development). Therefore, the only reason for their consideration would 
be due to their effect - negative, neutral or positive – on the cost of transactions, 
and therefore their implications for the principal objective: maximising shareholder 
(short-term) wealth.  
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In addition, institutional theory has a reflective function. It can inform institutional 
design (Harriss et al., 1997, p. 2). More generally, there is implicit acceptance that a 
framework of formal ‘rules’ may be the best option within a particular cultural or 
economic context to cope with market failure (Harriss et al., 1997). Such failure 
could be found in a weak equity market (where participants are unrestrained in 
their misuse of information – insider trading), cultural norms or where weakness 
of the economy and its vulnerability to domination by transnational business 
organisations prompt a Government to respond with changes to formal rules – 
including regulations criminalising certain market behaviours, providing import 
controls or offering other sorts of protection (including minimum and maximum 
incomes, levels of foreign ownership or other participation in business (Nwabueze 
and Mileski, 2008). Finally, as Mason et al., (2006) explain, in incorporating informal 
restraints, the theory immediately moves beyond the boundaries assumed by 
agency theory (that the contracts between the agent and principal will be 
determined by agreement and enforcement/control) to look at other relevant 
factors.  
 
A second departure from agency theory relates to the treatment and nature of 
choice. A fundamental assumption for agency theory is that individuals make 
decisions based on rationality (basic cause and effect) (Albanese, et al. 1997), 
primarily economic. The sum of such choices then becomes the choice of the 
collective. Institutional theory sees the situation as more complicated. North 
(1997, p.18) posits that choice is multifaceted because ‘ideas and ideologies’ also 
play a part (consistent also with post-structural ideas of a human as a social 
product, shaped by his or her socio-temporal environment (Foucault, 1973). 
Institutions may reduce the levels of uncertainty that might otherwise result from 
those ideas and ideologies (North, 1995) but does not eliminate them. According 
to (Rutherford, 1995), Commons (1934) takes the matter of ideology further, 
presenting its evolution as a process of modification to ‘habitual assumptions’ 
(Rutherford, 1995, p. 445) – a manifestation of social learning without which no 
progress would be possible.    
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Therefore, if the influence of those ideas and ideologies is such as to prompt a 
decision-maker in an organisation, including a corporation, to reach the conclusion 
that maximising the satisfaction of members and outside groups is achieved 
through increases in charitable donations or sponsorship of the arts, it is difficult to 
then conclude that economic rationality is paramount (in accordance with pure 
economic theory anyway although Jensen and Meckling (1976) might argue 
differently). However, ignoring these other facets to the decision-making process 
will not make them go away. 
 
 
3.5.3. Institutional Theory – Its Meaning and Scope 
 
Are there variations in how theorists define or view this theory?  Due to the 
relative complexity of the theory as compared to agency, there is no single 
approach taken by those researching in the area (Letza et al., 2008). Nor is the 
distinction between the various strands that clear. There is also some dissension 
by institutional theorists about what should be studied and how findings can be 
explained.  
 
Old Institutional Theory 
 
First, there is the so-called ‘old’ institutional theory that recognises the firm or 
company as dynamic, responding to influences from the outside and inside 
(Rutherford, 1995) that may be functions of economic stimuli but that do not have 
to be. This strand places the organisation at the centre of the analysis, referring to 
it as the institution (Selznick, 1996; Leaptrott, 2006) and focuses on the “purposive 
efforts of individuals to respond to environmental pressures” (Leaptrott, 2006, p. 
216). The driving motivations for these individuals are the rituals and formality (the 
internal processes) and values of the organisation (such as employee satisfaction 
and social ethos). It is important to stress that in terms of this strand of the theory 
that external regulatory, political and social pressures are only important for 
 
 
Jens Mueller “Movements in the Long White Cloud of Governance”  Page 93 	  
governance in the form they appear in internal practices and behaviour. Also, 
history matters as it is history of the organisation (subject of course to change) 
that determines current internal structures and practices.  
   
 
 
 
New Institutional Theory 
 
New institutionalism (although Rutherford (2005) refers to it as “old”) shifts focus 
from the company as the institution to the cultural context in which companies 
operate. Therefore, external and internal social and political influences (including 
status, group, reputation, ideology and power) (Rutherford, 1995) are also 
important in both describing and evaluating corporate governance structures. It 
draws on organisational theories and the social, political and economic role of the 
firm to understand and formulate governance “aligned with the concepts of 
citizenship, participation and legitimacy” (Parkinson, 2003, p.491). Consequently, 
such research focuses on identifying those influences and tracking their effect. In 
addition, there is the underlying premise that organisations must reflect social 
norms, lest their legitimacy, resources or even survival is threatened (Nwabueze 
and Mileski, 2008; Li and Harrison, 2008), a premise that supports a normative 
model, not merely a tool for description.  
 
In a very real sense, this new institutionalism is reminiscent of post-structuralism 
with its focus on individuals, groups and organisations with a multiplicity of 
identities and meanings (for example an organisation as employer, producer or 
social player and an individual as voter, employee, group or team leader, investor 
and consumer of products and services) and ‘myths’ or the abstractions, languages 
and symbols that permit individuals to manage their material world (Smith, 1998).  
As Selznick (1996) explains it, formal structures such as companies validate, 
support and maintain myths by responding to external and internal institutions 
through policies, practices and processes.   
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This strand of the theory seeks to explain isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983) of organisations in a particular cultural context – the notion that within a 
context organisations and their governance are more likely to display similarities 
than they are differences. Usefully, van der Steen (2006: 15-18) identifies 
institutional isomorphism as having three mechanisms – that is, means whereby the 
relevant culture is created and changed (also see DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
These are coercive (a function of formal and informal pressures from regulatory 
agencies but also industry organisations, investors, customers and competitors; the 
tendency for organisations to respond to uncertainty by imitating successful ones 
(mimetic isomorphism) and professional and management norms (normative 
isomorphism) and a function of educational theories and approaches and 
monitoring processes.  
 
 
How then do the various strands of institutional theory manage the issues 
associated with corporate governance differently to agency? This is addressed in 
the following section. As part of this discussion, some aspects of agency theory as 
discussed earlier that are seen as problematic for institutional theorists are 
highlighted. 
  
 
3.5.4 Governance Problems – the Institutional Solution  
 
The first major set of problems is a function of the emphasis under agency theory 
on a narrow range of economic factors as a means of measuring firm success and 
CEO performance. These include short-term market indicators, including return 
on investment, share price and dividend policy, for Letza et al. (2008, p.19), the 
outcome of “competitive myopia”. Various issues with this emphasis have been 
identified. First, it fails to acknowledge that the world is riddled with uncertainties 
(McNair and Watts, 2006) and factors that are not easily controllable by the CEO 
(or anyone else in the company). Institutional theory offers an opportunity to 
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identify and control political, economic and other uncertainties (through practices 
such as benchmarking (McNair and Watts, 2006) and workforce training and 
policies) and to permit future strategy and policy in light of pending environmental 
changes.  
 
An example to illustrate this point is research and development of new drugs. In 
the short-term, the interests of shareholders of a drug company are best served by 
investment in drugs that have a ready and easily accessible market, minimal 
development time and expenditure and quick and cheap approval horizon. 
However, society is not best served by such a focus (as the global disease profile is 
constantly changing) and, because many drugs involve much pure research, costs 
and an extended timeline before launch, the long-term interests of shareholders 
are not best served either. There are also the potentially adverse effects of 
publicity on deadly or significant side effects or reactions that can bring a drug 
producer down (Thalidomide, a drug from the 1960s that caused gross birth 
defects in thousands of victims, still provides a salutary lesson today).  
 
Secondly, there is the matter of remuneration for CEOs. As identified above, some 
(although not all) research suggests that the link between the remuneration of 
CEOs and company performance is unclear (Tevlin, 1996; Ramsay, 1993; Murphy, 
2002). Nor is the optimum mix or size easy to establish with any degree of 
certainty (Gordon, 2002; Matolcscy and Wright, 2007). Some researchers find a 
positive correlation (Fama and Jensen, 1983) but others find it to be weak or non-
existent (Jensen and Murphy, 1990; Tevlin, 1996). One explanation for this might 
be that the mix is wrong (Murphy, 2002). Another might lie in the assumption that 
there should be a positive link.  
 
Even more problematically, linking return for the CEO to company performance 
(through stock-based and bonus type incentives) may encourage the CEO and 
other members of management to respond to the market signals by manipulating 
financial data (Fogarty and Markarian, 2009; Zhang, Bartol, Smith, Pfarrer and 
Khanin, 2008). Such manipulation can include retiming of expenditure, restatement 
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or recalculation of income (Catanach and Rhoades, 2007) or other more significant 
creative accounting mechanisms Haldeman 2006 (discussing Enron); Tran (2002) 
(referring to WorldCom).  
 
Consider, for example, the CEO with independent wealth. A large compensation 
package might be offered to encourage that person to become CEO and there may 
be a positive correlation between compensation and performance. However, that 
correlation is of little value as an explanatory tool because that person has little to 
no reliance on that position for their financial well-being. At best, size and 
structure of the package may be seen by the market as a proxy for board 
confidence in that person and by the individual as an indicator of esteem and trust 
(Davis, 2010). In other words, there are real difficulties in reaching a conclusion 
that the package size caused the positive performance. More fundamentally and of 
direct strategic importance, a narrow focus on package and an unquestioning 
assumption that it will improve performance is arguably a factor in the 
astronomical growth in compensation levels (The Economist, 2003; Davis, 2010)    
 
Institutional theorists therefore look to other motivations. As referred to above, 
such personal concerns as status, power, group and reputation (Rutherford, 1995) 
are also considered important drivers for CEOs to work to maximise performance 
of the company or other organisation.  To this could be added personal interest, 
ambition, the desire to do good and cooperate with others for the common good. 
 
Another set of problems for agency theory is associated with the premise that 
agents needs persuading (and perhaps can only be persuaded), via an appropriate 
set of incentives, to put their self-interest aside in favour of that of the principal. 
Yet individuals might make decisions for other reasons! Lockhart (2007) attacks 
the stringencies of, and ‘obsession’ with, agency theory for blinding the monitors 
and the CEOs themselves to the place of trust in the relationship. Ironically, such 
lack of trust may prompt the CEO to be more risk-averse than the shareholders – 
a problem identified by agency theorists - and pursue achievable easily measurable 
and straightforward short-term goals rather than long-term objectives, again an 
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agency problem. In addition, for Alces (2008) a significant effect of this structure of 
incentives and control has been the effective elimination, with very narrowly 
defined exceptions, of a fundamental underlying concept of the company - the 
fiduciary – again seriously challenging any suggestion that trust has any part to play 
in the modern company. 
 
Arguably, part of this trust issue has to do with the group to which the CEO or 
director as agent is held accountable. Certainly, one of the most important 
relationships for a commercial organisation is that that exists between its owners 
and its managers (the focus of agency theory and also one recognised under 
institutional theory and stakeholder theory). However, it is not the only one. In a 
world of capitalistic choice, without satisfied customers, the long-term future of 
the company is bleak; without capital from lenders or prospective shareholders any 
expansion or developmental plans are unlikely to succeed; without goodwill from 
community and regulators/law enforcers the company may find itself the target of 
social criticism or unwelcome investigatory attention. Yet a focus on short-term 
present shareholder interests may discourage the CEO from expending resources 
on cultivating these other relationships. 
 
For non-profit and public sector organisations this range of interests is even more 
marked (Mason, Kirkbride and Bryde, 2007; Hazeldine and Quiggan, 1997; Wallis, 
1997). Ethical and professional considerations too might spur CEOs and other 
decision makers to act in certain ways. In this context and given the discussion 
above on the application of agency theory to New Zealand’s public sector reforms, 
it is useful to consider Shick’s concern (Allen Shick was invited by the New 
Zealand Treasury and State Services Commission to provide an independent and 
unbiased assessment of the New Zealand reforms) over the effect over-
enthusiastic adherence to agency and other aspects of contractarianism might have 
– specifically that it “may diminish public-regarding values and behaviour in 
government” (Wallis, 1997, p. 493).   
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In addition, regulatory bodies, most importantly governments, may react to 
adverse publicity or events with the calamity model of action – again having 
potentially problematic and costly effects for companies. Campbell (1997), in his 
criticism of the direction of company legislation in the UK and similar jurisdictions, 
considers that the focus in the reform process on technical aspects of agency 
theory (again a lack of trust) has led to a “derogation of ethics as the basis of the 
obligations of company executives”. This “ethical emptiness [has led] to [their]…. 
flatly exploitative actions” (Campbell, 1997, p. 345).  
 
Overall, it is claimed that institutional theory offers a rich alternative to the 
narrow-minded, static approach offered by agency theory (Letza et al., 2008). By 
drawing on a range of social science disciplines (including sociology, psychology, 
economics, law, politics and others) it is possible to increase understanding of what 
motivates individuals and groups within an organisation (Van den Abeele, 2007); 
explain how and why managers and directors make decisions (Yiu and Makino, 
2001; Campbell, 2007), thereby ensuring appropriate process and structure; 
explore the role of ideologies, ethics, power and personalities in determining 
direction and decisions within hitherto univocal groupings (Letza et al., 2008; Li and 
Harrison, 2007; Mason et al., 2007; Mtar, 2010); create robust models for 
governance in different settings and for different purposes (Mason et al., 2007, 
Nwabueze and Mileski, 2006; Bates, 1995) and establish the institutional 
mechanisms to maximise individual and social welfare (Kahn, 1995; Jwa et al., 
2000).  
    
By way of illustration of this argument, it is useful to discuss briefly Nwabueze and 
Mileski (2008) and their analysis of Swissair, a partly government-owned company 
“renowned as a flying bank and…national symbol” (Nwabueze and Mileski, 2008, p. 
584). They point to findings that the Swiss business sector was effectively 
controlled by 300 people through a network of interlocking directorships (Steger 
and Krapf, 2002). Although there was a legally required separation of powers 
between the board and the management of this company, the board was populated 
by business colleagues and friends and political appointees. Business people on the 
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board were also involved in other companies - whose board members were on 
Swissair’s board - and Swissair was regarded as “source of national pride” 
(Nwabueze and Mileski, 2008, p. 584), an important consideration for the political 
appointees.  
 
Given these realities, to challenge the decision of the CEO of Swissair to pursue a 
strategy of acquisition in the extremely volatile global aviation industry of the time 
(the 1990s) was to threaten the very structure of Swiss corporate governance. As 
a result, the Board failed to ask the right questions and the company ultimately 
failed in 2002.  
 
Nwabueze and Mileski (2008) explain that agency theory would be inadequate in 
explaining how managers and directors in a situation like that prevailing at Swissair 
could deal with non-shareholder interests. Clearly here political considerations, 
social pride and social and business networks were much more important than 
either economic concerns or risk management (given the volatility of the aviation 
market of the time). Therefore, they opted for institutional theory given its ability 
to acknowledge that individuals within organisations may be driven by factors other 
than economic. 
 
 
3.5.5. Institutional Theory: The Criticisms  
 
Not everyone is positive about the contribution to governance research offered by 
institutional theory. First, and as a general point, it should be noted that certain of 
the criticisms levelled against stakeholder theory also can be levelled against 
institutional theory. For the proponents of shareholder theory (Friedman, 1970), 
the danger posed to business through the diffusion of responsibility and the 
difficulty of establishing with any degree of assurance, exactly who or what factors 
or interests should be considered of importance to governance.  
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Other criticisms are more specific to institutional theory in general, to its specific 
strands and to its application or use. General criticisms include its persistent 
conceptual confusion (Peters, 2000). Even the short introductions above to two 
main strands hint at this confusion, while Peters (2000) considers that the 
approaches or strands are actually contradictory. Also, there is lack of consensus 
as to how individuals interact with institutions in making judgments about policies 
and actions. While, as Peters points out, March and Olson (1989) ‘argue 
vigorously’ (Peters, 2000, p.5) that preferences are affected by the person’s 
experience with the institution (endogenous), others argue that they are 
exogenous or not affected by any such experience. In addition and as also indicated 
above, there are different meanings applied to institutions themselves – from old 
institutional theory with the focus on the organisation as a formal institution and 
the new – with its far broader and less distinct meaning. 
 
Old institutional theory has been criticised on several fronts. Noorgard (2001) for 
example, explains that the environmental backdrop is seen as static and 
unchanging, a point also made by Van der Steen (2006).  To this could be added 
the difficulty involved in defining the important aspects of that external 
environment, their respective influence and therefore a lack of rigour in results 
from empirical research. Thirdly, the focus on formal and clear structures and their 
implied rationality, system and discipline (Selznick, 1996) has been criticised as 
inconsistent with the loose, changing and disorganised reality (Selznick, 1996). By 
way of contrast, new institutional theory (as defined above) has been criticised for 
its lack of focus and clarity. In particular, Rutherford (1995) describes Commons’ 
(1943) interpretation of the ideological evolution as adaption to change, as lacking 
detail and precision.  
 
Finally, Aguilera and Jackson (2003) are of the opinion that while institutional 
theory is a response to the ‘under socialised’ characteristic of agency theory (as 
being overly dismissive of  ‘institutional embeddedness’ and its effect on corporate 
governance), they consider that institutional theory suffers by stint of going to the 
other extreme – that it is ‘over socialised’ (its model or models too abstract to 
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deal with conflicts and cooperation at firm level). In seeking means to make 
institutional theory concepts work (their particular focus being the different 
corporate governance structures and practices in different jurisdictions - which is 
where we started this discussion), they prefer an ‘actor-centred’ approach; hence 
governance will be the function of the characteristics, interactions and preferences 
of these three stakeholders but also as moderated and influenced by institutional 
factors.   
 
The above discussion clearly signals the importance placed on strategies and 
mechanisms to maximise the performance and responsiveness of management of 
organisations (especially companies). While it is acknowledged that the main group 
with an interest is this responsiveness is that of the owners (normally 
shareholders) institutional theory in particular acknowledges also that other 
groups are affected by the organisation and in fact it may not be in the company’s 
best interests to ignore that. Institutional theory also posits that such 
consideration is not only an expectation but a given – the economic rationality 
assumed under agency theory is coloured by political, social and behavioural 
considerations.   
 
The final theory to be explored due to its relevance to corporate governance is 
resource dependence or dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salanick, 1978; 
Christopher, 2010; Muth and Donaldson, 1998). This is worthwhile discussing 
separately from those above due to its potential significance in addressing the 
particular issues of governance in SMEs.  
 
 
3.6     Alternatives to Agency Theory: Resource Dependence Theory 
  
A theme that emerges again and again, no matter what the theoretical construct, is 
that in the interests of good governance, boards should protect the interests of 
owners, by way of selection and monitoring management conduct, but also, and 
perhaps more importantly, by determining strategy and providing and exploiting 
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vital resources that will permit the company to thrive and grow (Bennett and 
Robson 2004; Gabrielsson and Huse 2005).  
 
To enable this wide range of functions to be executed this theory assumes that the 
board have at its disposal expertise, experience, networks and contacts, and skills 
and, if not, will take the necessary steps to acquire them (Muth and Donaldson, 
1998). This range of resources is described as ‘board capital’ (Christopher, 2010) 
but, he also points out, is largely ignored by agency theory with its focus on 
monitoring. This theory is largely disproved for New Zealand as this research 
shows that the quality of skills around the board table is less-than-excellent, and 
thus the ‘buy-in’ of skills is not widely practiced, given the ‘closed system’ of board 
appointments we see in the old boys network of director recruitment in New 
Zealand. 
 
The questions then arise: How does a board acquire the necessary skills, expertise 
and experience, and what does that say about the constitution and size of a board 
in any given situation?  
 
Pfeffer (1972) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) explains that a board looking to 
satisfy its vital governance functions will look to attract directors who can 
contribute: Whether that contribution supports that provided by existing 
members or offers new and innovative skills or other advantages. In a sense similar 
to the situation under stewardship theory, once a new member is on the board, 
the organization “expects the individual will come to support the organization, will 
concern himself with its problems, will favourably present it to others, and will try 
to aid it” (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978).  The proof of the benefits arising from such 
aid and support comes in improved firm performance (Boyd, 1990; Dalton et. al. 
1998; Pfeffer, 1972) and, theoretically at least, the constitution and size of the 
board will be optimal for the purpose: a small firm might rely on very few multi-
skilled members while a large may realise growth and innovation by way of a well-
resourced board boasting a range of talents and connections (Christopher, 2010) .  
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It is also possible to suggest that the selection of a manager that can enrich the 
resources available to the board may also improve firm performance (Christopher, 
2010; Toms and Filatotchev, 2004). In such an instance, the gap between the board 
and manager so carefully cultivated by agency theory may be narrowed in the 
overall interests of the firm.  
 
Arguably, and as mentioned at the beginning of this brief introduction to the 
theory, it is for SMEs more than any other size of enterprise that resource 
dependency theory is most relevant as a framework in which to both describe and 
evaluate governance structures and practices. In particular, the costs in having a 
large number of directors (to include the range of talents and skills to enable 
survival and growth) are likely to be prohibitive to SMEs. Therefore, survival and 
growth becomes more the result of some game of chance than of logic and 
business nous.  
 
Finally, and by way of summary and conclusion to this chapter, Daily et al. (2003) 
explains that “the overwhelming emphasis in governance research has been on the 
efficacy of the various mechanisms available to protect shareholders from the self 
interested whims of executives” (Daily et al., 2003, p. 371). However, governance 
is not just about management decision-making. Rather it can be argued that its 
underlying purpose has long been much broader - encompassing the range of steps 
and strategies that are instrumental in improving company performance.  
 
The theories expounded as alternatives to agency theory – as described in the 
latter part of this chapter attempt to shift attention from the protection 
mechanism: Monitoring, that is the focus of agency theory, to firm performance – 
arguing that to achieve this over the long term it is necessary for governance 
mechanisms to acknowledge and manage the broad and complex relationships a 
firm as social actor must foster and do those for the long-term benefit of the firm. 
The board of directors plays a vital and central role in such identification and 
management. 
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The following chapter explores issues around the composition of boards of 
directors, specifically the importance, characteristics, role and success of the 
independent director (which is increasingly seen in various jurisdictions (including 
the US, UK, Australia and New Zealand) as the best means of maintaining the gap 
between the board as monitor and manager as monitored mooted by agency 
theory as pivotal to governance) and the best means of addressing principle six 
(OECD, 2004).  Another aspect to be explored is the motivation for individuals to 
become directors on the assumption that firms benefit the most (maximising 
performance) where there is a good fit between director motivation and firm 
needs.  
 
It should be noted that most of the cited research on independent directors 
focuses on large corporates. This is an important point as the reservation could be 
raised as to its relevance to the issue of governance of SMEs that is such an 
important theme of this work. However, it also has another implication: raising 
questions as to the relevance of independent directors to many firms in the New 
Zealand business context. In particular, with the propensity for New Zealand firms 
to involve family in ownership and management, or to be so small that directors 
also act as managers of the same firm (with the consequence that independent 
directors are still more a rarity than the norm, at least for SMEs), it is important to 
ask why such directors are increasingly being sought by such firms. 
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CHAPTER 4: COMPOSITION OF BOARDS 
 
 
4.1 Purpose of the Chapter 
 
As is the case with chapters 2 and 3, the purpose of this chapter is to provide 
background, context and rationale for the empirical research documented and 
reported in chapter 4. Therefore, the hypotheses to be tested in the research are 
validated and supported by reference to research findings and questions explored 
previously.  
 
   
4.2. Overview 
 
An effective Board of Directors has been identified as pivotal for good corporate 
governance and performance of companies both in the private and, increasingly, 
the public sector (Bainbridge, 2008; Bale and Dale, 1998; Borokhovich, Parrino and 
Trapani, 1996; Coles and Hesterley, 2000; Hazeldine and Quiggan, 2005; Petrovic, 
2008). Published research has centred largely on empirical indicators of the 
effectiveness of its monitoring and control of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) as 
the head of the management team of a large publicly traded corporate such as 
return on investment, control of CEO incentive packages and performance in the 
markets for control and finance.  
 
In particular, the presence and role of independent directors have raised questions 
about the ability of such directors to improve corporate governance more 
generally through control and oversight of the CEO. Of relevance to that question 
is the troubling realisation that the three biggest US Bankruptcies ever – Enron, 
WorldCom, and Conseco – occurred in part because of accounting practices that 
the boards either were not aware of or did not understand (Lawler and Worley, 
2011.)  
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The definition, role and effectiveness of independent directors therefore provide 
the focus for the discussion in the first part of the chapter. As part of this, and 
based on the at best ambivalent findings of research into the area, an explanation is 
offered of the growth of independent directors by reference to institutional 
theory. Fundamental to such effectiveness is motivation: the reasons why 
individuals join and participate in boards, and criteria: why particular individuals are 
deemed desirable potential directors. These aspects are explored in the second 
part where reference is made also to experiences reported by such directors.    
 
However, two important preliminary points should be made. First is a matter of 
definition. Caution has to be exercised when discussing research on the role and 
success of independent directors as the term is not used in a consistent way. 
Consequently in the discussion that follows, attempts are made to emphasise 
where there are inconsistencies in the terminology. More specifically, and despite 
theorists and regulators using these terms to refer to different things (Harvard 
Law Review, 2006; Clarke, 2007b), the term has been associated with (or in some 
cases encapsulated by) non-executive directors (who may be insiders or outsiders), 
outsiders (who may alternatively be tied or ’grey’ (Felo, 2001)), non-employees 
(who may again not be independent but instead be insiders or grey), non-
interested (who may have no financial ties to the company) and disinterested 
directors. Furthermore, some authors have discussed independent directors 
without offering any definition, increasing the uncertainties surrounding the 
literature.  
 
On the other hand, McCabe and Nowak (2008), in their analysis of views held by 
Australian public separate company board members (both executive and 
independent) on their experience with independent directors, draw a distinction 
between non-executive directors who are considered to be independent and those 
who are not (2008, p.549). In drawing this distinction they emphasise that 
independence is more a state than compliance with a set of rules. Independence is 
not truly achieved unless the director can display independence of mind (the 
confidence to disagree with management and the level of understanding sufficient 
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to support that confidence), independence of information (the ability to source 
information from somewhere other than management or at least have the skills to 
critique that information), independence of income (to remove the fear of removal 
of financial support should their role on the board be terminated) and 
independence from the organisation (a lack of reliance on the company for 
business or employment – essentially any connection that might influence objective 
decision making.) In addition though, questions have been raised as to what true 
independence entails. For example, and given the concern that shareholder 
interests be supported and safeguarded, does or should independence means 
independence also from shareholders? Swan and Honeine (2010) argue that “if 
protecting shareholder interests is the task non-executive directors are facing, than 
surely alignment with and not independence from shareholders is ideal”(Swan and 
Honeine, 2010, p11). 
 
In light of the above, it is of interest to consider the definition of independence in 
the  OECD principles. The term “independent director” is defined in the 1999 
principles as “board members not…employed by the company and not…closely 
related to the company or its management through significant economic, family or 
other ties. This does not prevent shareholders being board members” (OECD, 
1999, p.24). By the time the principles had been revised in 2004, the definition had 
been expanded to exclude directors of affiliates of the company from the definition 
of independent (OECD, 2004, p. 64). However, it is perhaps important to 
remember that the OECD principles did not come out of the blue but both built 
on and reflected practice and principles already in place. The trend for some time 
in various jurisdictions (most particularly the UK and the US) had been towards 
the presence of independent directors.  
 
Secondly, one significant aspect stands out from the rhetoric on corporate 
governance and the function of the Board. This is the assumption that conclusions 
can be drawn that are universally applicable and by analogy, that a unitary approach 
can be applied in determining optimum characteristics and mix of members on the 
Board of Directors and optimum incentives that will attract that optimum mix.  
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Several problems arise in this regard. Firstly, the focus in the published literature 
on the Board of large, publicly traded companies tends to ignore, or at least 
diminish, the different roles and direction of directors in different types of 
organisation most disregarded is the small to medium size company that may have 
very different objectives, priorities, characteristics and focus to the large corporate 
(Bennett and Robson, 2004; Mueller, Dana, McDonald and Maier, 2006). Ironically 
perhaps, the statistics suggest such disregard is rash: it is estimated that some 95% 
of enterprises across the OECD are small to medium and furthermore, provide 
some 60-70% of employment (Ministry of Economic Development, 2007).  
 
Secondly, directors tend to be classified not so much in accordance with behaviour 
but more by reference to their connection to the company. Increasingly, and in 
accordance with agency theory, affiliated directors are considered less effective 
monitors than independent, a position that is at odds with stewardship theory that 
indicates that such directors are eminently capable of providing alternative 
perspectives and expertise (Arosa, Iturralde and Maseda, 2010).   
 
Thirdly and relatedly, treating the Board as some sort of monolithic “black box” 
(Neill and Dulwicz, 2010) without understanding the characteristics and 
motivations of the actual individuals on that Board carries the risk of obscuring the 
true picture of how decisions are made by those individuals and therefore, 
potentially, the danger signals that forewarn of problems adversely impacting the 
present effectiveness of the Board and possibly its future (sparked by, for example, 
the departure of valued Board members).   
 
Although not exactly on point, the conclusion drawn by Taylor, Chait and Holland 
(1996) on non-profit organisations is also relevant to the matter of motivation of 
directors. They explain that the boards of such organisations are often “a 
collection of high-powered people engaged in low-level activities” (Taylor et al., 
1996, p. 36). With little personal accountability, little experience in working as a 
team or in dealing with issues of governance they may offer little of positive value 
 
 
Jens Mueller “Movements in the Long White Cloud of Governance”  Page 109 	  
to the organisation. “The stakes remain low, the meetings process-driven, the 
outcomes ambiguous and the deliberations insular.” (Taylor et al., 1996, p.36)  It 
would be too easy, therefore, for such individuals, regardless of the laudatory 
purpose they had in joining such a board, to withdraw commitment and enthusiasm 
to the point of departure and thereby having a potentially negative impact on 
board effectiveness and organisational performance.  
 
As a starting point, it is perfectly conceivable that the motivation for directors can 
vary significantly by reference to their context. More generally, motivation can 
differ as between small and large businesses, individual director categories and 
between businesses in different industry contexts. In other words, it is very 
possible that a one-size fits all approach is unsuitable in determining why Directors 
join boards and therefore the incentives that will attract them, maximise their 
effectiveness and encourage them to stay. It is also very possible that some 
directors, as suggested in chapter 1, may be motivated to serve not because of 
personal advantage but because they wish to provide some advantage to the firm 
and its members. 
 
 
4.3 Independent Directors and the Board 
 
4.3.1 Context 
 
Despite the fact there is a strong body of opinion that the focus should really be 
on best directors with the term ‘best’ encompassing individuals that have the ability 
to think autonomously and objectively regardless of their other interests (business, 
social or personal, it is generally accepted that a high degree of board 
independence strengthens the board and improves its effectiveness  As mentioned 
previously, statute law and codes (both examples of institutions) are increasingly 
blunt in demanding independent directors for listed companies, often requiring an 
arbitrary number on publicly listed firms’ boards, although no such obligation exists 
for the boards of unlisted firms.   
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In many jurisdictions, the presence of such directors on the board of public and/or 
listed companies is thus considered de rigueur in this first part of the twenty first 
century.  In Switzerland 81.3% of board members are independent directors, in 
Canada 73.6%, and the USA 68.5% (Maier, 2005) and considered to provide an 
important guarantee of integrity and accountability (Pass, 2004). In its first 
published Principles of Corporate Governance in 1999, the OECD emphasised the 
important role for independent directors (OECD, 1999, p. 24) and included a 
strong recommendation that non-executive members should have a role to play in 
important decisions (OECD, 1999, p. 24). Six years on and an international study 
concluded that director independence was considered by many respondents as the 
most important corporate governance issue (Ritchie, 2007). To meet the new 
demands and challenges many corporations are seeking to renovate their 
corporate governance policies and practices, including policies around 
requirements for independent directors.  Recent reviews and proposals for 
corporate governance reform such as those put forward in the Turner Review 
(Financial Services Authority, 2009) and the Walker Report (Financial Reporting 
Council, 2009) (UK) and the US Department of the Treasury (2009, dealing with 
executive compensation) focus primarily on improving director independence in 
relation to executive remuneration and compensation policy but the proposed 
reforms would have the potential to address other aspects of independence such 
as managerial capture as well. 
 
As something of a diversion, and in light of the wide diversity of contexts (see 
discussion in chapter 3, particularly in relation to institutional theory) and firm 
characteristics nationally and internationally, how can this consistency of demand 
be explained? One possibility is to consider this growth within an institutional 
framework.  
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4.3.2 Institutional Theory and Board Composition 
 
Institutional theory predicates governance as an ‘articulated system of meaning’ 
(Fiss, 2008, p. 391) and that company strategy, processes and behaviour reflect 
such meaning. If prevailing theories and logics on distribution of power in the 
organisation and on the ‘natural’ (Fiss, 2008, p. 391) order assumes a proportion of 
independent directors on boards as a norm, what does that say about their spread 
and the rationale for their presence?  
 
As explained in chapter 3, the theory seeks to explain how various rules, practices 
and other structures (or institutions) have evolved in the way they have, and new 
institutional theory, in particular, looks at how institutions associated with 
organizations become more homogeneous over time.   
 
Assuming board composition, along with the regulations and rules that drive it, can 
be defined as an ‘institution’, it is possible then to explore how two related 
influencers (legitimacy and isomorphism) (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2001) have caused widespread acceptance and adoption of 
independent directors as the norm.   
 
Briefly, legitimacy is defined as “a generalised perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 
574). Novel organizations might incorporate characteristics that society deems 
appropriate or expected in the environment because by doing so helps them gain 
legitimacy and obtain resources needed for survival (Scott, 1995; 2001). Ashforth 
and Gibbs (1990, p.181) point out that “management may choose to identify the 
issue in question with other actors, values, or symbols that are themselves 
legitimate”. 
 
The concept of isomorphism as applied in institutional theory  demonstrates how 
organizations may be similar (DiMaggio and and Powell, 1983; 2003; Scott, 1995) 
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(although strategic choice, which allows for decisions to be made in response to 
external pressures and forces such as those exuded by regulatory agencies 
(Stevens and Slack, 1998) is also highly relevant). It must be stressed, however, that 
this evolution may not be economically rational.   
 
For example, sometimes institutional change occurs through diffusion of practices 
from one organization to another as organizations attempt to gain legitimacy by 
copying practices of other companies in their sphere who they see as successful 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  The homogeneity that results from organizations 
fashioning their own practices based on those of peer organizations is sometimes 
referred to as mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The institutional 
logic behind this cultural-cognitive element of institutions is that of orthodoxy—a 
shared understanding among members of a group as to what constitutes 
established practice (Scott, 2003). 
 
Specifically to board composition, certain practices of corporations may be diffused 
to other organizations within a sphere —for example, within an industry, a 
country, a group of countries or even worldwide—through a process of mimetic 
isomorphism as organizations strive to attain and maintain legitimacy within their 
reference group. As indicated in chapter 2, Li and Harrison (2008) found that 
cultural attributes of a country influenced the proportion of outside directors that 
are found on boards. 
 
Another factor that can influence institutions is regulation (leading to coercive 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell,1983)). Laws and sanctions have a direct 
impact as organizations have little discretion to avoid such change and conform to 
avoid sanctions and loss of legitimacy (Scott, 1995; 2003).  
 
In the context of board of directors, new laws directing specific types of board 
composition (such as the requirement for independent directors of listed 
companies in the US, UK, Australia and New Zealand (see chapter 2) would be an 
example of such a coercive force for homogeneity (Duchin et al.2008)). 
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A third force for isomorphism (normative isomorphism) (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983) emerges where normative structures suggest a need for change driven by a 
sense of what would be most appropriate (Scott, 1995; 2003). Normative forces 
can include the influence of professional organizations or affiliations through which 
what might be considered superior practices are diffused throughout the 
organization’s reference group.   
 
Again in relation to boards, normative influences could occur through professional 
associations relating to governance or by way of director training and credentialing. 
Professional associations may raise potential problems associated with board of 
director composition and identify solutions that may be diffused through 
organization managers or directors affiliated with these professional associations. 
Dahya and McConnell (2007) report that companies in the UK increased 
proportions of outside directors in response to a recommendation of the Cadbury 
Report that boards should have at least three (even though these 
recommendations have never been made law). They find that the increased 
proportion of outside directors is positively associated with company performance. 
Selekler-Goksen and Oktem (2009) found evidence that family companies in 
Turkey changed their board composition in response to codes of best practices 
developed in other jurisdictions. 
 
An organization’s reference group is that against which an organization compares 
itself and within which it strives to maintain legitimacy, is often referred to as the 
organizational field (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). It can be observed that with 
globalization, organizational fields are expanding beyond the local or national level. 
This suggests a greater ability of institutions to become diffused from one nation to 
another. 
 
So why are independent directors considered so valuable?  Many in the financial, 
institutions and academic worlds see the independent director as an important 
agent against self-interested management groups and shareholder lobbies.  
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However, it would seem, no consistent message as to the effectiveness of 
independent directors has emerged.  
 
The hypotheses to test are:  
 
H2 = Independent directors are considered to contribute positively to the board. 
H3 = Director contributions are not seen to be equally important by directors and 
shareholders. 
 
It should be noted that H3 refers to directors rather than independent directors 
(which of course means that respondents are asked to judge the contribution of 
insiders as well as independents). The reason for couching this hypothesis as such 
is that shareholders may find it difficult to distinguish between the relative 
contributions of these two groups. This is particularly so as, and as discussed 
previously, independent directors on New Zealand boards are still below what is 
the norm in other countries, and are only mandated for publicly listed firms. With 
>98% firms in New Zealand unlisted, such regulatory mandates do not extend to 
the vast majority. 
 
However, based on the assumption that directors were much more likely to be in 
a position to make such a distinction, and as independent directors interact more 
with the other board members than with shareholders, directors might be in a 
better position to determine whether independent directors add value to boards 
in New Zealand. independent directors provided the focus for relevant questions 
asked during the follow-up interviews. Overall, a reasonable question to ask is, if it 
is demonstrated and accepted that independent directors deliver value, even 
where their inclusion is optional, firms might decide on the inclusion of outsiders 
on the board. 
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4.4    Rationale for independent directors 
 
By way of introduction to this section it is worth referring to the OECD (2004) 
where it states that “The corporate governance framework should ensure the 
strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by the 
board, and the board’s accountability to the company and the shareholders” 
(OECD, 2004, p.24). Clearly, its three main roles are to determine strategy, 
monitor management and to account to shareholders for the use of company 
assets and resources (Carver and Oliver, 2002). In achieving those roles, the Board 
is responsible for ensuring legal requirements are met (including those specifying 
the form of financial and other reporting to shareholders and, if listed, the 
requirements of the particular exchange or other body involved in determining 
rules). The growing support in the courts, specialists and some business groups led 
to the mandating of independent directors as an integral part of the governance 
structure in the Sabarnes-Oxley Act 2002 (Wallison, 2006, p.1).  
 
By reference to those roles, and in an attempt to clarify the situation as to 
whether and what independent directors contribute to the company, the following 
section documents the arguments that have been made for independent directors 
by reference to two principle roles and qualities often attributed to them – 
improving shareholder value (an aspect not only of accountability but also of 
strategy) and monitoring of management (also inclusive of strategic guidance). 
 
 
4.4.1   Improvement in Shareholder Value 
 
One of the important rationales for independent directors is that they increase 
shareholder value (Harvard Law Review, 2006; McCabe and Nowak, 2008; Petra, 
2005). Gordon (2007, p.1471) considers this to be a function of a focus on market 
value as a proxy for firm performance. As independent directors are less ‘wedded’ 
(Gordon, 2007, p.1471) to inside accounts of company prospects and less worried 
about the personal implications for them of public disclosure of sensitive 
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information, they have the potential to create significant value from the efficient 
allocation of resources not only for their own company but right through the 
economy. In particular, and in an ideal world, these directors are independent 
thinkers who can play a decisive role in influencing strategic decisions.  Also in an 
ideal situation, shareholders can rely on independent directors to validate 
disclosure, provide an objective view in relation to the operations of the company 
and to participate in conflict resolution.  
 
Black (2001) indicates that independent directors can help shareholders identify 
disclosure problems while Lorsch and MacIver (1989) argue that firms can be 
evaluated and monitored by such directors.  In addition, Byrd and Hickman (1992) 
point out that they can effectively protect and endorse the interest of minority 
shareholders. Gupta and Fields (2009) find that the stock market responds more 
negatively to resignations of independent directors than to resignations of internal 
directors, suggesting that investors value their specific contributions. 
 
Matolcsy, Stokes and Wright (2004) argue that firms with substantial growth 
options can enhance their value by appointing a higher proportion of independent 
directors to the board.  They also point out where company has potential growth 
options, “outside directors do add value (1) in their first year of appointment and 
(2) where they have three or more other board positions” Matolcsy et al. (2004, p. 
38). 
 
Studies by Dahya and McConnell (2007) and Duchin et al. (2008) identified 
conditions under which increased utilization of independent directors is positively 
associated with organizational performance. Exogenous changes in board structure 
exploit shifts in regulatory environments and provide evidence that increase in 
board independence precede improvements in firm performance. 
 
However, empirical evidence suggests that the presence of independent directors 
on the board is not necessarily always positive. There are also suggestions that 
their effectiveness is limited to specific roles and functions. Duchin et al. (2008) 
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found the effect of outside directors on firm performance was small on average, 
while Baysinger and Hoskisson (1990) suggest that their presence can harm the 
innovation and creativity of the organisation. Finally, while Baglioni and Columbo 
(2011) consider that their presence is merited because such directors do a better 
job at monitoring due to the lack of a direct link to the CEO (explained 
elsewhere), in terms of performance, these authors maintain it is positively affected 
by executive directors and negatively by independent.  
 
More specific to the non-profit sector, where directors are volunteers and work 
without compensation, the recruitment of independent directors is thought to 
come with certain disadvantages. Independent directors may not only lack specific 
knowledge to support innovation, but they are also hard to retain (Brody, 1996; 
Pati, 2007) and recruit (Pati, 2007). In general it is advisable to recruit directors 
who have a connection to the organisation as they are more likely to be available 
for recruitment, and will be more motivated (Taylor, Chait and Holland, 1991). 
Unfortunately many independent directors do not have such connections and 
those directors who are insiders are seen by some to be more easily recruited, 
easier to retain and have stronger motivation (De Andres-Alonso, Azofa-
Palenzuela and Romero-Merino, 2009).  
 
Overall, it would seem, the effect of outside directors on firm performance varies 
according to the information environment of a firm: outside directors are effective 
when the cost of acquiring information about a firm is low, but less so when the 
cost of acquiring information is high. This also tallies with the monitoring role 
under agency theory where, despite some documented mix of expertise and views 
amongst board members in some jurisdictions (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Buher, 
Rasheed and Rosenstein, 1997; Alces, 2007), it is assumed that monitoring the 
decisions of the CEO is most efficiently achieved by members fully informed about 
the business and its business environment (Nowak and McCabe, 2003). Therefore, 
for many companies in the United States, industry expertise and experience in 
independents are priority characteristics (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Peterson and 
Philpot, 2007).   
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The whole issue of monitoring by independent directors is addressed below. It 
should be emphasised as a preliminary point, that for some researchers, effective 
monitoring leads to good firm performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Baysinger and 
Butler, 1985; Coles and Hesterley, 2000; Beasley,1996) but not for all (Petra, 2005 
(maybe); Hermalin and Weisbach,1991 (no); Ghosh and Sirmans 2005 (no)). 
 
 
4.4.2  Oversight of Management (particularly CEO) performance and  
 reward (monitoring) 
 
Shareholders of a company have problems ensuring that those responsible for the 
management of that company do not maximise their own short-term benefits (as 
agents) at the expense of the owners’ long-term interests (as principals) 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Borokhovich, Parrino and Trapani, 1996). Bhagat and Black (2002) argue that there 
is a “conventional wisdom that the board’s principal task is to monitor 
management, and only independent directors can be effective monitors.” (2002, p. 
231). It is in this context, therefore, that independent directors are identified as 
particularly important (Cadbury Committee, 1992; Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Lawrence and Stapledon, 1999; Helland and Sykuta, 2005). A cohort of 
independent directors on a board can minimise the likelihood of board capture by 
management and mitigate the potential for conflicts of interest among board 
members that may influence the independence of non-executive board members, 
their orientation towards, and their relationships with, management and other 
stakeholders. Siagian and Tresnaningsih (2011) identify another advantage of 
independent directors that arises from the above: their ability to exercise 
independent judgment and resist the influence of management actually reduces 
agency costs from monitoring.  
 
At the same time, and as indicated in chapter 3, the presence of independent 
directors is regarded by some as a reliable means of maintaining the gap between 
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the monitor and the to-be-monitored entity and activities. Most particularly, that 
monitoring comes via management of  remuneration and incentive packages for 
CEOs. This issue has been identified over a long period as being of major concern. 
Epstein and Roy (2005) refer to complaints by investors that CEO remuneration is 
both excessive and de-linked from firm performance while more recently Hindery 
(2008) refers to it as a “cancer” at the heart of America’s financial ills. 
 
The theory is as follows: While inside directors may be in the Executive’s “pocket” 
(Ryan and Wiggins, 2004, p.479) an independent director or group of directors has 
the power, strength and incentives to appraise the evidence of performance and 
resources prior to making decisions on remuneration and incentives (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). In addition, they are less impressed than internal directors might be 
of the desire to boast to the market that the CEO to whom they offer the job is 
anything less than the best (The Economist, 2003). The alternative is for the size of 
CEO packages to soar out of control (The Economist, 2003), damaging the market 
perception of the company, fomenting discontent amongst investors and 
employees and possibly setting the company up to fail. 
 
There is a further aspect of monitoring too that should be mentioned as it is also 
highly relevant to firm performance (particularly in the world of theories such as 
stakeholder and stewardship that shift attention from shareholder value as THE 
focus for governance to the whole gamut of interest groups and constituents): with 
the prominence of the “triple bottom line” reporting standard and “balanced score 
card” review process, the societal pressure is on companies to report not only on 
financial results but also on their social responsibility and environmental 
sustainability. Epstein and Roy (2005), using the results from a survey conducted by 
the Wall Street Journal/Mercer Human Resource Consulting in 2003, consider that 
companies have been slow to react to this trend when assessing performance of 
their CEOs with such assessment still closely aligned with financial results. Epstein 
and Roy (2005) argue that the balanced score card emphasises the importance of a 
multi-dimensional evaluation (Epstein and Roy, 2005). Arguably, independent 
directors can offer a valuable input in this regard – with their position more 
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unaffected by past events (as shaped by financial performance) - than that of 
insiders, and with the skills and experience to help change the future (the non-
financial considerations) they can offer a new outlook and fresh ideas. 
 
Keeping in mind the touted benefits involved in having independent directors on 
the Board of public companies, it is appropriate now to look at the position of 
such directors. As part of this examination, I seek to identify the characteristics of 
those individuals who are appointed, how they are recruited and their experience 
once they are appointed. In the course of this examination, reference will be made 
to the points made above in an attempt to establish whether it is the fact of 
independent directors or their experience that makes the difference in their 
effectiveness for their companies.   
 
As a reminder, the definition of an independent director can be approached in one 
of two ways. First is a definition of who cannot be treated as such (OECD, 2004; 
NYSE, 2011, s303A.02) including a person who has close business or family ties 
with the company in question. The other way of defining independence is through 
ability and preparedness to demonstrate it – of thought, action and links (Van den 
Berghe and Baelden 2005; Ritchie 2007; McCabe and Nowak 2008; Reiter and 
Rosenberg 2003). Researchers have introduced other factors that could affect a 
director’s independence.  Based on a sample of U.S. listed companies that 
misstated their financial statements in 1999, 2000 or 2001 with a matched sample 
of non-misstating companies, Sharma and Iselin (2006) posited that outside 
independent directors may not be independent if they have a developed certain 
relationships with management.  Such relationships can develop with a director's 
long tenure on the board and through lucrative director compensation. Most 
studies focus on a simple view of director independence, however defined (see 
Sharma and Iselin, 2006).  The literature appears to simply take some quantitative 
measure of independence, such as number or proportion of non-executive 
directors on a board, yet director independence is not a simple concept that can 
be reduced to a number. 
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Also by way of review, and depending on the jurisdiction, boards of listed 
companies may be required to have a stated proportion of independent directors 
(as is the case for the NYSE) or offer justification if it does not (as in the case of 
the UK, New Zealand and Australia). The differences in the rules pertinent to 
different jurisdictions (as well as the wider legal and market context) are inevitably 
going to have consequences not only for the characteristics of the persons 
appointed/elected to these positions but also for the means of their recruitment. 
Hence findings in this context should be treated with some degree of caution when 
drawing wider conclusions. The principal findings reported are therefore explored 
where possible for their broader implications. 
 
For this reason, it is appropriate and highly relevant to consider the  board 
composition of companies in New Zealand, first through a discussion of the SME 
experience with boards of directors and secondly with respect to independent 
directorships more generally. A fundamentally important part of this exploration is 
the matter of its evolution and how that evolution may have been influenced by the 
companies’ interrelationships with their environment as they seek to maintain 
legitimacy within their organizational field. 
 
 
4.5   Directors in the New Zealand Context: SMEs 
 
By way of reminder, and reflected in the OECD (2004) Principles and in various 
rules and guidelines in place in other jurisdictions, a properly constituted board of 
directors, is thought to be the cornerstone of corporate governance and to have a 
significant impact upon the progression of a firm (Cocks et al., 2010; Pearce and 
Zahra, 1992; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Logically, conflict 
between the board and owner, as referred to above, is avoided when the owner of 
the firm is also the principal director, as it ensures an absence of conflict of 
interest.  Since this is common in New Zealand SMEs, their governance structures 
tend to remain informal and they may resist evolving towards a more formal 
governance arrangement.  
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However, even in contexts bearing the potential for conflict, there has been very 
little research on governance strategies involving implementation or constitution of 
boards of directors in SMEs (van den Heuvel, Van Gils & Voordeckers, 2006). 
Furthermore, the small amount of published research on governance in SMEs 
leaves the definition and role of a board of directors vague.  This is a mistake given 
that shareholders, directors and managers of SMEs often are the same individuals 
or are taken from a small pool of family members or friends (van den Heuvel, van 
Gils and Voordeckers, 2006).  
 
In addition, and despite the potential importance of the board in the governance of 
New Zealand’s SMEs, findings indicate that they have not been well structured or 
used in the past if indeed in some cases they even exist (Read, 2007). Citing Nigel 
Williams (ANZ managing director of institutional, corporate and commercial 
banking), Read maintains that (a) 31% of small and medium firms in New Zealand 
lack a board of directors and (b) many firms remain as sole proprietorships and are 
not registered as limited liability companies and that a vast majority of registered 
companies probably do not have a board (even aside from the fact that they 
technically must appoint a board upon registration of their firm). This, Read claims, 
could be holding many companies back from achieving their potential, with 
resultant impact on New Zealand’s SME performance and sustainability. Read 
writes further, “Nigel Williams says there is a lot of talk about the need for New 
Zealanders to be world champions not only in the sporting and cultural arenas, but 
in business too and a key way to facilitate New Zealand’s growth in the business 
arena is the proper utilisation of boards in New Zealand firms” (2007, p.66).  
 
Yet it is likely that a board of directors is just as, if not more, important in small 
and medium businesses as it is in larger firms because the presence of a board can 
result in improved company structures, firm continuity and good financial results 
(Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Borch and Huse, 1993; Johannisson and Huse, 2000). 
Corbetta and Tomaselli (1996) argue that the presence of a board of directors can 
have a much greater impact on a small or medium sized firm’s prosperity than on 
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larger firms, “a well-functioning board of directors can in fact be a critical resource 
for both family and business” (p. 404).  
 
What is generally agreed is that any board, including that of an SME, should protect 
the interests of owners and investors (Fama and Jensen, 1983, as cited in van den 
Heuvel, van Gils and Voordeckers, 2006).  In their paper, van den Heuval et al. 
(2006) found that boards of family-owned Belgian SMEs had two main roles: service 
and control. The service role included building organisational reputation, formulating 
organisational strategy, networking and maintaining relations and advising 
management. The control role was proposed as a strategy to close the divide 
between owners and managers. Hence the Board’s role in controlling the firm 
includes evaluating and controlling management performance, providing access to 
extra resources, determining the manager’s responsibility, maximising the 
shareholder value and determining the salary/compensation of management.  
 
In addition, it seems obvious that boards should be both effective and efficient yet 
a profound concern is emerging over the workload and related costs and 
commitments associated with board meetings (such as with the Directors in the 
case of ASIC v Healey and Ors [2011] FCA 717 (the Centro case). 2 In this 
instance, Directors were expected to read and absorb copious pages of 
board memos and agenda documents – a task they argued was impossible. 
However, these need not be enormous. The Wal-Mart Board, for one of the 
largest companies in the world, meets in person only four times a year (Lockhart, 
2007a).  Vafeas (1999) actually concludes that firm performance suffered from too 
frequent board meetings. Overall, there seems no doctrinal norm for numbers of 
board meetings for any particular size or nature of company and it could be argued 
that in the case of SMEs, on-going communication amongst members renders it 
unnecessary to have very frequent formal board meetings.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
The Directors of the Centro Group were found in breach of the Corporations Act 2001, ss 180(1) 
(statutory duty of care) and 344 (statutory duty to ensure compliance with financial reporting duties). 
Justice Middleton rejected the argument made by the Directors that they were entitled to rely on 
advice by the auditors (PriceWaterhouseCoopers) and the CFO as to the effect of a new accounting 
standard and stated firmly that they were required to form their own opinion as to the compliance of 
the accounts (in this case A$2 billion was wrongly categorised as non-current liabilities). 
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The monthly meetings that are typical of current business practice here could be 
construed as being intended to establish a ‘NZ standard’ of monthly board 
meetings.  This could be over-governance, a state unfavourably described by 
Lockhart as ‘intense governance’ (2007, p. 68). More specifically, intense, frequent 
involvement of a board can pose prohibitive levels of cost for a firm and divert the 
attention of the CEO and top management team from improving the firm’s 
performance.  
 
Certainly, there are cases where the managers of companies have not worked in 
the owners’ best interests due to lack of effective oversight by a board:  Enron, 
WorldCom and Lehman Brothers are examples of firms where management 
embarked on an unchecked course of action that wrecked their firms and 
destroyed significant shareholder wealth. However, as illustrative as those 
examples might be in demonstrating the impact of poor governance, these cases 
still form a tiny minority of all companies.  Lockhart confirms that “if this were not 
the case then business in free economies would have long since perished” 
(Lockhart, 2007, p. 68). Therefore, he argues that boards must take their hand off 
the brake and allow the CEO a measured hand in steering the company: “if the 
CEO cannot be trusted for any more than four weeks at a time – then get one 
who can” (Lockhart, 2007, p. 68).  
 
Also of direct relevance to the governance of SMEs are the motivations that drive 
managers. As pointed out earlier, the general assumption that emerges from the 
body of governance literature is that the board must control and supervise 
management to ensure it acts to benefit the owners of the firm (the shareholders). 
Underlying this assumption is the premise that if appropriate mechanisms are not 
in place, the manager will act in his or her own self-interest (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1992). This assumption ignores the influence of such factors such as friendship, 
cooperation, familial ties and interpersonal or person-firm loyalty that might affect 
the manager/owner relationship. 
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Yet these are the very factors that are often significant in SMEs and even more for 
family-owned firms. As identified in chapter one, many New Zealand companies fall 
into both categories, so factors such as loyalty to the firm, a sense of responsibility 
that comes from being one of only a handful of employees and friendships between 
owner(s) and manager(s) are relatively more important to their relationship in 
New Zealand SMEs than are control and supervision.  
 
 
4.6  Directors in the New Zealand Context: Independent Directors 
 
The New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) has proposed that the boards of 
directors of listing companies include at least two independent directors on board 
with at least 1/3 of board members being independent directors.   
 
To the extent that companies do not already have a higher proportion than this, 
this new regulation - a coercive force in institutional theory terms - would 
undoubtedly change the landscape of independent directorship in New Zealand, 
although the effect would be mitigated by the small proportion of firms that are 
subject to NZX rules.  
 
The reality is that a large number of firms in New Zealand are unlisted.  However, 
even for them, and despite their tendency in the past not to have a board at all or 
rely very little on it, the voluntary inclusion of independent directors is emerging as 
a matter of significant importance. Hossain, Prevost and Rao (2001) found that the 
proportion of outside directors on New Zealand boards increased significantly 
after the passage of the Companies Act 1993 that codified the duties of directors, 
a codification that included more detailed instruction on director’s duties and 
provided that they could be sued for breaches of duty (Hossain et al., 2001, p. 
124). The authors also observed a positive association between the proportion of 
outside directors in New Zealand firms and firm performance.  
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Overall, while the coercive aspect of this legislation was directly related to board 
duties and consequences of failure to properly perform those duties, the enhanced 
rigor of the legislation appears to have had the effect of increasing the use of 
outside directors, a move that has had the additional and desirable effect of 
improving firm performance.  
 
Taking five firm characteristics into account: Inside share ownership, variance of 
aftermarket returns, operating history, leverage, and firm size, and examining initial 
public offerings (IPOs) by 110 New Zealand issuers,3 Mak (2006) concluded that 
firms without any operating history used more independent directors, and that 
greater variance of aftermarket returns and lower inside share ownership are also 
related to a higher proportion of outside directors.   
 
His finding that firms without operating history are more likely to have a higher 
proportions of independent directors suggests that newer firms may be in a better 
position to have a board that is increasingly seen from the normative standpoint as 
most appropriate (ie, one with independent directors), or that shareholders of 
such firms believe their credibility during the early years might be improved 
through the showcasing of more independent directors. 
 
Consequently, recent discussion not only in New Zealand but also elsewhere tends 
to focus not so much on whether there is a need for such membership but how it 
is to be achieved. Governments and other officially commissioned reports look for 
ways of increasing the overall percentage of independent directors in a range of 
companies (Higgs, 2003) and companies routinely announce their new independent 
director appointments. Yet there remain those who warn of the danger of 
accepting without question and without exception the assumptions that such a 
presence is necessary.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 New Zealand SMEs would normally be classified as ‘exempt companies’ (Financial Reporting Act 
1993, s6A: stand-alone companies with no more than NZ$1in assets, no more than NZ$2 in turnover 
and no more than 5 employees). Such companies, like proprietary companies in other jurisdictions, 
cannot normally solicit money from the public sources. To do so, requires they be ‘issuers’- 
Companies that are larger and often listed on the NZX.. 
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This work moves beyond the picture presented by statistics and publicity to 
examine the phenomenon that is the growth of independent directors First, a brief 
overview of the history of independent directors is offered, this being followed by 
a review of the present regulatory framework within which companies in various 
jurisdictions are called upon to implement a policy of increasing the proportion of 
independent directors on their Boards. It should be noted that most of the 
discussion will focus on publicly listed companies (sometimes referred to as public 
companies although this is not necessarily strictly accurate. However, in the 
interests of clarity the term ’public’ will be used throughout this section to refer to 
this category of companies).  
 
There are two reasons for this focus: one is that this is the category on which 
most relevant research is conducted (and relevant information on practice 
available). The second reason lies in the fact that corporate governance for public 
companies more generally remains a hot topic. The third part of the section 
therefore examines the arguments raised for the inclusion of independent 
directors on the board of public companies while the fourth looks at the 
motivation and characteristics of those who are likely to be appointed with 
particular emphasis on the differences in demands and requirements faced by those 
in small and medium enterprises (SMEs) as compared to those in the large 
corporate. The final section conclusion identifies areas that might benefit from 
further research.  
 
 
4.6.1 Historical Background 
 
The traditional view of the board of directors is of a group of individuals 
(traditionally middle-aged men) with significant experience in the market within 
which that company operates and with significant experience of the workings of 
that company. Consequently, the membership of such boards was also traditionally 
and overwhelmingly constituted by insiders, who might include family members (if 
a family company) friends, professional advisors (lawyers or accountants) or 
substantial shareholders or their nominees (Gordon 2008,1468). Even as late as 
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the 1980s when the idea was more likely to be debated in political and business 
circles, the very notion that outsiders should be included was to some 
conservative thinkers an anathema. After all, what could such individuals possibly 
contribute to a company they didn’t understand?  
 
Consequently, such a presence was resisted in some other jurisdictions dominated 
by the Anglo-American model of a unitary board (having the roles of both 
supervision and management). Amongst those can be listed Australia and New 
Zealand as well as the United States and the UK. Critics of the idea cited a range 
of reasons for their position. Some objections to the idea of independent directors 
are listed by Zandstra (2007), albeit recently, but likely to be very similar to those 
voiced 20 years ago. Inter alia, those include the fact that for many such directors 
their interests are artificial (lacking strong links between the company’s wellbeing 
and their own) a characteristic that reduces their motivation to maximise 
performance; they may lack experience and understanding of the business 
environment; they may well have a seat on a range of boards, reducing loyalty and 
adversely affecting their focus on the company and its wellbeing. In addition, and 
depending on the individual, they may perceive the position of director as a chance 
to strengthen or maintain social or business networks, affecting the degree to 
which they are truly independent (Zandstra, 2007, p.3).  
 
Despite such objections, however, and as stated earlier, the independent director 
is a must for the boards of public companies in a range of jurisdictions, increasingly 
mandated or encouraged by legal and quasi-legal rules. As pointed out before, the 
OECD’s promulgation of guidelines in 1999 was the first trans-national display of 
determination to have independent directors on the boards of public companies. 
However, that does not mean it was the first move to promote their presence. In 
order to provide an overview of these earlier steps while not being too 
complicated, three exemplar legal/regulatory frameworks will be considered, these 
being in turn the UK, United States and Europe.  
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4.6.1.1   UK 
 
In 1991 in the UK, the Financial Reporting Council, London Stock Exchange and 
the accountancy profession moved to address low levels of confidence in financial 
reporting, control and standards and investor disillusionment after some enormous 
and unexpected company failures. These included that of the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International (BCCI) that failed owing billions after an international 
investigation into lending practices and lack of regulation of its activities, the 
Maxwell group of companies where investigations revealed millions of dollars 
worth of fraud and misappropriation of pension funds and Polly Peck Ltd where for 
years financial records had been falsified. Consequently they set up a committee 
headed by Adrian Cadbury to report on how to improve corporate governance 
practices. This committee’s report (Report of the Committee on the Financial 
Aspects of Corporate Governance (the Cadbury Report, 1992)) included a range 
of recommendations, one being the inclusion of independent directors principally 
to fulfil a control function in relation to decisions being made by the executive 
directors (Cadbury, 1992, p.21). As Jones (2003, p. 4) explains, this report was just 
the first of a series of reviews and studies of corporate governance in the UK but 
was probably the most important in establishing the approach to the issues not 
only for the UK but also internationally that lasted for more than a decade. In the 
UK, the recommendation of the Report was for a voluntary code. The Hampel 
committee followed in 1998 with a recommendation that the Chairman of the 
Board should act as a leader of the non-executive directors but did not alter the 
approach engendered by the Cadbury report.  
 
However, by 2002 some major financial scandals, including those of Enron, World 
Com and Tyco, put the issues of corporate misfeasance back into the sights of 
regulatory bodies in the UK. As the root cause for many of these was identified as 
poor corporate governance practices the Government initiated another report 
(the Higgs Report, 2003) that, while supporting the maintenance of the ‘comply or 
explain’ (Pass, 2008, p. 291) approach instigated by the Cadbury Report, also 
advocated that Boards should be responsible for ensuring a proportion (at least 
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50%) of members are independent. Although there was some criticism that these 
recommendations were overly prescriptive (Jones, 2003, p. 8), they were 
incorporated into the combined code in time for the 2003 reporting year (FRC, 
2003). Since then, there have been a series of reviews of the Code (now retitled 
the Corporate Governance Code (FRC, 2010)) but little has changed either in 
terms of approach or criteria (FRC, 2010, p.12-13). It is important to note that this 
code refers to non-executive directors but clearly includes independent ones. A 
similar approach has been adopted by the Australian Stock Exchange (Australian 
Stock Exchange, 2007). While the New Zealand code (New Zealand Exchange, 
2010) requires that at least 25% of directors should be independent (rule 3.3.1) it 
leaves it to the company to identify those who fall into that category.  
 
 
4.6.1.2. USA 
 
In America, the trajectory and outcome of initiatives to improve corporate 
governance through the participation of independent directors has been somewhat 
different. Despite a lack of any requirement or strong recommendation, their 
presence was already well established by the turn of the century. Bhagat and Black 
(1998) estimated that in 1991 more than two-thirds of the 957 largest United 
States companies had a majority of independent directors on the Board while also 
making reference to the fact that Spencer Stuart in their survey of 100 of the 
largest companies in 1996 reported that no fewer than 50% had a maximum of two 
insiders on the board. Gordon (2007, p. 1476) cites studies that put the 
proportion much higher than that – in a study conducted by Korn/Ferry in 2003 
65% of respondent companies reported fewer than three insider directors. One 
year later that had increased to 91%. In his lengthy article, Gordon documents 
their rise with their overall membership of large public company boards increasing 
from some 20% in 1950 to 75% in 2005 (Gordon, 2007, p.1465). He posits the 
reason for this as a change in the function of the American Board from the end of 
World War II – from  advisor to monitor (2007, p.1469). This, he considers, made 
director independence critical. In addition, with a shift in focus for a company from 
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stakeholder concerns during the 1950s to shareholder wealth maximisation in the 
1980s and 90s, the conflict of interest for insiders and a growing faith in an efficient 
market hypothesis, as opposed to the expertise of the insiders in growing market 
value, meant that outsiders were painted as the objective mediators of the 
shareholder interest. 
 
However, the financial and confidence shock sparked by the Enron and similar 
collapses were to spark a fundamental shift in the mechanisms used in the United 
States to assure good corporate governance. One of the first steps taken by the 
Federal Congress post Enron was the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002. One 
of its main provisions (s301(2)) is the requirement that audit committees be 
composed entirely of independent directors, and it also by analogy mandates the 
membership of such directors on the board. Consequently, and shortly after the 
passage of this legislation, both the New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq moved 
to require boards of listed companies to have a majority of independent directors 
(Wallison, 2006, p. 1; Ritchie, 2007). These rules are quite prescriptive: the NYSE 
Company Manual s303 A.01 specifies that at least 50% of the members of the 
board of a listed company must be independent; s303A.02 of the specifies 
remunerative caps (applicable both before and during the time a stated individual is 
a Director) and other quite detailed criteria that are either met or not in 
determining whether or not the requirement for independence is satisfied.  
 
 
4.6.1.3. Europe 
 
Insofar as continental Europe is concerned, the historical background is again 
different. This is largely due to the use of a two-tier board structure as found in 
the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, Finland and Denmark (Jungmann, 2006). With 
a management board (made up of those with industry and company experience and 
often working in the firm) and a supervisory (of those representing stakeholder 
interests) there was far more room and logic for the inclusion of independent 
directors).  
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However, there was little in the way of guidance or mandatory rule at a national 
level as to the determination, role or status of the members of the supervisory 
board, a situation that largely remained unchanged until recently despite some 
moves in certain jurisdictions (Germany in particular (Enriques and Volpin, 2007, 
p.130)) to increase their power and profile. Enriques and Volpin attribute this lack 
of legislative enthusiasm to the difference in the characteristics of shareholdings in 
United States companies (widely dispersed) with European (relatively 
concentrated) but could also be a function of the existence of the supervisory 
board. In 2004 the EU “moved to promote the position of independent directors 
in both a unitary board situation and on the supervisory board in the instance of a 
two tier structure” (Country Monitor, 2004). However, a year later, the sentiment 
moved past encouragement when the Commission of the European Communities 
recommended to the European Parliament that a set of definite rules (similar to 
the American model) be adopted. The recommendation also admitted the 
possibility of the “comply or explain’ approach as applied in the UK and other 
jurisdictions (Ritchie, 2007; International Finance Corporation, 2008). 
 
These various initiatives, be they recommendations, code, rules or law, all reflect 
acceptance of, and enthusiasm for, independent directors on the boards of 
companies. The following section provides detail of how they have been 
incorporated into the law of various jurisdictions and/or how they are implied into 
relevant institutions.  
 
 
4.6.2 Legal and Structural Framework 
 
Company legislation generally provides for a separation of powers between a 
Board of Directors (responsible for “risk and compliance, strategy, governance, 
developing the CEO and senior management and managing stakeholders” 
(Nicholson and Newton, 2010, p.204)) and Shareholders in General Meeting 
(SGM) with the collective responsibility (or more accurately, right) to elect 
directors to safeguard their investment in the company, appoint the auditor to 
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examine the truth and fairness of the financial reports and to participate in certain 
important decisions such as the liquidation of the company or a change to the 
company’s constitution. This arrangement places Directors firmly in the driver’s 
seat – described by Bainbridge (2008) as “Director primacy”.  
 
Arguably, however, this situation is not universally applicable, only applying to a 
relatively large company with a large number of shareholders – or what can be 
described as a diffuse shareholder model. In such a case, with no one shareholder 
having sufficient power to influence the deliberations of the Board, the Directors in 
making decisions (at least theoretically) have as their main focus the benefit of the 
company as a whole (and as prescribed as a director’s duty within such legislative 
frameworks as the New Zealand Companies Act 1993 (particularly s133), the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Australia (s181) and the UK Companies Act 2006 (ss`171-3) 
as well as by way of the common law in the three named countries and in the 
United States (relevant cases in the last named including In Re the Walt Disney 
Corporation No. 15452 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005) and Stone v Ritter 2006 Del. 
LEXIS 597, 30-31 (Del. November 6, 2006).  
 
This places such directors in a hybrid position, first as Agent acting for the 
shareholders in relation to the decisions made by the Board, and as Principal in 
controlling and monitoring the conduct and decisions of the CEO (Bainbridge, 
2008). As will be explained later, this position may influence motivation to join, act 
and leave a Board, and therefore the arrangements under which such a Director 
acts. 
 
There are several other models that, depending on the shareholding profile, can be 
applied to companies and demonstrates again the danger of assuming a ‘one-size-
fits-all’ governance model. First, there is what might be described as a 
concentrated ownership model (where there is a high proportion of institutional 
shareholders but where the shares are publicly traded).  
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Two different iterations of the Board may be associated with the concentrated 
ownership model. First there is the situation that prevails where the large 
institutional shareholders take no direct role or interest in the governance of the 
company (Monks and Minow, 2000). The second is where they do – sometimes 
through the right to appoint a nominee director or directors. It should be noted in 
this context legal obligations of all directors (that would include nominees) lie 
primarily to the company (for an explanation see below). However, it is still 
reasonable to assume that such directors will have particular motivations for 
serving on the Board that differ from those elected by the shareholders as a whole, 
assuming of course that they actually participate in the running of the company. 
That is not always the case. Aspects of this and its implications for motivation are 
discussed further below.  
 
Secondly, and of most importance for the immediate purpose, there is a limited 
ownership model, a term that can be applied to small to medium sized enterprises 
with a corporate structure. In this context, it is important to remember that the 
definition of SMEs varies considerably across jurisdictions. In the United States, for 
example, different criteria are used to identify SMEs depending on industry sector. 
For example, companies in manufacturing or mining are normally considered SMEs 
if they have fewer than 500 employees, but in the wholesale trade industries that 
figure is lower at only 100 (University of Strathclyde, 2010). More generally, the 
New Zealand Ministry of Economic Development (MED, 2007) reports that for 
member countries in the European Community a business with fewer than 250 
employees is deemed an SME, but in Australia that figure is 200. Finally the MED 
(2007) defines a business with fewer than 20 employees as an SME.  
 
Legislative provisions in different jurisdictions also indicate differences in treatment. 
Although these do not tend to refer to SMEs per se, they differentiate between 
companies that will often also be SMEs and those that are not. The New Zealand 
Financial Reporting Act 1993 s6A, for example, excludes subsidiaries from its 
definition of a non-reporting company (s6A) (that while not exactly the same as an 
SME, being companies with 5 or fewer employees and $1 million in assets and $2 
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million in turnover). In the UK, the Companies Act 2006  ss 382 and 465 define a 
small company as having fewer than 51 employees plus turnover of no more than 
6.5 million and balance sheet total of no more than 3.26 million (the figures for a 
medium being 250, 25.9. and 12.9 250 respectively (University of Strathclyde, 
2010) while the Australian Corporations Act 2001 provides that a small 
proprietary company is only so if two of the following three criteria are satisfied: 
turnover  below Aus$25 million, assets below Aus $12.5 million or fewer than 50 
employees. 
 
These variations in size and definition raise potential difficulties in making 
international comparisons or drawing conclusions as to motivations of directors. In 
addition, the concept of an SME is far from homogenous, including family and one-
person companies, start-ups and fast growing entrepreneurial ventures 
(Gabrielsson and Huse, 2001). Nevertheless, SMEs can be considered to have 
certain common characteristics. First, they are closely held and independent of 
other businesses. Not only does this mean that their structure and decision 
processes are relatively informal and direct as between the directors and the 
shareholders (as compared to the large public corporate) (Bennett and Robson 
2004) but also, a shareholder’s ability to trade may be subject to legal or 
constitutional restrictions and/or subject to the Board’s discretion as per the 
Companies Act 1993 (NZ) s84, the Australian Corporations Act 2001 s1072G and 
the model Articles of Association under the UK Companies Act 2006 for 
companies limited by shares and Subchapter S of Chapter 1 of the United States 
Internal Revenue Code (sections 1361 through 1379) that grants preferential 
“single tax” status to the “S” corporation that ceases should an ineligible foreigner 
acquire its shares. The main consequence of these restrictions on the transfer of 
shares is that their membership tends to remain stable and constant which also 
often means that the group of directors will also be stable.  
 
Secondly, and according to the OECD (2000), SMEs are most likely to emerge in 
the service industries, including business services, IT, research and development, 
marketing, business consulting and human resource management. To this can be 
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added retail and agriculture. It is also suggested that SMEs tend to thrive in those 
sectors characterised by high levels of innovation and entrepreneurship (Carree, 
van Stel, Thurick and Wennekers, 2002).  
 
Thirdly, SMEs are commonly owned by a small group of shareholders (often 
members of a family and/or close associates) (Bennett and Robson, 2004; Dana and 
Smyrnios, 2010) and are also commonly run by a director or directors who come 
from those ranks (Gabrielsson and Huse 2001; Dana and Smyrnios, 2010). It is also 
possible that outsiders such as providers of specific expertise (Bennett and 
Robson, 2004). Again, the characteristics of any given director of a limited 
shareholder company are likely to shape motivation, and again, these are likely to 
differ significantly from those of directors of companies fitting other models. 
 
A derivative of the above model is where although the shareholding may be wider 
than under a limited shareholder model, it is still comparatively narrow. Such 
businesses may be on a growth trajectory, the range of shareholder expectations 
wider and the pool of director talent broader than in the instance of a company 
fitting a limited shareholder model as described above (being more likely to have 
independent directors).  
 
Of course, the expectation that a board will have independent directors also 
assumes that there is a pool from which such directors can be drawn. This raises 
questions of motivation – why a director would agree to serve. This is one of the 
main foci for this work and is explored via the third hypothesis to be tested in the 
empirical study (see chapters 5 and 6 for details).: 
 
H1 = Directors are motivated by the chance of doing good rather than by other 
benefits of a directorship4 
 
Rationale: As pointed out previously, principles of agency theory drives the 
prevailing model used to explain the method by which directors are anchored into 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This hypothesis is identified as number one although discussed and contextualised after hypotheses 
two and three, given that it is the main focus of the empirical research. 
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the structure of a firm. As it reflects a rigid application of a legal duty to represent 
shareholders, it is valid to ask whether this theory adequately explains how 
directors in New Zealand firms understand their relationship, rights and duties, 
with the businesses in which serve or wish to serve as company directors. 
 
Analyzing the expressed intentions of prospective and sitting company directors in 
New Zealand as to their motivations to serve on boards may thus allow a 
determination whether this model is indeed adequate to explain the relationship 
between director and firm. 
 
 
4.6.3 Motivation 
  
The next sections explore differences in motivation that have been posited for 
directors under each of the models identified above, beginning with the diffuse 
shareholder model. As a cautionary note, it should be emphasised that research 
into this question does not necessarily differentiate between inside and outside or 
independent directors.  
 
4.6.3.1 Director Motivation: Diffuse shareholder model.  
 
By way of reminder, this model describes the large publicly traded corporate with 
a broad and diffuse membership and where increasingly, the exemplar governance 
structure requires an independent Board of Directors to monitor and control the 
CEO on behalf of the body of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Fama and 
Jensen, 1983).  
 
By way of introduction to this analysis, Neill and Dulwicz (2010) stress the 
difficulties involved in gathering data on the operations and effectiveness of boards. 
This they attribute to a growing tendency to keep such activities secret. However, 
they believe that a deeper understanding of what actually goes on in the 
Boardroom is vital to an assessment of effectiveness. The rationale for their 
position is the detrimental effect on potential caused by “process losses” (Steiner 
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1992 as quoted in Neill and Dulwicz 2010, p. 294) that are defined as “the sum of 
coordination loss due to the difficulty in coordinating efforts of multiple individuals, 
and motivation loss (Neill and Dulwicz, 2010, p. 294). Board effectiveness, they 
posit, is reliant on such social-psychological processes as group interaction, 
information exchange and critical discussion – not easily achieved for a Board that 
meets only infrequently. The importance of such processes is also recognised by 
Ingley and van der Walt (2003) who refer to Forbes and Millikin (1999) for support 
for their position that boards achieve maximum effectiveness when members are 
attracted to each other and are motivated to stay and contribute their expertise to 
the organisation.  
 
Significantly, Silva (2005) states that Board of Director motivation in this context 
has ’never’ (Silva, 2005, p.1) been studied and moves to address this lack by using a 
sample of 1200 outside Directors on Boards of Fortune 500 companies to analyse 
the relationship between directors’ pay and equity holdings and their evaluation of 
CEO performance. She concludes that financial motivation (in the form of 
remuneration) for Directors is negatively correlated to their use of quantitative 
measurements in assessing CEO performance but that their ownership of stock is 
positively correlated (a conclusion in line with that of Hermalin and Weisbach 
1991 as a reflection of agency concepts). 
 
In reference to the particular issue of motivation, two points from this study are 
worth noting. First, she reports on the results of a survey in which respondents 
were asked to indicate levels of accountability, autonomy and significance in 
relation to such statements as “I feel my participation…is valued” and “being a 
board member is important to me.” She hypothesises, and tentatively concludes, 
that support for such statements was highest amongst those who were better at 
supporting shareholder interests (Silva, 2005, p. 5).  
 
Secondly, and despite the above, the emphasis in Silva’s analysis is on financial 
forms of motivation – salary and related payments and/or stock. This suggests that 
for her at least, the main reason for directors to join and participate in boards is 
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money or at least the promise of some in the future. This assumption aligns with 
that of Ramsay (1993) and Jensen (1994) on the question of incentives for agents.  
Given the compliance and management expectations placed upon directors, 
particularly in large companies, perhaps this is only fair (Bush, 2005).   
 
However, this position raises interesting issues for motivation. Arguably, inside 
directors would assume positions on the Board because it is part of their role in 
the company (such as that of the Chief Financial Officer) or because they hold 
equity in the company either through purchase or, more likely in the case of a 
senior executive, as part of their compensation package. Silva (2005) points out 
that while both inside and outside directors are dependent on management for 
their compensation package, a position that potentially affects the ability of the 
board to act independently, inside directors as employees are even more 
restrained due to their reliance on the CEO for their continued employment. 
Therefore, not only is the motivation of such directors to join the Board directly 
linked to their employment (and therefore to their remuneration) but also their 
motivation while on the Board is affected by their on-going dependence on the 
CEO. 
 
Outside or independent directors might join for a variety of good reasons. Cortese 
and Bowrey (2008); McCabe and Nowak (2008); Pass (2004); Peterson and 
Philpott (2007); and Spencer Stuart (2009) all report that a large proportion of 
independent appointees come from business backgrounds, including serving or ex 
CEOs/Directors of other companies. In addition, Higgs (2003) and McCabe and 
Nowak (2008) warn of a tendency for existing board members to approve the 
candidature of those most like them. Such directors might join as a result of their 
business, social or other links with existing members of the board (Nwabueze and 
Mileski, 2008) and as a means of increasing their business power or influence 
(Borokhovich, Parrino and Trapani, 1996).  
 
Reasons for such individuals to resign are analogous to the above. Arthuad-Day, 
Certo, Dalton and Dalton (2006) studied the impact on director turnover of 
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negative financial restatements. Although their focus was the forced rather than 
willing departure of directors, it is reasonable to assume that a negative event 
would encourage the directors to jump the sinking board. Conyon (1998) studied a 
large sample of UK firms and found that CEOs were influenced by levels of pay and 
company performance in making decisions to stay or go. Logically, directors would 
be similarly influenced, a supposition supported by Asthana and Balsam (2010).  
  
Appointment to the board of those who do not fit this profile does occur. One 
motivating factor for such membership is maintenance of founder-family control or 
influence over a listed company (Demott, 2008). Demott (2008) suggests a link 
between poor performance of boards as a result of such involvement (possibly 
because top management may consequently be recruited from a limited talent 
pool) and of even more concern, discusses misuse by family directors of the 
position to gain inappropriate benefits (in the case of Tyson foods). This strongly 
suggests that the motivation of some such members in maintaining the role as 
director may be less than honest.  
 
Not all individuals accepting such roles do so for dubious reasons: a wish to 
inculcate particular ethics or values into corporate decisions or strategy (Kemp, 
2006), contribute to a drive to bring a sense of social responsibility or broader 
cultural expertise to the Board (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001; Cunningham, 2010) 
or as part of a move to introduce ethnic or other diversity (Women on Boards, 
2006; Spencer Stuart, 2009). Such directors are not necessarily driven by money 
(He, Wright, Evans and Rowe, 2009).  
 
However, and as a cautionary word, such super-independents frequently must look 
to the CEO to overcome their lack of experience or background and “old hands” 
(Ritchie, 2007) for information and support, or what Hooghiemstra and van Manen 
(2004, p.317) label the “independence paradox” (also see Cunningham, 2010 and 
Demb and Friedrich Neubauer, 1992). Kemp (2006) also offers a list of reasons for 
their failure to perform well - including friendship and other ties to other 
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directors, shareholders and members of the management team, and lack of 
knowledge, expertise and time.  
 
The above suggests that the motivation of such individuals in accepting a position 
as independent directors might be for a range of laudatory and other purposes. 
However, it is all too easy for new members to become part of the crowd (Van 
den Berg and Baelden, 2005; Kemp, 2006), pay “more attention …to personal gain 
than [to] fiduciary duty (Bosch, 2001 as quoted in Kemp, 2006, p.58) or 
disillusioned, prepare an exit plan. 
 
In this context, Le Blanc and Gillies’ (2005) exploration of director experience is of 
relevance. What they uncovered indicates a significant problem with 
disfunctionality of boards. Inter alia, respondents considered that the board, 
particularly the independent members, was seen as a low-value impediment to the 
CEO’s performance rather than as a valuable aspect of management and strategy, 
and even more worrying, cited the lack of trust between the Board and 
management, lack of commitment on the part of their fellow directors, strong 
personality conflicts and problems with the way Board made decisions. Throw into 
the mix the potential liability faced by directors (Mueller et al., 2006; Reuters, 
2009) and the “substantial settlements” (Wallison, 2006, p. 3) directors of Enron 
and WorldCom were forced to pay for failing to catch and address fraud, and the 
impact on reputation and wealth of poor company performance and increased risk 
(Asthana and Balsam, 2010) and the question is not so much why would people 
join boards but more, why would they stay? 
 
4.6.3.2 Director Motivation: Concentrated Shareholder Model 
 
Although many of the same points re motivation in the above model also apply 
here, there is one difference that should be explored: That of the nominee 
director. By way of clarification, in this context the term nominee applies to any 
situation where a director represents the interests of a shareholder or group of 
shareholders. Particularly in cases where the interest of that shareholder(s) is 
hidden, the nominee director often does no more than provide his or her name to 
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the company documents for purposes of legal compliance and takes no part in the 
proceedings of the board – the classic “sleeping” director. Motivation for such 
nominees is clearly not interest or involvement in the company or its affairs: it is 
quite possible they are giving their consent in return for money – or receiving 
“rent” for their name. 
 
It is also possible that the director be appointed specifically to represent the 
interests of a large shareholder – normally an institutional shareholder. As Monks 
and Minow (2000) and Bainbridge (2008) point out, although the ownership of a 
“control block” of shares is sufficient to hand control over the company to those 
large shareholders, the reality is that few such shareholders do use their voting 
power due to the costs involved in directly monitoring the CEO.  However, the 
appointment of a nominee director to represent a sectional interest (including that 
of the institutional shareholder) is frequently an option. This also raises particular 
issues of motivation. 
 
It is important to remember that the duties of a director, any director, lie first and 
foremost to the company, including shareholders en masse. Not only does relevant 
legislation and case law charge directors with exercising their duties for a proper 
purpose (see above) but also to act in good faith, including avoidance of conflicts of 
interest (for example, New Zealand Companies Act 1993 s131; Australian 
Corporations Act 2001 s184; UK Companies Act 2006 (particularly s175);  
Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas [1951] Ch 286. Also see discussion in Black, 2001). 
It is perhaps the last duty that has most significance in relation to motivation. 
Nominee directors are potentially torn between maximising the interests of all 
shareholders and the interests of the shareholder(s) responsible for their 
appointment and on whom they rely for its continuance (Salem and Teh, 2008, in 
reference to the situation in Malaysia). Although there may be means whereby they 
can record their conflict yet still be involved in Board decision-making, that conflict 
can still be the elephant in the rooom. 
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So far, the focus has been on motivation for directors in the case of large, listed 
corporates. However, despite (or perhaps because) of the fact smaller unlisted 
companies are not exposed to market scrutiny or its sometimes-fickle wind of 
fancy, issues associated with motivation can if anything be more critical. These are 
considered in the following sections. 
4.6.3.3 Director Motivation: Limited Shareholder Model 
 
Before these are discussed, some initial points should be made. Firstly, very small 
SMEs (sometimes referred to as “micro-enterprises” (MED, 2007) in particular, 
may have only one director/operator/manager/owner who is recognised as a 
director only because the business has either been created as a corporatised sole 
tradership, or because it has transitioned from a non-corporatised entity but 
nothing else has changed. These one person companies are given legal recognition 
under, for example, the New Zealand Companies Act 1993 (s10), Australian 
Corporations Act 2001 (ss114 and 201A); the UK Companies Act 2006 ss7 and 
154 and the Delaware Commercial Code, Title 8 (Corporate Law) subchapter I 
s101 and subchapter IV s141(b). These types of SME, although important, offer 
little in the way of data for study into motivation of directors. Instead, it is those 
which have some structural separation of ownership and control through an 
officially designated Board of Directors that have been the subject of some 
research. It is those ones, therefore, that provide the focus for the discussion that 
follows. 
 
Secondly, in his analysis of the state of research into the subject of boards and 
SMEs, Huse (2000) identifies the issue of motivation for directors to join the 
boards of small companies as an important part of any agenda (Huse, 2000, p.279 
and 280). Included amongst  the important questions he considers need to be 
asked are what are the reasons for, and the profile of, independent directors, what 
persuades individuals to serve and how do differences in company profile and size 
affect what directors do and are?  
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Despite this call, there is little direct and broad-based research into factors that 
cause individuals to join and participate. However, some research has been 
conducted on aspects of membership and operation of such boards, research that 
goes some way to revealing the answers to such questions, at least in the context 
in which it is conducted.  
 
By way of introduction, Bennett and Robson (2004) refer to Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand and Johnson (1998) in making the point that boards of smaller companies 
should be more influential than those of large companies. They are in a less 
complex and compliance-driven environment and deal with fewer vested interests 
(such as diffuse shareholders and capital markets). In exploring the justification for 
this position, Bennett and Robson (2004) examine boards of SMEs and their links 
to business performance by reference to three theoretical frameworks: resource 
dependence, counselling and control.  
 
As explained in chapter 3, the concept of “resource dependence” refers to the 
board as a source of expertise, resources and networks (Bennett and Robson 
2004; Gabrielsson and Huse. 2005) while counselling recognises the 
advice/stewardship and guidance roles of directors (Bennett and Robson, 2004). 
Finally, control refers to the monitoring function of the board. As Bennett and 
Robson (2004) point out, with the close relationship if not the complete or partial 
overlap between management and directors that is common in small SMEs, there is 
little space or need for control. However, with one of the “most important 
transitions” (Bennett and Robson, 2004, p. 98) being a shift from a one-person 
management model to a wider board along with a possible separate management 
team, control over the “management” function becomes both more necessary and 
more possible.  
 
Mueller et al. (2006) develops this theme, making the point that where only a small 
pool of people are engaged in both operating and directing a business (such as 
where the Manager is also on the Board) it is very difficult for such a person to 
distinguish between the needs and demands of both roles and therefore lose 
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effectiveness (a reflection of control and counselling issues facing SMEs (Bennett 
and Robson, 2004).  
 
However, and despite the economic and social importance of SMEs, particularly in 
the innovative and entrepreneurial industries (Carree, van Stel, Thurick and 
Wennekers, 2002), growing the board by way of new members motivated by self-
interest may actually reduce its effectiveness (Demott 2008).  
 
In this context, the findings of a recent study into Australian family businesses (of 
which some 80% are companies) (Dana and Smyrnios, 2010) are revealing. 
According to this report, only 42% of respondents have a formal Board of 
Directors with only 45% meeting at least four times a year (Dana and Smyrnios, 
2010, p. 14), a finding that suggests that for SMEs boards are not necessarily 
considered an important part of the governance structure.  
 
Moreover, 85% of boards have no non-family members, mainly to maintain privacy 
(at 52.5%) (Dana and Smyrnios, 2010 p.15). This finding is supported by 
Gabrielsson and Huse (2005) with their point that “suspicion and family politics are 
common ingredients in the selection process” (Gabrielsson and Huse, 2005: 33). 
Although the second most frequently offered explanation was that the necessary 
skills were available in the family, this still only made up 29% of the responses 
(Dana and Smyrnios, 2010, p.15). As 58.4% of owners do not require family 
members to have outside business experience prior to joining the business, the 
question of what skills are available remains unanswered. Although Dana and 
Smyrnios (2010) do not specifically discuss the motivation for Directors of such 
companies the above statistics hint that directors are there because they are 
expected to be or because they see it as the means of safeguarding their financial 
or family position.   
 
Although in some respects seemingly at odds with the above, three other sets of 
findings also offer some useful indicators of motivation for such directors. First is 
the set of issues and challenges facing family businesses, the most important of 
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which are communication between family members (at 40%), letting go of 
leadership/ownership control (40%) and providing liquidity to permit exit (37%) 
(Dana and Smyrnios, 2010, p.15). When these findings are combined with that 
showing that 60% of younger family members are not as interested in actively 
managing the business as are the older (Dana and Smyrnios, 2010, p. 16) and that 
45% of owners are actively planning to sell (Dana and Smyrnios, 2010, p. 23), it 
suggests that there is a tendency for the family-based businesses to be viewed as 
the source of a retirement income stream rather than as the basis for on-going 
family cohesion. These findings give some indication of motivation for directors: 
the desire to maximise returns and levels of efficiency even if it means alienation of 
the business from the successive generations.   
 
There is growing support for the argument that the appointment of well-qualified 
external directors offers positive benefits for SMEs, improving the effectiveness of 
the board and potentially the performance of the company (Barrow, 2001; Bennett 
and Robson, 2004; Berry and Perren, 2001; Feigener, 2005; Gabrielsson and Huse, 
2005; Mueller et al., 2006), particularly in the context of a slightly broader 
shareholder base and or a company on a growth trajectory (Barrow, 2001 in 
relation to high tech SMEs). Those benefits include increasing the ability of a 
company to manage the external environment, reducing uncertainty and a means 
of co-opting resources (such as finance, expertise and intellectual property) that 
will permit it to grow and thrive (Bennett and Robson, 2004; Gabrielsson and 
Huse, 2005) (an aspect of resource dependency). In addition they can improve 
accountability of management (Keyt, 2004) (an aspect of the control function), 
provide guidance and advice to management (Fiegener, 2005) (counselling) and give 
space to management to focus on the business decisions - or those areas where 
they have the expertise and talent (Barrow, 2001; Fiegener, 2005).  
 
A venture capitalist, for example, is motivated by the desire to see the company 
grow (and to realise his or her investment in the shortest possible time). 
Therefore, he or she does not just maximise his or her short-term return but also 
fills a mentoring role for other members of the board (Barrow, 2001; Gabrielsson 
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and Huse, 2005).  Professionals such as accountants or lawyers will be paid for 
their time and expertise and would therefore be expected to be motivated by both 
financial reward and a desire to enhance their market reputation and expand their 
client base and demand. Finally, and more generally, as in the case of diffuse 
shareholder companies, individuals may be motivated to join due to their support 
for the objectives and philosophy of the company. Of relevance in this context is 
Fuller and Tian’s (2006) identification of SMEs as well placed to pursue corporate 
social responsibility as “competitive advantage” (but contrast this with Fassin 
(2005) who sees evidence of unethical behaviour in entrepreneurial businesses. 
Perhaps the lack of broader management experience on the part of the owner of a 
SME now in a growth phase offers an opportunity for unscrupulous or self-serving 
behaviour on the part of an independent appointee to the Board – or vice versa).  
 
Yet, and in conclusion, the ability of even willing SMEs to recruit and retain 
independent directors is limited (Mueller et al., 2006; Dana and Smyrnios, 2010). 
Although some research suggests that potential directors may be happy to ‘do 
good’ (however that may be defined) rather than merely do well, SMEs remain at 
the bottom of their lists of potential or actual employers (Mueller et al., 2006). 
This has been attributed to the relatively low status and low stakes for SMEs and 
their boards, especially when the potential legal exposure is also taken into 
account (Mueller et al., 2006). This raises issues for SMEs into the future because, 
while as indicated above, research reveals that independent directors can add value 
in a wide range of ways, potential candidates may be unwilling to serve unless the 
company is manifestly stable, low risk and with a good reputation (Mueller et al., 
2006) – potentially a chicken and egg situation!  
 
Various reasons can be offered for a Director to leave the board of an SME. 
Obvious ones include retirement (particularly where the SME is a family concern 
and either passed on to the succeeding generation (Dana and Smyrnios, 2010)), 
sold or closed due to lack of interest, market or finance (Featherstone, 2009; Dana 
and Smyrnios, 2010) or where (such as in the case of a venture capitalist) the 
arrangement has come to an end. However, although little research appears to 
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have been done on this situation, one that is of potential importance in the context 
of SMEs and the one that would be unlikely to arise in larger companies, is 
board/member politics.  
 
Because of the close relationship and necessity for mutual trust between members 
of the company (who often constitute the board as well), small corporations are 
sometimes regarded as ‘quasi-partnerships’. Hence, a breakdown in the mutual 
trust and confidence or board/management deadlock may lead to the court 
ordering the company be wound up (liquidated) on just and equitable grounds (as 
per Australian Corporations Act 2001, s 461(1)(k), the Companies Act 1993 (New 
Zealand) s241(4)(d) and the UK Insolvency Act 1986 s 121(1)(g)) such as in the 
cases of Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries [1973] AC 360, Carpenter v Carpenter 
Grazing Pty Ltd (1985) 4 ACLC 18, Re A and BC Chewing Gum Ltd [1975] 1 
W.L.R. 571 and Re Yenidje Tobacco Co Ltd [1916] 2 Ch 426. Given the 
fundamental and terminal consequences of winding up, a director faced with the 
possibility of the company going into complete meltdown might take the difficult 
decision to fall on his or her sword or be forced or choose to leave an untenable 
position. 
 
Given the focus of the previous discussion it is useful by way of contrast to 
consider the issue of motivation in a purportedly quite different context (although 
this is debateable), this being in Non-profit Organisations.  
 
4.6.3.4 Director Motivation: The Case of NPOs 
 
Cleave and Inglis (2006) suggest that there are five factors that determine the 
participation of individuals. The first of these is attitude towards the organization. 
Second is the size of the organization. The third factor is a person’s social 
background as a person’s education and gender can influence preparedness to 
volunteer as a board member. Fourth relates to personality: ideal board members 
will have ‘enduring traits such as emotional stability’ (Cleave and Inglis, 2008). The 
last factor relates to a person’s situation, such as whether an individual has been 
approached to join the board. Overall, Cleave and Inglis (2006) concluded that 
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individuals who have some type of identification and connection with the 
organization and its values and goals will be more likely to serve.  
 
It is more likely too that such individuals will be effective: Taylor, Chait and 
Holland (1991) found that effective directors on boards of universities had 
previous connections to the colleges before they joined, and thus were effective 
shortly after being appointed. Respondents in their survey cited ‘loyalty to the 
college’ and ‘respect for the college’ as motives for joining the board.  
 
A further study highlighted by Cleave and Inglis (2006) examined the motives of 
board members of a sports organization. Their findings from the survey resonate 
with the common themes emerging from the literature: that motivation comes 
from enhancement of self-worth, learning through community, helping the 
community, developing individual relationships, unique contributions to the board, 
and self healing. In their findings, volunteer board members rated the community 
foci highest. Hence board members were altruistically motivated because they 
carried a concern for others rather than themselves.  
 
Overall conclusions as to motivation for directors to join boards, participate in 
their deliberations and make decisions to leave are hard to draw and dangerous to 
generalise (given the broad range of organisations that have them and the 
characteristics unique to each). With the drive for the economically and socially 
important SME sector to lift its corporate governance game, SMEs offer a fertile 
area for further research (Huse 2000). 
 
 
4.7 Characteristics of Independent Directors 
 
It is clearly not just motivation that shapes the contribution of independent 
directors on a board of directors. Specific characteristics of those directors are 
also of importance. Aspects of these characteristics are explored below.   
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4.7.1 Characteristics: Self-confidence 
 
Two hypotheses directly address examine the opinion such individuals have as to 
their own expertise and/or commitment. Specifically, those hypotheses are:  
  
H4 = Directors consider themselves more than ‘average’ competent in all aspects 
of contributing to a board. 
 
H5 = Directors report that their level of ‘commitment’ exceeds their level of 
competence in other areas. 
 
Rationale: A reasonable presumption is that if sitting directors have all the skills 
they might need to be effective directors, other directors (including those from 
outside) would not be required. In that case, the interest of shareholders to 
identify, recruit and engage independent directors would be muted. To some 
extent at least, the maintenance and development of desired skill sets are 
subjective: Existing directors who maintain awareness, commitment and 
responsibilities are likely to retain their positions.  
 
As stated above, research consistently highlights the importance of establishing and 
maintaining a strong board of directors (George, 2010; Cocks et al., 2010; Pearce 
and Zahra, 1992; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). However, 
there is a broad range of desired or ideal types. Boards of large for-profit and non-
profit firms might be formal in their operations and take care to accord with 
statutory or regulated procedures (McNamara, 2010).  They often have small 
executive committees and possibly many members, some of whom are highly 
visible in society (McNamara, 2010).  
 
By way of contrast, boards of small non-profit or for-profit firms might be informal, 
with informal operating methods. McNamara writes that there are many 
similarities between non-profit boards and for-profit boards. Both types of board 
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have similar fiduciary responsibilities among members. In addition, both have to 
conform to operating rules and regulations set by the state and by the firm itself. 
For-profit board members usually are paid and tend to deal closely with decisions 
the firm’s financial operations with a view to maximising the firm’s profits. 
However, board members on non-profit boards are volunteers. They are not paid, 
except for expenses and do not seek to maximise profits but instead are often 
involved with fundraising (McNamara, 2010). 
 
Such variability can affect board attributes and, ultimately, its contribution to 
organization performance. As some indication, Norburn (1986) reported how 
certain variables in industry settings, growth, turbulence, and decline, helped to 
shape directors’ characteristics, abilities, beliefs and skills. He found that directors 
in growth industries demonstrated certain characteristics, including wide exposure 
to other cultures, and an inclination to use participative decision styles. In 
turbulent industries, directors valued career mobility, had little international 
exposure, and were people-oriented in their managerial styles. In declining 
industries, directors were motivated by monetary rewards, had little international 
exposure and were older than directors in other industries. 
 
Appreciation of the characteristics or likely characteristics of board members is 
crucial to understanding what motivates board members in the range of settings 
identified above, and to understanding what characteristics are sought by firms and 
other organisations seeking to recruit. The body of research into the 
characteristics of independent directors is large, broad, multi-national, spans a 
broad range of contexts and offers a range of conclusions and inconclusive results. 
For all these reasons, what follows is an extended discussion of this research with 
specific foci on diversity (age, background and gender being three aspects of this 
but with most emphasis on gender as a context in which to explore some of the 
institutional and other underlying causes that might contribute to lack of diversity) 
and its rationale; possible challenges to independence; and aspects that might 
support or affect the effectiveness of independent directors in achieving the two 
roles expected of them: monitoring and firm performance.  
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4.7.2 Characteristics: Diversity  
 
There is a substantial body of literature that supports the importance of having 
experienced and competent members on the board of directors (e.g. Carter and 
Lorsch, 2004, Coulson-Thomas, 1991, Garratt, 2003; Hillman, Canella and Harris, 
2002; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; van der Walt and Ingley, 2000).  However, 
competence as a director is not simply a function of professional and industry-
based managerial (namely CEO) expertise, which are the skill-sets most 
emphasised among shareholders and traditional selection criteria for board 
appointments.  While executive experience brings many of the required 
commercial skills to a board position, the role of governing is distinct from 
managing in crucially important ways.  Executives are required to implement or 
execute decisions agreed in conjunction with the board and will thus have primarily 
an operational perspective, while it is the board’s role to guide the overall strategic 
direction of the organization. To have the level of competence necessary to 
provide leadership and engage actively with stakeholders, boards require directors 
with additional leadership skills and a solid understanding of the difference between 
managing and governing an organization (see Hillman et al., 2002 for a discussion of 
board capital).  
 
As a starting point, a board is a complex organization that must rely on the 
collective strength provided by its members. Individual directors must accept a 
common responsibility to form an effective working group (Demb and Neubauer, 
1992). Although certain individuals and groups are clearly more influential than 
others, board members usually see their boards as homogenous groups of 
colleagues who have similar socio-economic backgrounds, and who work together 
on a consensual basis (Hill, 1995; Westphal and Milton, 2000). Historically and 
persistently, board members are usually men, often with extensive experience in 
top management positions, with similar interests, and similar social and 
professional networks. Although some appointments from a pool of candidates 
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may be controversial, board members are traditionally selected from those already 
in the professional networks of the CEO and the other board members, and new 
members’ qualifications may not be scrutinised (Huse, 2007). Independent or 
outside directors especially, are recruited primarily because of their expertise and 
reputation. Arguably, this communality has many advantages, such as common 
knowledge of the informal rules of the game, and a rapid grasp of issues to be 
discussed and decided (Huse, 2007). 
 
Accordingly, current board recruitment practices appear to be more closely 
aligned to the needs and demands of key internal actors who are generally 
considered to be the top management team (Huse, 2005). Having the same 
business background, non-executive directors usually subscribe to the same 
dominant business ideology as the executives.  This means that they may intervene 
reactively rather than proactively in executive decisions and therefore be less 
effective as a check on management hegemony, although they still serve to 
constrain managerial opportunism (Hill, 1995; Huse, 2005). 
 
Given the above, Hill’s (1995) study of boards as social organizations in major 
British companies is interesting because respondents (both executive and non-
executive directors) identified certain personal attributes of non-executive 
directors (‘breadth of vision’, ‘a broader perspective’, ‘a global view of the company 
and environment’) that seemed more desirable than was expertise in a particular 
area. Because getting the right people in place is paramount, personality, reputation 
and influence all counted. What was needed were suitable people (Ruigrok, Peck, 
Tacheva, Greve and Hu, 2006), who could not only work with the existing 
members but also provide vital support for the firm in a changing environment 
(Ruigrok, et. al, 2006). Carefully identified and recruited members of a diverse 
group might offer the best chance of this, given their quite different experiences, 
and thus different attitudes on issues or problems.  
  
Therefore, in recent years, firms have been under pressure from institutional 
investors and shareholder activists to appoint directors with different backgrounds 
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and expertise. Nevertheless, measurable progress toward more balanced and 
diversified boards has been slow, with by no means universal support. Debate 
continues over whether increased diversity leads to increased shareholder value, 
and whether it actually matters at all. The emphasis in the literature on achieving 
greater diversity implies that it is important but progress is slow (van der Walt and 
Ingley, 2003).  
  
The issue of board diversity and its importance in determining the power (and 
hence effectiveness) of the board is therefore one that has been the subject of 
much study.  Milliken and Martins (1996) usefully explore what is meant by the 
term, distinguishing between observable or readily detectable attributes (p. 403), 
such as race or ethnic background, age, or gender, and less visible or underlying 
attributes such as education, technical abilities, socioeconomic group, personality 
characteristics or values (They note that these are not mutually exclusive: for 
example, ethnic differences may be associated with socioeconomic status.). These 
qualities will manifest themselves in the choices directors make (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989).  
 
Board diversity can be seen as a means of conduit for representation of a range of 
interests held by a range of stakeholders and promoting those interests to the 
board through the medium of on-going relationships.  
 
Indicative of this, Tyson (2003) argues that greater diversity (e.g. in knowledge, 
functional expertise and relational skills) can improve relationships with corporate 
stakeholders, such as customers, employees and shareholders and, if truly 
representative of a range of interests, achieves greater legitimacy among both 
shareholders and among the larger community of stakeholders (Ray, 2005). 
 
Representation is thus an institutional process whereby the voice of the governed 
is heard and taken into account by those doing the governing (Bebchuk, 2007; 
Krohe, 2000, 2004; Ray, 2005). In addition, and according to resource dependence 
theory, the board is a provider or procurer of important resources rather than an 
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evaluator of management. In this service role, boards act as ‘boundary spanners’ 
and networkers with external sectors or organizations, such as financial 
institutions, or political bodies, finding ways to tap into these bases of power and 
influence (Parsons, 1960; Pfeffer, 1972, 1973; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Pfeffer 
(1972; 1973) found that, by increasing in size, and including members of diverse 
occupational and professional groups, boards could link an organization to its 
external environment, thus helping to secure critical resources.  
 
However, representation is not the only reason for diversity (Burton, 1991). It can 
be seen also as a means of drawing on a variety of experience that might effectively 
be used to address issues in a novel way (Ingley and van der Walt, 2003).  
 
Minichilli, Zattoni and Zona (2009) report that board member diversity (functional 
or ‘background’ diversity rather than observable attributes) is positively associated 
with board performance. The promotion of diverse perspectives can encourage a 
wider range of solutions and ideas for strategic decisions (Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois, 1988). Again drawing on resource dependence theory, researchers 
suggest that directors from a broad range of experiences and backgrounds may be 
actively involved in strategy making through counsel and advice to the CEO or by 
initiating their own analyses or proposing new business ideas (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989). They argue that larger and more diverse boards reduce uncertainty 
surrounding strategy development (Pearce and Zahra, 1992) and can ‘promote the 
airing of different perspectives and reduce the probability of complacency and 
narrow-mindedness in a board’s evaluation of executive proposals’ (Kosnik, 1990, 
p.138). Directors can contribute to creative strategy formulation, because they can 
offer a variety of experiences and quality of judgment (Rindova, 1999).  
 
Similarly, in his study of the power and influence of boards of directors, Zald 
(1969) identified ‘resources’ possessed by board members (including detailed 
knowledge about organizational operations such as expertise about a technical 
process, access to and control of relevant external resources, and individual 
characteristics, such as social status, gender and personality) that influence how he 
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or she will relate to others. These different kinds of resources, Zald argued, are 
important in determining the ability of boards to challenge and/or formulate lines 
of action and thus contribute to decision-making. Boards of directors are 
sometimes impotent, he said, and sometimes all-powerful. What each will be is in 
part determined by context and other subjective characteristics. It is for both 
these reasons that it is argued that diversity on a board is important.   
 
However, it should also be noted that researchers have identified disadvantages 
with diversity on boards in respect of its potential to disrupt cohesion among 
board members, and issues relating to board size and efficiency (see van der Walt 
and Ingley, 2003 and van der Walt et al., 2006 for a review of the literature on 
these effects). While Milliken and Martins (1996) and others champion diversity for 
its positive influence on decision-making and relationships, they warn that groups 
with diverse backgrounds and skills may have integration problems similar to those 
of other diverse groups, and membership turnover might be higher among those 
who are different from their peers. In this way the cognitive and symbolic benefits 
of diversity might be outweighed by affective costs that organizations cannot 
necessarily manage effectively. In addition, diverse boards may be less cohesive, and 
are more likely to experience coordination and communication difficulties than do 
more homogeneous boards (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). A striking research finding 
is that groups that are diverse have lower levels of member satisfaction and higher 
rates of turnover than more homogeneous groups (Milliken and Martins, 1996).  
 
Others argue that, as boards increase in size and diversity to fulfill their roles, they 
may not be ideally suited to strategic decision-making, which involves complex and 
ambiguous tasks. Board members may bring their individual and constituency 
interests and commitments to the board. Differences among these interests, 
especially those based on occupational and professional affiliations, may lead to 
different views on proposed strategic changes that may be destructive rather than 
positive. Indeed the greater the diversity of board interests, the greater the 
potential for conflict and factions (Goodstein, Gautam and Boeker, 1994).  
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In terms of recent empirical evidence of the practice of diversity, some indication is 
given by McCabe and Nowak (2008 into the Australian situation, but some of the 
most comprehensive studies have been conducted by Pass (2004) into the situation 
in the UK, Cortese and Bowrey (2008) (also see Cortese, 2009) in Australia and by 
Spencer Stuart (2009) in the United States. Although the UK and Australian studies 
are based on data sets four years apart, the results are surprisingly consistent, 
perhaps a function of the common non-mandatory corporate governance regime 
and the similar legal and corporate framework in both countries. Pass (2004) 
conducted a study involving 51 large companies drawn from the FTSE index and 
selected as representative of the major industrial activities. Cortese and Bowrey 
(2008) looked at 42 of the largest 50 companies listed on the Australian Securities 
Exchange (the ASX). In both cases the researchers relied on the annual reports to 
provide the information they needed on the characteristics of non-executive 
directors (that while not necessarily equivalent in scope to independent, do include 
them). (Pass used 2001 and 2002 reports and Cortese and Bowrey 2006). The 
Stuart Spencer survey involved 500 Boards on the Standard and Poors index from 
2008. Other surveys have also been conducted. The findings from these various 
surveys will, as identified in the introduction to this section, be discussed under the 
three headings of age, ethnicity and gender. It should also be noted that most time 
will be dedicated to gender, as this is the area where much of the research has 
been focused and also one where the issues that emerge in the diversity debate 
can usefully be explored.  
 
 
4.7.3  Characteristics : Age Diversity  
 
Pass (2004) found an age range of 51-66 with 59 as the average while for Australia 
(Cortese and Bowrey, 2008), although the range was wider - 32 to 64, the average 
age were 60. For Spencer Stuart (2009) the mean was even higher at 61.7 years of 
age, although they also found that the range of  for newly appointed directors went 
from 28 to 74. These findings suggest that those nearing retirement are inclined to 
look to this role, perhaps for a variety of reasons including a wish to use their 
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experience and knowledge in business to give something back. Another possibility 
is that by then they have accumulated the networks, contacts, confidence and 
experience that will make them ‘useful’ individuals that can be relied upon to 
occupy such a position (Wallison 2006). A third possibility is that such individuals 
now have the time, wealth and knowledge to devote to active management of an 
investment portfolio and see the role of director as a useful means of safeguarding 
that investment. A final possibility is that a young CEO with a weak Board might 
perceive an older non-executive (or independent) director as more easily 
influenced, persuaded or pushed into supporting the CEO’s proposals.   
 
4.7.4  Characteristics: Background Diversity  
 
In the Spencer Stuart (2009) survey, they identify 13% of new independent 
directors as being from diverse backgrounds (in terms of ethnicity – a factor not 
examined by either Pass (2004) or Cortese and Bowrey (2008)).  
 
Peterson and Philpot (2009) report that in 2002, 50% of all Fortune 500 companies 
had at least one academic on the Board, with a total of 412 seats held by 282 
individuals (which means a good proportion held more than one). Of those 412 
seats, African-Americans held 62 or 15%. Both these cited proportions, and the 
failure by Pass (2004) and Cortese and Bowrey (2008) to include ethnicity in 
survey populations, are interesting given the rationale for diversity as a means of 
connecting with the environment – in an increasingly connected global economy, 
surely it makes sense to claim legitimacy from stakeholders and interest groups 
through diversity in board representation.  
 
There is more reported research on career background (eg, Spencer Stuart 2009 
and Pass 2004), a useful measure given that their range of experience is one of the 
arguments put forward for having them at the table. Spencer Stuart (2009) reports 
that 82% of new independent directors come from business backgrounds (65% 
CEOs and the like and 17% retired from such roles) and a relatively small 16% 
from diverse career backgrounds such as Government service, law or consulting. 
Out of the 317 in Pass’ (2004) UK sample, 165 (52%) were former executives, 124 
 
 
Jens Mueller “Movements in the Long White Cloud of Governance”  Page 159 	  
(39%) current executives and a mere 28 or 9% ‘other’ (Pass, 2004, p. 57). As the 
‘other’ category includes politicians, academics and ex-civil servants, it is not 
unreasonable to conclude that there is an overwhelming tendency in various 
jurisdictions (also see McCabe and Nowak for some indication as to thinking in 
Australia and Jayne 2007) to appoint those with business expertise and/or 
experience rather than other types. In this context it is pertinent to note 
Wallison’s (2006) dismissal of the value of advice from independent directors – 
with the major exception of a former government official who might add a useful 
perspective on likely government reaction to a proposal. 
 
Peterson and Philpot (2009) confirm through a ‘casual inspection’ (Peterson and 
Philpot, 2009, p. 203) of company information that ‘most’ outside directors in 2002 
in the United States were current or retired senior executives (so things appear to 
have remained largely unchanged for seven years). Of the 282 academics occupying 
positions as independent directors or Fortune 500 boards, most tended to be in 
the business discipline (27.2%), economics (8.0) or law (12.9), another factor 
supporting the assumption that business expertise or insight is the principal 
characteristic sought by companies when appointing independents.  
 
4.7.5  Characteristics: Gender Diversity  
 
The traditional board gender profile is overwhelmingly male. Claringbould and 
Knoppers’ (2007) research provides evidence that men can control boards by 
affirming and negating affirmative action policies and by framing the process of 
recruitment and selection in such a way as to reproduce the male-dominated 
culture in the board. However, since the early 1980s, and in light of the growing 
realization that women control nearly all consumer spending, researchers have 
been paying more attention to the study of women directors, highlighting in 
particular the dearth of women in corporate governance roles (Toddi, 2001), a 
lack that has been directly related to the lack of female senior managers (Sheridan 
and Milgate, 2003) and arguing in favour of change.  
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One argument that can be used to support the appointment of more female 
independent directors is their ability to represent interests such as consumers. 
However, of relevance to this argument, Carver (2002) points out that, although 
the representation notion implies that a board represents the diversity within the 
ownership of the firm, he also reasons that a board cannot realistically be 
constituted so that it is fully representative of that diversity. There is the danger of 
tokenism (Carver, 2002) and perils in the idea that one member of a minority 
represents all members of that group. He warns that without actually gathering 
input from interest groups, even careful selection of those apparently represent-
tative of such groups might seduce a board into complacency.  
 
 A better reason to appoint such directors is the value women can add (Daily and 
Dalton, 2003). They argue that more women are needed in boards of directors 
due to the fact that women and men have different strengths. Women are able to 
contribute in a unique way to the overall benefit of the organization. Moreover, 
they suggest that the presence of women in boards of directors signals that the 
entire organization promotes equal opportunities between men and women. 
 
Overall, the main arguments for increasing the number of women in these 
leadership positions are based on the changing realities facing business, such as the 
globalization of activities, that has so dramatically changed world markets, and the 
challenges and social trends of the past two decades (Bilmoria and Piderit, 1994; 
van der Walt and Ingley, 2003).  
 
Similarly, Burke (2000) argues that both men and women are appointed to 
corporate boards first and foremost because of their abilities. Consistent with the 
resource dependence view, the presence of women can also serve the 
organization’s interest to build links to its environment, bringing both strategic 
input and social capital to the boards on which they serve (Bilmoria and Wheeler, 
2000). A non-executive director in particular must be able to offer individual skills, 
broad knowledge, and expertise based on education, experience in management, 
and age (Burgess and Tharenou, 2000; van der Walt and Ingley, 2003).  
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Several studies based on data from companies with Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance systems have examined the effect of recruiting female board members 
on a firm’s performance. One of the most comprehensive of these was conducted 
by Campbell and Vera (2010) on Spanish companies where, helpfully for their data 
collection, the Unified Good Governance Code recommends affirmative action 
whereby female board appointments should be favoured in accordance with the 
Gender Equality Act 2007. Overall they found that the presence of female board 
members has a positive influence upon a firm’s value.  A firm’s value on the stock 
market tends to increase upon the announcement of a female appointment to the 
board (Campbell and Vera, 2010). They therefore concluded that investors believe 
that recruiting female board members raises the value of a firm.  
 
It is significant and ironic in this context that women tend to negotiate their entry 
by distancing themselves from their gender and proving their ‘fit.’ (as in acting, 
thinking and reasoning like their male colleagues). Indicatively, Claringbould and 
Knoppers (2007) interviewed a number of female board members about the 
recruitment and selection process that led to their presence on the board of 
directors. Their data showed that all of the interviewed women, prior to joining a 
board, were part of predominantly male networks.   
 
Witz (1990) argues that exclusion (lack of fit) and inclusion (fit) are the result of 
processes between subordinate and dominant groups. Dominant meanings and 
images are associated with gender in accordance to the perceived roles of men and 
women by the dominant group.  Such associations generate gender roles and 
associations between a person of a particular gender and certain activities. In their 
2007 study, Claringbould and Knoppers established that their respondents had 
been asked to become a board member for specific reasons, the main one of which 
was their gender.   
 
So it would appear that although there are necessary qualities needed for board 
membership (for example a strong track record, expertise in management and 
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governance, high visibility and social capital (Sheridan, 2001; Sheridan and Milgate, 
2003)), the manner in which men and women are recruited onto a board highlights 
masculinity as a dominant group and femininity as the subordinate group. 
Recruiting women onto boards of directors seems to depend largely on how 
gender is perceived in specific contexts (Martin, 2003). 
 
For example, if the dominant male group associates being female with domesticity, 
caring, low paid or part time work and so forth then a female has little ‘fit’ for a 
position as a CEO or board member (Acker, 1992; Witz, 1990).  Managerial 
positions have come to be associated with white middle class men, a reason why 
there are fewer women than men in senior managerial positions (Collinson and 
Hearn, 1996).  This situation persists where managers associate women with low 
paid, domestic work as they are then less likely to facilitate the inclusion of women 
into senior management positions.  	  
How do these findings and theory translate to statistics on women and their 
representation on boards? Although 73.5% of the 200 largest companies in the 
world have at least one woman director, only 10.4% of all board members in the 
Fortune top 200 are women. The American companies that belong to the Fortune 
Global 200 have more women directors (17.5%) than European companies, who 
typically have less than one-half of that number. Women for example, comprise 
6.3% of the corporate board members in The Netherlands (Claringbould and 
Knoppers, 2007).  
 
The Spencer Stuart (2009) survey indicates a total of 16% of all directors are 
women, and 89% of Boards have at least one. In terms of new appointments, 17% 
are women. By comparison, 48% in the UK but only 17% of Australian Boards have 
one or more women occupying positions as non-executive directors. Pass’ (2004)  
UK study revealed that only 11% of all non-executive directors are women while 
the Australian study by Cortese and Bowrey (2008) demonstrated that the average 
age of women in these positions was significantly lower than men at 53 (equivalent 
data is not available for the UK study). A possible explanation for these findings 
comes from the wider corporate context where the proportion of women 
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occupying senior roles, including on the Board, in companies in many jurisdictions 
still languishes well below that of men (McGregor and Vinnicombe, 2009; Oakley, 
2000; Osler, 2008; Still, 1994). In addition, for the Australian study, and with the 
increasing attention being paid to this imbalance and moves to address it (Burke, 
1997; Hornsby-Geluk, 2010; Janda, 2010), it is reasonable to conclude that the 
women’s talent pool for directors is likely to be younger on average than the 
men’s.   
 
The recent growth in the percentage of women independent directors in the 
United States is of interest, particularly when viewed alongside findings from other 
research. Daily, Certo and Dalton (1999) investigated the position of women vis a 
vis Board membership in the United States but while they stated that some 37.6% 
of such women directors had a corporate background (Daily et al., 1999, p.96) 
they did not report either on total numbers nor on the number of boards with 
such outside directors. In addition, they reported that some 32% of outside 
women directors were  ‘affiliated’ (or ‘gray’ (Felo, 2001, p.212) – connected to the 
company by business links (Daily et al.,1999) – and therefore clearly not 
independent under the current NYSE definition. A more recent one by Williams 
(2003) involved a sample of 185 companies in which he investigated the 
relationship between women members (albeit insiders as well as outsiders) and 
corporate philanthropy. In addition to finding a lowly average of 6% women on 
Boards (with a range of 0 to 26%), 41 companies or 22% of the sample had no 
women members at all (Williams, 2003, 5) Finally, Peterson and Philpot’s (2009) 
study found that of the academics holding posts as independent directors in 
Fortune 500 companies, women (of all ethnicities) held 80 or 19%.  
 
New Zealand, like the rest of the Western world has few female board members. 
In the most recent census of EEOU top 100 companies, McGregor and Fountaine 
(2006) found that only 7.13% of board members were female. New Zealand has an 
informal policy of affirmative action towards women in corporate governance but a 
strong anti-discrimination policy to prevent gender discrimination. However, when 
in 2008 there was a 10% growth in boards of State Owned Enterprises in New 
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Zealand (where the shareholding Ministers control the appointments of directors) 
with 12 new appointments, only one these was female (Vinnicombe, Singh and 
Burke, 2008). Thus even for a government that wishes to set a good example, 
gender parity has yet to be achieved. 
 
With the observable trend in recent years towards corporate boards recruiting 
people based on experience rather than title, high level business women who are 
not CEOs are more likely to be considered not only in New Zealand but 
elsewhere. Moreover, the pool of likely candidates has become wider (Toddi, 
2001). 
 
By way of general conclusion to this discussion on diversity, recent research by 
Ingley and McCaffrey (2007) shows how established companies in New Zealand 
see new directors as bringing industry knowledge to the table as well as their 
reputation in business and industry. These established companies are concerned 
with the candidate’s reputation in their industry, business community and financial 
sector. Most factors that influence established companies in their selection of non-
executive directors are external to the organization, that is, “what the candidate 
brings to the company” (Ingley and McCaffrey, 2007, p.324). In contrast, the criteria 
used by New Zealand start-up companies can be summed up as “what the 
candidate can do for the start-up” (Ingley and McCaffrey, 2007, p.324). These 
findings demonstrate the importance for start-ups of a director’s ability to bring 
contacts, networks and capital to the business. The importance of other criteria 
such as strategic capability, expertise in areas of interest to the business and 
understanding the business’s risks also indicate the importance to the firm of a 
director as a resource.  
 
Through all these director service activities, including providing information, 
directors can enhance a company's identity, reputation, commitment to mission, 
and standing in the community (Provan, 1980). In this way they can absorb 
environmental uncertainty, thus enhancing organizational performance. For 
example, members of hostile groups could be recruited on to governing boards, or 
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long-term contracts could be established with suppliers. The presence on 
University boards of government departments on which they rely for funding, is 
another.  
 
Indicatively, boards are particularly interested in adding directors with expertise in 
technology or contacts in international markets. `When you take people who have 
different experiences and backgrounds, the group is more effective at problem 
solving’ (Julie Daum, managing director of board services for Spencer Stuart, an 
executive-search firm (as quoted by Toddi, 2001, p. 3730).  
 
 
4.7.6   Characteristics: True Independence 
 
There is some belief that the longer a person serves, the less able they are to think 
objectively or to act independently. This could be a function of inculcation of the 
corporate culture (Pass, 2008; McCabe and Nowak, 2008) or friendships and other 
social connections formed with inside members of the Board (Kren and Kerr, 
1997; Vafeas 2003). The dangers posed by this erosion of independence is implicitly 
acknowledged in the guidelines and codes issued by some rule and guidance bodies 
including the ASX (principle 6) and the FRC (principle B1.1), both of which state 
nine years as a suggested maximum, but not in the more prescriptive rules of the 
NYSE.  Pass (2004) found that the average time served was 5.6 years with the 
range from 3-10.4 years while Cortese and Bowrey’s (2008) finding was six years, a 
little more than in the UK but still well inside the maximum recommended in the 
principle. However, the maximum was well beyond that figure at 23 years. Spencer 
Stuart (2009) report that only 5% of respondents imposed any term limits on 
directors (most of whom will be independent). Of the 25 that do, 10 specify a 15 
year limit, five, 12 and four, 10. Overall, the average tenure for independent 
directors was found to be 8.4 years.  
 
The remuneration level for non-executive directors has also been raised as a 
potential threat to independence – if a director is in receipt of large sums from a 
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company, agency issues as outlined earlier may come into play. In the UK, fees 
ranged from £21000-69000 with £36800 as the average for non-chairs (or for 
comparative purposes approximately A$78,000 (Cortese, 2009) and in the United 
States US$75,893 (Spencer Stuart, 2009). Spencer and Stuart (2009) also report 
that 37% of respondents offer stock options to independent directors either as an 
alternative or in addition to their cash consideration. Cortese and Bowrey (2008) 
report an average of A$149,662 for Australian directors. However, it is in relation 
to the chairs that both Pass and Cortese express the most concern as to the 
potential impact on their independence and ability/incentive to monitor given an 
average in the UK of £222000 (or for comparative purposes approximately 
Aus$466,000 (Cortese 2009)) and $456,946 in Australia.  
 
This whole question is a vexing one: Cortese (2009) suggests that the level can 
impact on perceptions on the part of fellow directors (particularly non-chairs when 
looking at the disparity between theirs and the chairs) as to independence. The 
same could easily hold for shareholders. McCabe and Nowak (2008) also hint at 
the unease director participants had of any situation where an independent 
director was reliant on just the company for income. There is some support, 
however, for the idea that the modern regulatory regime for directors raises such 
high expectations on the part of shareholders and has such significantly punitive 
aspects that directors need to be well recognised and rewarded for the work they 
do  (Bush,  2005). From another but related perspective, it could also be argued 
that not only does paying a comparative pittance deter talented people from 
agreeing to serve but also encourages part-time involvement with potentially 
negative effects for shareholder value and monitoring (Pass, 2004; Wallison, 2006).   
 
However, there is also some recent evidence (He, Wright, Evans and Crowe, 
2009) suggesting that performance-based incentives play little part in motivating 
independent directors to do a thorough and effective job. This might suggest that 
such individuals see fixed remuneration as a recognition of their commitment of 
time and effort as directors but are willing to actually do the work for other 
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reasons – perhaps feelings of loyalty, worth or safeguarding their own investment 
(where they hold shares in the company) come into play.  
 
Non-executive directors who hold a number of directorships are the final aspect 
Cortese and Bowrey (2008) considered as a threat to independence, although Pass 
(2004) and Spencer Stuart (2009) also look at the background of such directors 
(discussed below). This situation has been cited as a potential advantage (Pass, 
2008), having no demonstrable impact on the ability of directors to carry out their 
duties (Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard 2003) but also as a potential problem 
(Pass, 2008; Matolcsy, Stokes and Wright, 2004; Steele, 2008). In his discussion of 
this issue, Steele cites the example (Steele, 2008, p.58-9) of an independent 
director who, in his rush to catch a train, grabbed the Board meeting papers for 
the wrong company. The confusion and embarrassment that followed his intensive, 
insightful and utterly misguided grilling of the Finance Director did nothing for the 
Board or his reputation as a good monitor.  
 
This whole issue has been specifically addressed in the FRC code as something to 
be taken into account in determining whether a director is truly independent (FRC 
2010). The findings of the immediate studies were to the effect that on average the 
UK non-executive directors held two other directorships (although 15 out of a 
total of 317 held more than five) and the Australian three with a maximum of nine, 
while in the United States, 66% of the respondent companies had recently imposed 
limits to the number of other directorships their directors could hold with 92% 
setting the figure at between 3-5.  
 
 
4.7.7    Characteristics: Effectiveness 
 
As an indication of what firms seek in independent directors, nearly 50% 
responding to the Spencer Stuart (2009) survey put business expertise at the top 
of their wish list, in particular in respect of financial and risk. (Interestingly, given 
the heightened awareness and exposure to legal rules, the desire to have 
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independent directors who could advise of legal risk came a lowly bottom at 2% of 
all mentions).  
 
Also in the case of North America, other indications of the overall effectiveness of 
independent directors come via the literature around effectiveness of such 
directors. In early studies (pre NYSE and NASDAQ requirements for 
independence) Fama and Jensen (1983) state that independent directors tend to be 
major decision-makers at other organisations while Borokhovich, Parrino and 
Trapani (1996) offer the holding of interlocking directorships and executive 
positions as reasons for an independent director failing to challenge the CEO. Both 
these indicators point to business people as the most likely independent presence 
on the Board. Post the requirements things do not seem that different. Kolasinski 
(2009), for example, argues that poor acquisition decisions by the CEO can be 
avoided if independent directors use their good business judgment to prevent it – 
thereby implying that they will in most likelihood be experienced in business.  
Wallison (2006) also assumes that independent directors are likely to be 
professional - probably holding directorships elsewhere.  
 
 
4.7.7.1  Do Independent Directors Improve Shareholder Value? 
 
Pass (2004) found a higher proportion of business related academics as outside 
directors by comparison to those from other areas, a finding that suggests that the 
forward looking or visionary approach of such individuals help a company 
strategize for the future – or maintain or increase shareholder value on the longer 
term – rather than merely focus on the past and the financial results.In Hills (2005) 
study, respondents who fell into the ‘non-executive’ director category cited board-
conflict resolution, dismissal or support of CEO and the shaping of company 
morality as important aspects of their role.  
 
However, others look beyond the direct independent director-shareholder value 
link to hypothesise that some companies might have different objectives in mind 
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when selecting such directors. Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) posit that those with 
political or legal backgrounds are recruited onto Boards in order to assist 
companies in managing their environments. Therefore, as external political (as in 
the case of those in the electric utility sector (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001)) or 
regulatory/governmental pressures increase so too will the proportion of those 
with relevant backgrounds. Theoretically, this strategy will permit the Board to 
mine the expertise of these outside or independent directors in order that they 
might better understand their responsibilities and, perhaps more importantly, 
utilise those directors’ networks and contacts to minimise business risk. This in 
turn will have a positive effect on shareholder value as the market responds 
positively to the perceived stability and low risk associated with the investment 
(Gordon, 2007). 
 
Peterson and Philpot (2009), in their study of academics as Board members, 
identify two potential direct benefits for the company of having such directors (and 
not just from business or related disciplines), these being advanced discipline-level 
expertise and for them more importantly, experience in research and/or creative 
activity (benefits that seem somewhat contradictory to their findings that the vast 
majority are from the business or related disciplines).  
 
However, they also posit a broader role, this being in line with that of Agrawal and 
Knoeber (2001), Cunningham (2010), Ray (2005) and Tyson (2003) more 
generally,that academics may assist the company in managing its environment by 
liaising with important stakeholder groups. They suggest, for example, that a 
community-based company might have the President of the local university on its 
Board (who then provides assistance in recruiting talent) or as a means of 
increasing the profile of the company in the academic community). A company in 
an environmentally sensitive industry could demonstrate its concern for pollution 
or threats to biodiversity by having a biologist in such a position.  
 
Finally, and more directly relevant to shareholder value, they suggest that because 
such expertise is valued by the company, such outside directors will be elected or 
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appointed to committees that contribute to fulfilment of the duty of care owned 
by the Board to shareholders. Peterson and Philpot (2009) suggest the most likely 
such bodies would be those concerned with public affairs or community relations 
rather than financial. This suggestion is interesting given that Williams (2003) sees 
this type of body as “soft” with compensation, executive or finance committees 
having a greater impact on corporate governance (Williams, 2003, p.2) and 
therefore more important and prestigious.  
 
Arguably, in an environment of triple bottom line or balanced score card reporting 
and pressure for companies to be socially responsible, wider environment and 
therefore for the broader experience non-business people might bring is of 
increasing importance to the company and is likely to improve shareholder value, 
at least in the longer term. Perhaps also of relevance in this regard is the fact that 
recent amendments to the Companies legislation in the UK (Companies Act 2006) 
s172 codify those very aspects of governance in which an independent non-
business director might shine – for the first time it specifically charges a director to 
promote the success of a company (s172). In so doing, he or she must consider a 
variety of factors, including fairness of treatment for various member groups, 
employees, suppliers, customers, the environment, the community and the need to 
maintain high business standards. 
 
However, and despite the above, results of relevant empirical research on the link 
between the membership on the Board of independent directors and shareholder 
value (or company performance more generally) are mixed (Petra, 2005; McCabe 
and Nowak, 2008). Amongst the plethora of studies since 1980 are those that 
suggest a positive link either generally or in specific contexts between the 
proportion of independent directors (or similar data sets such as non-executive or 
outside directors) and company performance (Fama and Jensen 1983; Baysinger 
and Butler 1985; Coles and Hesterley, 2000; Beasley 1996).  Others have achieved 
results that are not so clearly positive. Bhagat and Black (1998) found no such 
positive correlation, neither did Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Bhagat and Black 
(2002), Wan (2005) or Prasanna (2006).   
 
 
Jens Mueller “Movements in the Long White Cloud of Governance”  Page 171 	  
 
Without dismissing these studies, it is difficult to draw any clear conclusion as to 
whether the presence of independent directors reduces or improves shareholder 
value or is neutral in effect. Basically, and as stressed by Bhagat and Black (1998) 
and by Gordon (2007), they are not consistent in their approach, research method 
or context. In addition it could be argued that some of the studies finding a positive 
correlation are early – prior to the financial scandals that pushed the issues of 
corporate governance to the front of investors’ minds, and prior to moves to 
make it strongly recommended if not mandatory to have independent directors. In 
the case of the later ones, Beasely (1996) looked only at the issue of financial 
statement fraud while Prasanna (2006) utters the caution that the results should be 
treated carefully given the nature of the data and the fact that the concept of 
independent directors had only lately arrived to the Indian business world.  
 
Another explanation may come from the experience such individuals have from 
their tenure on the Board. It is hoped that individuals are selected or 
recommended to the shareholders in General Meeting for election on the basis of 
their credentials and what they can bring to the company, not necessarily in terms 
of business experience but also a wider world view (Agrawal and Knoeber, 2001, 
Peterson and Philpot, 2009).  However, indications are that this is not always the 
case.  
 
McCabe and Nowak (2008) as discussed above, highlight the tendency for a board 
to support the election of potential director candidates who are most like them. 
Pass (2008) also refers to the “cynics” (Pass, 2008, p.294) who note that 
recruitment and selection for non-executives is partly determined by their 
“acceptability” to other directors. This can result in capture of independent 
directors and reduce their willingness or courage to speak against the crowd.  
 
Theoretically at least, having a majority of independent directors should minimise 
this danger, however the longer the tenure enjoyed by independent directors the 
more likely it is that a new director will be trapped into “groupthink” (Van den 
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Berghe and Baelden, 2005, p. 64), be affected by a general cozy atmosphere (Demb 
and Freidrich Neubauer, 1992) or even fall prey to “bullies” in the Boardroom 
(Maharaj, 2007). This is further exacerbated where a director does not have 
understanding or experience in the corporate culture and relies on the “old hands” 
for guidance (Ritchie, 2007). For this reason amongst others, various jurisdictions 
encourage companies to establish Board training and evaluation programs (OECD 
2004) to ensure new Directors (and seasoned ones) are fully aware of their role, 
rights and responsibilities and to have mentoring structures in place for the “old 
hands” (such as the Chair in cases where that person is also independent) to 
provide guidance (Spencer Stuart, 2006).   
 
It has also been suggested that independent directors are less willing to take risks 
(Wallison, 2006; Ritchie, 2007), therefore potentially closing down opportunities 
for the company to grow. Cohen, Dey and Lys (2005) look at risk taking (using 
capital investment as a proxy) and conclude that the preparedness to take risk has 
slowed in the United States after the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley but, as Wallison 
(2006) points out, more research has to be done on this aspect. 
 
In  making a similar point but focusing on legal liability, Wallison (2006, p.3) 
stresses the potential for such directors to be personally liable for losses caused 
through failure to fulfil their directors’ duties, citing in particular the “substantial 
settlements” (Wallison, 2006: 3) directors of Enron and WorldCom were forced 
to pay for failing to catch and address fraud. He considers that these cases were 
unusual but the fact remains: the legal frameworks in place in many jurisdictions 
(such as New Zealand under the Companies Act 1993 (ss 131-138), the Australian 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (ss 180-190), the Companies Act 2006 (UK) ss 171-
176 and the Delaware General Corporations Law (exemplar regime in the United 
States) s141(a) via case law on this subsection) make no specific distinction 
between executive or non, inside or outside, dependent or independent directors 
in terms of their liability for breach of duty. Normally there is an implied 
distinction based on concepts of business judgment and/or reliance on another for 
advice (New Zealand Companies Act 1993, ss131,136,137 and 138; Australia, 
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Corporations Act 2001, ss180 and 189; UK Companies Act 2006 ss171 and 174 
(implied); Delaware s141 (a) via case law on this section (Gordon 2007)), but these 
judge the performance of the director either on whether it was reasonable for that 
person to think the way they did or to rely to the extent they did (subjective) or 
what a reasonable person in his or her position would have thought (objective). 
Either way, they do not excuse a director, even an independent one ill-informed 
on the business or the company, for failure to be vigilant, informed or to ask 
appropriate questions.  The huge increase in potential liability and the massive 
increase in the burden of expectation from shareholders are identified as factors 
deterring otherwise qualified individuals making themselves available for Boards or 
making them less enthusiastic about the ones they are on (Reuters, 2009) 
  
By way of general conclusion to this discussion and given the uncertainty as to the 
link between independent directors and shareholder value, Bhagat and Black’s 
(2002) reflection on the results of their 1998 study and the negative or non-
correlation it revealed is potentially valuable in scoping research that might help 
clarify the issue. In this paper they suggest various rationales for their results. 
These include: while some independent directors may improve performance this 
same outcome may not hold for a Board with a super-majority of independent 
directors (all but one or two), that the test they designed and conducted is limited 
in its ability to produce useful results in a noisy experimental context and that, as 
every company is different in its needs, values and growth trajectory, any uniform 
approach to membership mix on the Board is suboptimal (Bhagat and Black, 2002). 
In other words, it is not the presence per se of independent directors on the 
Board that improves shareholder value: it is the type, talent, background, 
experience and performance of such directors that are important – and these are 
in turn a function of the available talent pool (Jayne, 2007; Bush, 2005), recruitment 
practices and policies of the companies involved (Jayne, 2007; Peterson and Philpot, 
2009); and the characteristics of the corporate structure and power distribution 
between executive and board (Borokhovich, Parrino and Trapani, 1996; Sharma, 
2004; Le Blanc and Gillies, 2005; Pass, 2008).  .   
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The second main aspect of the independent director’s role, as identified above, is 
that of monitoring of the CEO and other members of the executive by way of 
challenging proposals and decisions and setting remuneration.  
 
 
4.7.7.2   Do Independent Directors do a Good Job of  Monitoring? 
 
There seem to be two premises, albeit related, underlying the argument that 
independent directors have an unequalled power to conduct this monitoring task. 
The first premise relates to CEO and executive behaviour and performance. 
Agency theory stresses the critical monitoring or control role of the board, 
because of its primary duty as the agent of shareholders, protecting their interests 
and maximizing their wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). An objective board is 
best placed to conduct this task (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; Coles and 
Hesterley, 2000), which is why critics say that poor director selection and thus 
ineffective decision-making are handicaps (Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  
 
Lacking a strong remuneration or other income-based incentive to support the 
CEO, the independent director is the best choice to apply such objectivity. 
Borokhovich, Parrino and Trapani (1996) looked to studies of stock market prices 
to support a suggestion that the market trusts outsider-dominated Boards to those 
with a majority of insiders as did Gunasekarage and Reed (2008) who found a 
positive correlation but only where the market considered there to be a significant 
agency problem. However, other studies that look at other aspects of the 
monitoring function cast a somewhat more cautious light.  
 
Coles and Hesterley (2002) for example, identify a second crucial criterion that 
must be satisfied in order for an independent director, or any director for that 
matter, to monitor executive behaviour effectively, this being receipt, digestion and 
comprehension of material and relevant information. For Coles and Hesterley 
(2002), inside directors would find it easier to satisfy this criterion than would 
outsiders or independents due to their position in the company and to their 
experience of its operations. Long, Dulewicz and Gay (2005) identify similar 
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barriers to independent directors on UK boards achieving this role, noting in 
particular the torrent of information delivered to members of the Board as a result 
of formalisation of strategic and financial planning processes. Struggling in vain to 
absorb and comprehend such torrents, independent directors (here classified with 
non-executive directors) are often left heavily reliant on executive interpretation 
(Long et al. 2005, p.671), a situation that leads to what Hooghiemstra and van 
Manen (2004, p.317) label the ‘independence paradox’. McCabe and Nowak (2008) 
make a similar point in relation to Australian companies, a point also pertinent to 
the Centro case where the Directors placed huge reliance on the CFO for advice 
on the validity and accuracy of the financial statements (advice that turned out to 
be wrong to the tune of some AU$2 billion).   
 
Finally, there is the danger that where boards target those with business skills (see 
the discussion on diversity and desired skills) independent directors will be ‘people 
like us’ (McCabe and Nowak, 2008, p.559) who  ‘perpetuate’ (Higgs, 2003, p. 42) 
past practices and ways of thinking.  This implicit ‘cronyism’ (Pass, 2004, p. 60) may 
blunt the ability or urge of such appointees to act independently of other members 
or the CEO. 
 
More particularly, if directors come onto the Board due to their expertise but in 
an area not directly related to the company business, he or she may feel the need 
to rely heavily on the CEO for advice and guidance about the company and its 
business and feel uncomfortable with the idea of challenging proposals and 
decisions or giving business advice (Borokhovich, Parrino and Trapani, 1996; 
Wallison, 2006). By analogy too, in the case of a Board with a mix of inside and 
independent directors, independents may be dismissed by fellow directors and the 
executive as ignorant ciphers, there to make up the numbers, thereby further 
diminishing their effectiveness and generating tensions in the Board. Le Blanc and 
Gillies (2005) offer a direct quote from a Director on this point: ‘The CEO 
perceives the Board as an impediment – a group of individuals that must be 
tolerated and that add little value. Many are particularly dismissive of the input 
from the outside directors simply because they do not believe that they have 
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sufficient experience or knowledge to give much valuable input to the decision-
making process’ (Le Blanc and Gillies, 2005, p. 49). 
 
The second and related premise is that independent directors have the power, 
mandate and motivation (by virtue of their election by and accountability to 
shareholders) to exercise their authority to monitor CEOs and other members of 
the executive, including in the course of setting remuneration. “Empirical evidence” 
(Petra, 2005, p. 58) supports the idea that the level of CEO compensation is 
inversely related to the level of control exercised by the Remuneration committee 
(a committee responsible for setting CEO remuneration and other incentives) (see 
Jiraporn, Young and Davidson, 2005 for a similar conclusion). Petra (2005) also 
argues that the presence of independent directors on such committees serves to 
increase their negotiating power vis a vis the CEO.  
 
However, a yawning abyss sometimes appears between “can” and “does” in this 
particular context. That loading up the Remuneration committee with independent 
directors is not necessarily the solution was a lesson learned from the collapses of 
Enron (2001), Global Crossing Ltd (2002) and WorldCom (2002).  Each had high 
percentages of independent directors on their remuneration boards with Enron 
and Global at 100% and WorldCom at 75% (Petra, 2005, p.58). If shareholders are 
not “diligent” in doing their homework prior to electing director candidates and 
directors not “genuinely” independent, this problem will remain (The Economist, 
2003).  
 
Borokhovich, Parrino and Trapani (1996, p.339) cite three possible reasons why 
the incentives of so-called independent (they use the term “outside”) directors 
may not be well aligned with those of the shareholders in the monitoring function. 
First, in cases where the CEO dominates the selection process they may nominate 
outsiders (including independent directors) who would be more inclined to 
support their decisions. Secondly, interlocking directorships (a term used to 
describe the situation where members of a small group of directors sit on a range 
of Boards, effectively allowing that group to influence decisions on all those Boards 
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(Burt, 1983; Tuengler, 2000) may discourage an independent director from 
controlling CEO remuneration - such as where the question arises at company A 
and where that CEO is on the Board of a company (company B) where the 
independent director is an executive –a tit-for-tat effect. 
 
Finally and more generally, there are some concerns emerging from the literature 
as to how Boards work and issues as to how directors, particularly independent 
directors, perceive their role and their relationships with other directors and with 
the executive. Cunningham (2010) for example, sees three fundamental dilemmas 
for such outsiders (specifically non-executive directors or NEDs) arising from their 
role on the Board. These are engagement v non-executive (knowing what is going 
on versus staying objective), challenging v supporting (questioning the CEO to 
ensure a valid decision is made versus supporting, offering advice and expert 
insight), and independence v involvement (standing back from the group versus 
cooperative board decisions).  Le Blanc and Gillies (2005) highlight possibly greater 
concerns: from their survey of 200 directors they refer to a “large number” who 
were “deeply disturbed” (Le Blanc and Gillies, 2005, p. 67) by a lack of trust 
between the Board and management, lack of commitment on the part of their 
fellow directors, strong personality conflicts and problems with the way Board 
meetings were managed.   
 
 
4.8 Independent Directors as “Board Capital” 
 
Directors and the skills they have may be seen as vital strategic resources, the 
crucial “board capital”. This useful concept was coined by Hillman and Dalziel 
(2003), who defined it as the human capital and the relational capital of the board 
members. Directors’ expertise, experience, knowledge, reputation, skills and 
education can be seen as human capital. Human capital theory proposes that 
investments in such human capital result in economic advantages of advancement 
and higher salaries (van der Walt and Ingley, 2003). Burgess and Tharenou (2000) 
argue that such investments increase women’s skills and knowledge for senior 
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positions, in the same way as men, helping them to gain the visibility to be freely 
chosen for boards. Relational capital, sometimes called social capital, is “the sum of 
actual and potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived 
from the network of relationships possessed by an individual or social unit”. 
Relational capital also results of social ties (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003, p.386).   
  
Both kinds of capital can contribute to the general resources provided by inside 
and non-executive directors to their organization, which in turn strengthens firm 
performance. These resources include timely information, advice and counsel, 
building external relations, provision of firm legitimacy and reputation, maintaining 
channels of communication between the firm and external organizations, helping to 
acquire resources from important outside parties such as financial capital (Hillman 
and Dalziel, 2003). For example, directors with specialist expertise, such as legal 
and financial, or management expertise built up from experience in other firms, or 
official skills gained during government employment can provide advice and 
counsel.  
  
This provision of resources to an organization, by its board, can be seen as a 
function of board capital. This view was advanced by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, 
p.170), who identified the provision of expert advice and counsel, and the exercise 
of oversight control as two primary components of a board's internal 
administrative function (Westphal, 1999). 
  
Carpenter and Westphal (2001) showed the kind of advice and counsel provided 
by directors who had ties to strategically related organizations (relational capital). 
Certo, Daily and Dalton (2001) showed how the prestige of directors (board 
capital) could enhance the credibility and performance of the organization. Board 
capital enables the exchange of valuable information by providing channels of 
communication between the firm and external organizations, reducing some 
sources of uncertainty (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Board capital (e.g. financial 
experts) can also aid in acquiring resources, such as finance, from important 
elements outside the firm (Zald, 1969).  
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Conclusion to this section 
 
A board is a group of people, selected for their expertise, who work together to 
add value to the organization they lead. Although diversity in boards of directors 
far from being a requirement per se, it is crucial in the service role, but not in the 
strategic role. There is much more to board composition than director selection 
and achieving the right skill mix, important as these elements are in assembling 
balanced boards. Boards need to be aware of the potential to add value through 
the pool of board capital contributed collectively by their directors as a strategic 
resource for their organization. This board capital is a measure of the value added 
by the board in its governance. Researchers have linked board capital directly to 
the provision of resources and firm performance, according to resource 
dependence theory.  
  
Thus boards may need to focus first on merit criteria for director selection, 
seeking qualified individuals and reflecting in the mix, gender and a range of 
expertise, experience and personal attributes. Shareholders may be unmoved by 
the gender debate, for example, and prefer to hire exclusively for performance.  
 
Despite independent directors being identified as the crux of good corporate 
governance and despite moves in a range of small and large, developed and 
developing countries to make them a requirement or at least a very strong 
recommendation for public companies, the empirical evidence of their effectiveness 
achieving their touted purposes – of increasing shareholder value and monitoring 
the executive of the company - is by no means clear. Numerous studies show 
positive, negative and no effect on corporate governance practices or policy of 
their membership on the Board while others utilise a range of data sets to map the 
characteristics and nature of independent directors. Also some recent empirical 
studies seem to indicate a deep malaise on some Boards, which, if carried through 
to governance practices and decisions suggest that the presence of independent 
directors is just not achieving good outcomes. 
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A common message that seems to come out of the literature is that independent 
directors per se are only one aspect of corporate governance and, as such, cannot 
be considered the one shot panacea to corporate ills. It is necessary to go further 
and both look at how they fit into the raft of policies and practices adopted by the 
company and at the qualities they bring. Although in this regard there is a distinct 
preference for those with business experience (preferably in the same area of 
business if not in the company itself) there is also some sentiment favouring those 
with a wider world view, sentiment consistent with the social support for the 
display of social and other responsibility by the company. 
 
What is missing from this literature is an analysis of this vital link between presence 
of independent directors, activities and outcomes on a broad range of criteria. 
With the ever-increasing emphasis on their membership and the ever-increasing 
demands placed upon them, this is the one major area that would clearly afford 
some detailed and comprehensive exploration. 
 
 
4.9 THE RECRUITMENT OF DIRECTORS 
 
If the skill sets of existing directors are less-than-stellar, or where shareholders see 
those directors as not up to the task of addressing changes in the external 
environment, those shareholders might see a reason to bring in other directors to 
strengthen the competence of their boards. Hence three further hypotheses 
should be tested:  
 
H6 = Shareholders and directors consider a new director’s experience to be more 
important as a contribution than age or diversity. 
 
H7 = Work experience is preferred over formal qualifications, for new 
independent directors.  
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H8 = The majority of firms surveyed intend to hire at least one new independent 
director in the next 5 years. 
 
Rationale: In the context of recruitment of board members, codes of good 
governance and researchers both emphasise the benefits of increasing the number 
of independent directors (De Andres-Alonso, Azofa-Palenzuela and Romero-
Merino, 2009).  It is thought that utilising a number of independent directors helps 
to assure the board’s objectivity when monitoring the managerial team, thus 
reducing the managers' opportunistic behaviour and increasing the organization’s 
efficiency (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990; O'Regan and Oster, 2005) although 
there is no conclusive empirical evidence on the influence of board independence 
on the firm’s efficiency (De Andres-Alonso, Azofa-Palenzuela and Romero-Merino, 
2009). 
 
If independence is a desirable trait, what are the characteristics of a ‘desirable’ or 
‘ideal’ independent director? On the assumptions that for some shareholders at 
least, the inclusion of an independent director is desirable, and that indeed there is 
a significant interest in independent directors in New Zealand, the question arises 
what skills and/or attributes shareholders and fellow directors desire in any 
external directors, and how they see those new appointees as contributing to the 
talent of the board.  
  
The issue of recruiting new board members has been explored in the context of 
both for-profit boards and non-profit boards (Brown, 2007).In 2007, he examined 
whether using recommended recruitment, board member orientation and 
evaluation practices resulted in more competent board members and if the 
presence of these board members led to higher board performance. His results 
supported the hypothesis that using board development practices did lead to more 
capable board members and the presence of these board members led to stronger 
board performance. Ansari (2010) recommends recruiting board members who 
have a variety of backgrounds to enable them to engage with a diverse range of 
stakeholders.  
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To provide guidance into how a wish list of such potential directors should be 
compiled, McNamara (2010a) developed a director recruitment grid (see 
appendix). This grid provides structure for research into an individual’s suitability 
for a position on the board. McNamara (2010a) further suggests that the most 
important consideration when recruiting new board members is the range of skills 
needed at the time.  He also recommends that board development committees 
maintain an up to date list of potential board members which identifies the skills 
that individual could contribute.  
 
Finally, McNamara (2010) recommends that the board chair and CEO meet 
potential board members in order to impart gain a clear understanding of the firm 
and to receive a board member job description. Any potential conflicts of interest 
with the candidate must be identified. The prospective board member should be 
invited along to a board meeting and introduced at the beginning. Shortly after the 
meeting, the prospective board member should be contacted and asked whether 
they would like to join.  
 
Insofar as process of recruitment is concerned, often a new board member will be 
recruited by word of mouth, which raises the question of how objective the search 
might be. Current board members may recommend an individual or an open 
position may be made known by word of mouth (Ansari, 2010), supporting the 
concerns that director appointments are decided by insiders, and possibly not 
based on criteria that would ever allow outsiders to be considered. Zablocki 
(2007) also confirms the above suggestion. Good networking facilitates recruiting 
new board members and most often a prospective board member will be someone 
a current board member already knows (Zablocki, 2007). 
 
However there are executive search consulting companies that specialise in ‘board 
services’. Spencer Stuart is a multinational executive search consultancy firm and 
offers a firm access to a database containing information on potential independent 
directors for a company. Spencer Stuart claims that there is a greater need for 
 
 
Jens Mueller “Movements in the Long White Cloud of Governance”  Page 183 	  
independent directors given recent changes to corporate legislation and 
governance codes (Spencer Stuart, 2010). It offers to assist firms in finding and 
researching potential independent directors and conducts more than 400 searches 
for independent directors every year for companies around the world.  
 
In addition, some board members are recruited though the use of public 
advertisements. Den Hartog, Caley and Dewe (2007) examined the use of 
advertisements for this purpose. They compared all job advertisements that 
appeared in a prominent public domain (The Times Newspaper, UK) and found 
that out of the total number of advertisements (4217) that appeared over the 
course of 15 months, 1390 were for leadership positions such as chairperson, CEO 
or director. Hartog et al.’s analysis highlighted the terminology of the adverts most 
successful in attracting ideal candidates for leadership roles. They found that the 
terminology such as ‘people oriented’ and ‘transformational’ were used far more 
than terms describing traits such as ‘task oriented’ or ‘transactional’. 
 
In the particular instance of non-profit organisations, boards are generally 
composed of founders and substantial donors who serve as volunteers. Hence 
their willingness to maintain their personal donations of wealth or time and, 
presumably, some ideological affinity to the purposes of the organization, is 
commonly an implicit condition for membership (De Andres-Alonso, Azofa-
Palenzuela and Romero-Merino, 2009). Recruitment of board members in non-
profit organisations can therefore be self perpetuating.  
 
Traditionally, companies seek board members by having someone suggest a 
prospect, which they then pursue (Gottlieb, 2005). Most board will recruit new 
members by having existing board members put forward names. The nominee will 
generally fill out an application form and attend a meeting or two, after which they 
may be asked to join the board (Gottlieb, 2005). 
 
It is advisable to put in place a process for recruiting board members, writes 
Gottlieb (2005), whether it is to replace existing board members or to begin an 
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organised programme to recruit new members with skills complimenting those 
currently represented around the board table. Particular attention should be paid 
to ensuring diversity on the board although Zablocki (2007) claims that recruiting 
for diversity is hard. Often the perfect candidates are identified, researched and 
approached, but the answer is no. 
 
Standard advice is for the board to develop a wish list of potential candidates 
(Massey, 2010) whose backgrounds and circumstances are then checked for details 
such as wealth, giving capacity, giving history, volunteer involvement, educational 
background and business relationships. It is also important that the right person in 
the organization be identified to approach recruits (Massey, 2010).The final list 
should then be reviewed by the board development committee to ensure that the 
right potential recruits will be approached. He further suggests the full board 
should agree before this is done. Finally, should the recruitment be successful, the 
new board member ought to be encouraged to immediately get involved in 
meetings and events.  
 
An important preliminary step in determining how to recruit qualified board 
members with such a commitment is understanding the motivations of board 
members in non-profit organizations (discussed above).   
 
Cleave and Inglis (2006) suggest that future research with a focus on individuals 
serving as board members will help determine and understand the necessary 
human resource strategies needed to increase the skills and effectiveness of board 
members. This affects the recruitment and retention of board members by 
allowing organizations to better understand what they are looking for in a 
candidate and allowing a candidate to assess if they are able and willing to fill that 
position. By understanding key motivations of potential board members, 
organizations and their nominating committees will be able to strategize effectively 
on their specific recruitment strategies (Ansari, 2010).   
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In small family businesses, boards of directors tend to be recruited ‘in house’. The 
results of a pilot survey conducted by Johannisson and Huse (2000) suggest that 
entrepreneurial firms avoid recruiting outside directors. Contrastingly, managerial 
firms actively welcome outside directors. Family-run businesses were ambivalent 
on the issue.   
 
However, overall, in the New Zealand context there is high and growing demand 
for independent directors. According to a 2007 survey (Jayne, 2007), over 700 
New Zealand firms were looking to recruit directors. This demand is not confined 
to large corporate but, as indicated earlier, includes SMEs.  The question is, which 
ones and why? 
 
The next chapter describes empirical research conducted into some of the aspects 
explored in this chapter: specifically perceptions of the benefits to be obtained 
from their recruitment, the demand for, the role and motivation of independent 
directors. It could be subject to criticism due to its focus on directors and 
experience in large corporate, and therefore it has limited significance in relation 
to the use and role of such directors in New Zealand SMEs, the focus of much of 
the discussion so far, and the rationale for the project as identified in chapter one. 
However, the following points should be  
Made: 
 
• The variety of corporations in New Zealand means that the experience of 
many of those organisations included in the sample can be extrapolated to 
SMEs 
• Many of the respondents had served on NPOs, SMEs and other 
corporations. Therefore, their views and expertise are of relevance also to 
SMEs 
• The legal rules and requirments are similar for SMEs and other corporates. It 
is what they do and whether they are listed or not that deptermines the 
requirements. Therefore, it was not considered necessary to distinguish 
them further. 
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Chapter 5:  THE EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
 
 
5.1   Introduction 
 
This chapter describes methodology in conducting the research. Also, and by way 
of reminder, it lists the research questions and hypotheses, the methods used in 
the statistical analysis, the data collection process and the methods applied in data 
interpretation. It is important to note that the survey instrument (included in the 
appendices to this document) incorporates a broader range of questions than are 
subject to analysis and discussion in this and the subsequent chapter.  The reason 
for this lies in the fact that it was designed to support several research projects, 
not because some parts proved too difficult to analyse or because the results were 
problematic or contradictory. 
 
 
5.2 Research Design: Methodology   
  
The research around corporate governance, and the role and importance of 
independent directors in this process, is, as indicated by what has already been 
discussed, large, complex and diffused. Consequently the canon of knowledge is 
also arguably large and complex. The intention in this case is to enrich our 
understanding of corporate governance and independent directors in New Zealand 
and to contribute to the creation of a comprehensive picture of New Zealand 
governance.   
 
The means of creating such a picture can include historical research and case 
studies and often includes direct observation as a further means of enquiry 
(Eisenhardt, 1989a; Merriam, 1998; Yin, 1994). In this instance, perceptions, 
attitudes and beliefs of stakeholders in governance were explored by way of a 
nation-wide survey of three such groups: directors, management and shareholders.  
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I also wanted to enrich our understanding of the influence on governance of the 
characteristics, strengths and weaknesses of particular organizations (Cooperrider, 
Whitney, and Stavros, 2003) through the exploration of individual cases. The 
practice of analysing individual cases and extrapolating the findings to a larger 
population is well described (Stake, 1995). For this research, a deeper 
understanding of the context in which independent directors’ function was 
obtained by way of in-depth interviews held with selected individuals (see 
Appendix One for a list of organizations involved in this aspect of the research).  
 
More particular to this instance, these individual cases include those firms or other 
relevant organizations whose directors completed both individual surveys and 
participated in follow-up/validation investigations (Cohen, 2001; Yin, 2003) The 
benefits of reviewing the governance performance and attitudes with all or most 
directors of an enterprise lies in improving our understanding of the board as a 
collective unit of decision-making and attitudes. In addition, this information can be 
used as a validation tool for the anonymous large-scale nation-wide survey. 
 
To focus the data collection, directors interviewed were selected on the basis of 
their firms being representative by size and industry.There are two explanations 
for selection of the survey population.  
 
First, and as explained above, I intended to contribute to a comprehensive picture 
of governance in the New Zealand context. Although, as emphasised previously, 
most private firms in New Zealand are SMEs, it is also correct to say that most 
attention both in terms of rules and regulations and in attention has been directed 
to large corporate (Devlin, 2004) and/or governance issues facing public bodies. 
Hence, empirical research focusing solely or largely on governance in SMEs would 
offer a very pallid and limited picture.  
 
Secondly, a major emphasis in the work and in the research is in identifying the 
motivations and characteristics of independent directors and demand for their 
services. Again, much attention has been directed to independence on the boards 
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of large corporates. For this reason, much of the experience is also embedded in 
this context and should be tapped for the benefit of SMEs. 
 
 
5.3  Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
By way of reminder, the survey instrument (as described in 5.4 below) is directed 
at answering the following research questions, as defined and justified in chapter 
one. They are: 
 
a. Do independent directors contribute positively to company boards in New 
Zealand? 
b. Are independent directors sufficiently qualified to discharge their duties as 
company directors? 
c. What is the motivation of independent directors to serve on a company 
board in New Zealand?  
d. What are the characteristics and qualities of a ‘desirable’ independent 
director? 
e. Are New Zealand companies looking for additional independent directors? 
 
The questions reflect the specific data sought to answer the hypotheses, with 
several questions asked with a somewhat wider framefor background information 
but not included in the statistics. The survey populations of business 
operators/executives, shareholders and company directors were selected for their 
direct connection to the topic of company directorships in SMEs. Executives, as in 
small firms they often participate in the selection of directors or are decision-
makers on the question whether new directors are needed at all; shareholders 
because they are legally and practically the ones appointing new directors; and 
company directors because they often participate in the generation of  a ‘short list’ 
from which shareholders select appointable directors. 
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To enable these questions to be answered, a series of eight hypotheses were 
devised for testing by the research. Also by way of reminder (as they are described 
and justified in Chapter 4), these hypotheses are as follows:  
 
H1 = Directors are motivated by the chance of doing good rather than by other 
benefits of a directorship  
 
This hypothesis challenges the theoretical assumptions that directors perform 
purely based on some legal construct following, among others, agency theory. 
Given the high level of activity and engagement produced by the non-profit sector 
in New Zealand, it is presumed that there are other ‘do good’ factors at work to 
engage people into contribution of effort and energy. Such engagement would 
prima facie run against the presumption that a somewhat emotionally distanced 
arrangement crafted by legal constructs is the basis on which company directors 
feel triggered to produce their contribution. I note that the question asks about 
‘doing good’ in an unspecified manner and thus is of limited value to pinpoint 
specifically which parts of ‘goodness’ the respondents focus on when selecting this 
choice ans their answer. This work is intended to identify areas where follow-up 
research can be placed, and thus, if this hypothesis process true, would certainly be 
one of these areas. 
 
 
H2 = Independent directors are considered to contribute positively to the board.  
 
The literature, described above, is rife with arguments for and against the inclusion 
of independent directors on company boards. At the same time, in the SME 
markets independent directors are the exception and not the norm. This 
hypothesis, when prove true, would lay the groundwork to craft arguments for the 
inclusion of independent external directors even on the boards of privately-held, 
family-owned, small-/mid-size businesses on the basis of their contribution to the 
board. The presumption would be, quite reasonably, that if independent directors 
are reported to make a positive contribution, then such a contribution is not 
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limited to specific firms but by implication reproducible in many other entities as 
well. This question was asked of executives (who would likely interact with 
independent directors in SMEs), shareholders (who would likely form an opinion as 
to the contributions independent directors make) and company directors (who 
would have seen independent directors in operation). 
 
 
H3 = Independent director contributions are not seen to be equally  
important by directors and shareholders  
 
On the platform of independent director being hailed in the literature as being 
producers of value at a board, the question arises who would support the inclusion 
of external directors on NZ SME boards and who would not. Seeing that the two 
groups of actors involved in board member appointments are the existing board 
(through the most commonly practiced system of ‘recommending’ new board 
candidates for election) and shareholders (who vote on new board member 
appointments or re-appointments of existing ones and sometimes have 
nominations of their own…), it is important to determine how each of these two 
groups perceive the possible contribution of value by externals directors.  
 
 
H4 = Directors consider themselves more than ‘average’ competent in all aspects 
of contributing to a board. 
 
Inherent in the call for more independent directors is the knowledge and 
competence on which they would ride into the board room. If they are not insider 
executives with the inherent specific knowledge about the firm’s operation, then 
their claim to a board seat would be based on specific abilities that allow them to 
be proper agents for the shareholders. It is then an important consideration to 
identify whether and in which categories of the usual array of stewardship 
qualifications, newly appointed directors excel with their skills. If there was an 
outcome indicating a lack of transferable skills into a directorship role, the 
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presumption of more independent directors must fail unless there are additional 
training and education features added into the mix. 
 
 
H5 = Directors report that their level of ‘commitment’ exceeds their level of 
competence in other areas. 
 
Connected to H4, this adds a non-skill area into the set of competencies a 
prospective director could offer, that of commitment to be a good director. 
Following on from the theoretical framework of being a competent steward of a 
firm in the interests of its shareholders, this hypothesis tests for alternate 
competencies other than specific skills. “Other areas” were specific skills-based 
areas given in the survey and generated from the most commonly used training 
categories in directorship and givernance training, i.e. the ability to think 
strategically, the understanding of legal frameworks of governance, the ability to 
communicate effectively, etc. 
 
 
H6 = Shareholders and directors consider a new director’s experience to be more 
important as a contribution than age or diversity. 
 
Given the low number of independent directors on New Zealand SME company 
boards, the question arises how well newly appointed directors would fit in, to 
discharge their duties effectively. Looking at age (‘old boys network’) and diversity 
(mainly gender, evidenced as a flash point by fewer than 12% of women being in 
corporate leadership roles in New Zealand), as areas where new directors could 
provide freshness around the board table, this question tests whether a selection 
of new directors would mainly focus on specific expertise, or on age or diversity. 
Following from this outcome, specific recommendations can be advanced how to 
search for the directors that seem to be most wanted. 
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H7 = Work experience is preferred over formal qualifications, for new 
independent directors.  
 
On the basis of directors needing to perform within the framework of the legal 
and constitutional requirements, whether agents, stewards or other placeholders 
for the interests of shareholders, a relevant question is based on which specific 
ability new and independent directors might be considered for vacant board seats. 
Historically, lawyers and accountants, professional degree holders, were preferred, 
as were MBA graduates and other holders of advanced degrees. As it is not clear 
how such specific academic qualifications aid the discharge of directorship duties, 
this question tests whether this somewhat anecdotal and historic condition still 
exists or whether other, less formal, qualifications, such as work experience, 
would constitute sufficient attractiveness to be voted onto a board. This question 
set communicates a more general understanding by the respondents whether 
informal (work experience) qualifications are preferred over formal (degree) 
qualifications. 
 
 
H8 = The majority of firms surveyed intend to hire at least one new independent 
director in the next 5 years. 
 
This hypothesis tests for the real-life relevance or the argument that additional 
directors, independent ones preferably, would be needed to advance the level of 
governance in New Zealand. If, by way or argument, there was no interest by SMEs 
to hire new directors in the future, then the preceding argument of skills 
diversification, gender and age diversity and the benefits of independent directors 
would be rendered academic only and of no practical consequence for the upgrade 
of governance quality in New Zealand. 
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5.4.  The Survey instrument  
 
5.4.1 Development 
 
The survey was developed by reviewing prior research on governance in New 
Zealand and overseas to identify factors that are considered relevant. Interviews 
were conducted with several organization leaders in New Zealand to further 
identify elements of interest in the theme of governance, independent directors 
and board/director competence. 
  
The resulting survey instrument was then tested for functionality and ease of 
application with 15 directors/shareholders, all of whom were graduates of the 
Waikato Management School MBA programme. Further refinements were made to 
make questions and answer choices easier to understand and operate. 
 
Ethical approval was obtained from the Ethics Committee of the University of 
Waikato. Aside from the obvious issues of representation and conflict-free 
wording, the information provided to all recipients specifically assured their 
anonymity. Respondents were given the opportunity to provide contact details if 
they wished to be contacted for a follow-up interview, and  to re-establish 
anonymity, that contact information was then permanently removed from the 
answers.  Nearly 62% of the respondents indicated they would be willing to discuss 
this matter further, demonstrating the high level of interest in this topic. In the 
case of directors of ten organizations (see Appendix One for details) those 
respondents were contacted for follow-up in-depth interviews.    
 
No inducements were promised or given with the exception of arranging a free 
www.finddirectors.com 2-year listing membership for those respondents who 
wished to have one. Completion of the survey was not required to obtain this free 
listing (that has a value of NZ$95 but no cash value).  
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The following section describes the format of the survey instrument and the 
questions included. In addition, it offers justification for each question by relating it 
to one or more of the hypotheses tested by that question.  
 
   
5.4.2   Format and Questions 
 
The survey consists of 3 parts, each formatted specifically for either shareholders, 
senior managers or directors, with a joint preamble set of demographic questions. 
Depending on whether a recipient self-classified as either one or more of these 3 
classes of respondents, the applicable sections of the survey would open up. Below 
is an overview of the questions in the survey by reference to the eight hypotheses 
being tested. It should be noted that as there was some (relatively minor) 
modification to the instrument between 2009 and 2010, the table also identifies 
where such modification occurred. This proviso guards against misinterpretation of 
results where changes affect those results. 
 
The content, purpose and approach to analysis of each question or group of 
questions is described below by reference to each of the eight hypotheses.  
 
 
5.4.2.1   Director Motivation 
 
To gain insight into the reasons why directors might take up positions on a board, 
the survey included questions relating to what factors a participant may consider as 
important, were a position to be offered. Participants were asked to rate the 
importance of the factors on a 4-point scale: “Very important”; “Somewhat 
important”; “Somewhat unimportant”; and “Very unimportant”. To measure the 
principal motivation(s) of directors, I use responses to these questions pooled over 
all available survey years. 
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The question and answer choice options are: 
Question: If you were offered a Board position now, how important would each of 
the following factors be for you?  
Answer Choices (indicating the abbreviations used in the tables below): 
“ImpFee” = Fees and Benefits to the Directors 
“ImpPrestige” = Status/Prestige of the Organization 
“ImpPublic” = Whether the Company’s Shares are Publicly Traded 
“ImpKnown” = Becoming Known/Networking 
 
The Importance questions allowed 4 responses: 
1. Very important 
2. Somewhat important 
3. Somewhat unimportant 
4. Very unimportant' 
I may consider both the “important” responses (1,2) to support H1, whereas the 
“unimportant” responses (3,4) do not. Therefore, I code the answers to true/false 
relative to the hypothesis:  
• Very important, Somewhat important => True 
• Somewhat unimportant, Very unimportant => False 
and compare the relative proportions for the ImpGood question against the 
relevant “benefit” related questions: ImpFee; ImpPrestige; ImpPublic; ImpKnown, 
using the MH statistic. The set of sub-hypotheses for H1, then are 
 
 
   
 
 
Hypothesis H1 will be considered supported where all sub-hypotheses hold for the 
various cases.  
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis Test 
H1S1: ImpGood > ImpFee 
H1S2: ImpGood > ImpPrestige 
H1S3: ImpGood > ImpPublic 
H1S4: ImpGood > ImpKnown 
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5.4.2.2   The Contribution of Independent Directors 
  
One of the persuasive reasons for including independent directors on boards 
would likely be the manifest contributions made by those presently on the board. 
Both presently serving directors and shareholders are likely to be faced with 
making such a judgment. Therefore, it is important to establish not only whether 
independent directors are seen as contributing positively to the board but also 
whether the attributes sought by directors and shareholders are the same. 
Questions on this topic were added to the survey set in 2009 (Table 5.2.2 T1). 
 
However, and as stated above, shareholders could not be expected to have 
detailed awareness of the specific contributions made by independent directors to 
the workings of the Board. For this reason, only directors were asked to provide 
feedback on this question and only their answers were used to examine the validity 
of H2.  
 
The question and answer choice options are: 
Question: Based on your experience, how would you rate the NON-
EXECUTIVE/INDEPENDENT Directors' contribution? 
Answer Choices (indicating the abbreviations used in the tables below): 
“IndPerform” = Their contribution to the performance of the organization 
“IndMtg” = The quality of their contribution during board meetings 
“IndNetw” = Their ability to assist with networking 
“IndStrategy” = Their ability to provide strategic vision 
“IndSyst” = Creating a sustainable enterprise 
“IndGov” = Their understanding of governance issues 
“IndBus” = Their understanding of the organization’s business 
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In relation to relevant questions asked of directors on such contribution, five 
possible answers could be given:  
1. Poor 
2. Not so good 
3. Acceptable 
4. Very good 
5. Outstanding  
I may consider answers 3,4,5 to support the H2, whereas answers 1,2 do not. 
Therefore, I code these answers  
• Not so Good; Acceptable => False 
• Very good; Outstanding => True 
and the proportion of true/false outcomes are compared against the null (equal) 
proportions for the relevant questions. The contributing sub-hypotheses for H2 
are: 
 
Hypothesis Test 
H2S1: IndPerform > null 
H2S2: IndMtg > null 
H2S3: IndNetw > null 
H2S4: IndStrategy > null 
H2S5: IndSust > null 
H2S6: IndGov > null 
H2S7: IndBus > null 
 
Hypothesis H2 will be deemed supported where the hypothesis holds for each 
sub-hypothesis in the pooled  case. 
 
By way of explanation and justification for the coding of “acceptable” as false rather 
than true: it was considered that the judgment by respondents of contribution as 
merely acceptable was damming with faint praise. Positive contribution seems to 
be more than mere acceptability.   
 
In this specific case (and others in the reported statistics), the question was 
deliberately neutrally worded and a balanced (between potentially “negative” and 
“positive”) range of responses allowed, to ensure respondents were not presented 
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with a biased answer set. The responses are then forced into two groups, where 
clearly the positive responses group well, as do the negative. The question then is 
how best to incorporate the middle response. In some surveys this is accomplished 
using even-number of choices, however this approach actually only achieves the 
outcome of those who would have chosen “average” randomly assign themselves 
to “positive” or “negative”. Subsequent analysis based on those data are 
questionable as the two middle-responses (typically the largest population) are 
compromised. In the survey here, the “average” response is allowed, forming a 
true picture of perceived value.  
 
The question remains, how best to address the “average” response. The test 
desired was (in the reviewer’s example) if independent directors contribute 
positively. A positive contribution is assumed to mean more positive than the 
relevant “average” contribution. Hence a view of “average” contribution is NOT a 
positive contribution. The question was not probing NEGATIVE vs POSTIVE, but 
POSITIVE vs NON-POSITIVE contributions. So, the appropriate test is  
 
<all positive> against <all non-positive>  
 
The “Acceptable” then properly ought to be included in the “non-positive” group. 
Contrast, for example, the previous question on importance of director’s specific 
motivations. There a 4-point scale was deemed appropriate as it was felt a 
motivation was either important or not, and there was no “average” to consider.  
 
 
5.4.2.3   Contribution of Directors as Perceived by Directors and Shareholders 
 
Hypothesis two was tested using the responses of directors only as it was 
considered unlikely that most shareholders would fully understand the difference 
between independent and inside directors. However, it was also considered 
imnportant to analyse responses of both groups in respect of their perceptions as 
to the contributions of directors more generally, as they interact with directors in 
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different ways.  A number of such questions were included in the survey, however 
in this analysis, I only consider only two sets of these: the contribution as a result 
of international experience (as perceived by directors and shareholders (ContGbl 
and ShrGbl (Questions 37 and 44 respectively)) and the benefit to the firm of 
successful business experience (as perceived by directors and shareholders 
(ContRecord and ShrRecord (Questions 39 and 49, respectively)). 
 
The two pairs of questions asked of directors and shareholders were considered 
sufficiently similar that I could compare responses and assess if directors and 
shareholders had the same requirements of directors.  
 
The question and answer choice options are: 
Question: As a shareholder, how important are these attributes in a director? 
Answer Choices (indicating the abbreviations used in the tables below): 
“ContGbl” = Having global business experience 
“ContRecord” = Having a track record of business successes 
 
 
The ContGbl and ContRecord questions have only two answers (Yes or No), 
whereas the shareholder questions, ShrGbl and ShrRecord) have three outcomes:  
1. Very important;  
2. Somewhat Important;   
3. Not Very Important.  
 
A “Yes” response (1) was considered to be a positive statement while 2 and 3 
were considered negative, 2 because such a response was considered to be neutral 
at best. Answers were therefore coded as: 
• Very important => YES 
• Somewhat important, Not very important => NO 
 
This coding allows a comparison of responses from both groups. In this case I am 
interested in whether the two groups (directors and shareholders) have the same 
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view, but not whether it be more or less important in any case. The test then is 
just to assess if the null hypothesis (Q1=Q2) holds. 
 
Sub-hypotheses for Q1 and Q2: 
Hypothesis Test 
H3S1 ContGbl ≠ ShrGbl 
H3S2 ContRecord ≠ ShrRecord 
 
Hypothesis H3 will be considered supported where all the sub-hypotheses are 
shown to hold for the pooled case 
 
 
 
5.4.2.4  Competence as a Director 
 
A direct rationale for the inclusion of independent directors in firms is their 
competence in matters relating to governance. Using the approach for directors to 
self-evaluate the performance of themselves and that of their fellow directors, with 
all replies being anonymous and thus more reliable, this research wishes to identify 
whether directors consider themselves above-average competent in areas which 
relate directly to the discharge of their governance duties. 
 
The question and answer choice options are: 
Question: How would you describe the overall competence of the Board (not just 
your own individual competence) in these areas? 
“CmpCommit” = Commitment, to the business and to stakeholders 
“CmpStrategy” = Corporate strategy and the principles of risk/strategic change 
“CmpLegal” = Legal, regulatory and corporate governance and the responsibilities 
of directors 
“CmpLead” = Leadership qualities, commanding respect of others, displaying 
judgment and courage 
“CmpTeam” = Team player abilities, listening and influencing skills and awareness 
of own strengths and weaknesses 
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The competence questions allow 5 responses: 
1. Excellent competence 
2. Good competence 
3. Sufficient competence 
4. Poor competence 
5. Very poor competence 
 
Since I wish to establish whether directors consider themselves at least better than 
average, I may consider answers 1,2 to support H4, whereas answers 3,4,5 do not, 
3, because it was deemed an inadequate indication of confidence. Therefore, I 
coded the answers  
§ Excellent; Good => True 
§ Sufficient competence, Poor, Very Poor competence => False 
and tested the proportion of true/false outcomes compared against the null (equal 
proportions) for each competence question. Where the null hypothesis does not 
hold, inspection of the proportion of true outcomes will determine for that case 
whether directors consider themselves more competent than average. The 
contributing sub-hypotheses for H4 are: 
 
Sub-hypotheses: 
Hypothesis Test 
H4S1: CmpCommit > Null 
H4S2: CmpStrategy > Null 
H4S3: CmpLegal > Null 
H4S4: CmpLead > Null 
H4S5: CmpTeam > Null 
 
Hypothesis H4 will be considered supported where all sub-hypotheses hold for the 
various cases.  
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5.4.2.5  Commitment by Directors 
 
These questions explore the intangible quality of ‘commitment’ as a contribution as 
compared to the more tangible/measurable qualities of technical skills, such as ‘risk 
management’, ‘auditing’, ‘strategic planning’, etc. 
 
It should be noted that one of the competency questions, (question 29, coded as 
CmpCommit) asked participants to rate their and their fellow directors’ level of 
commitment to the board (Question 29). Where directors classify themselves as 
above average for commitment compared to the other competency questions, it 
suggests they consider the levels of commitment exceed competency in the 
specific skills areas tested.  
 
The question and answer choice options are: 
Question: How would you describe the overall competence of the Board (not just 
your own individual competence) in these areas? 
 “CmpStrategy” = Corporate strategy and the principles of risk/strategic change 
“CmpLegal” = Legal, regulatory and corporate governance and the responsibilities 
of directors 
“CmpLead” = Leadership qualities, commanding respect of others, displaying 
judgment and courage 
“CmpTeam” = Team player abilities, listening and influencing skills and awareness 
of own strengths and weaknesses 
 
Competency questions allow 5 responses: 
1. Excellent competence 
2. Good competence 
3. Sufficient competence 
4. Poor competence 
5. Very poor competence 
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I consider answers 1,2 to be an assessment of above average, whereas 3,4,5 to be 
at or below average. I code to the answers to: 
• Excellent; Good, Sufficient competence => True 
• Poor, Very Poor competence => False 
and compare the proportion of true/false outcomes between CmpCommit and the 
other competency questions to test the null hypothesis (that there is no 
difference). If the null does not hold, I establish which question has the higher 
proportion of true outcomes. The contributing sub-hypotheses to H5 are: 
 
Sub-hypotheses: 
Hypothesis Test 
H5S1: CmpCommit > CmpStrategyl 
H5S2: CmpCommit > CmpLegal 
H5S3: CmpCommit > CmpLead 
H5S4: CmpCommit > CmpTeam 
 
Hypothesis H5 will be considered supported where the all the sub-hypotheses are 
all shown to hold for the pooled case. 
 
 
5.4.2.6  Directors and Diversity 
 
One of the issues that has been the subject of research particularly with reference 
to independence is the extent to which those serving in that role are 
representative of diverse interests and groups. Therefore, respondents were asked 
(ContDiv; Question 34) to indicate whether they saw themselves as contributing 
to the diversity of the board in terms of either gender or age. This question was 
intended to test whether diversity is considered as important in selection as was as 
a new director’s previous work experience. It should be noted that research in the 
area indicates that diversity is far wider than just gender or age: however, these 
two served to provide focus in this instance. 
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The question and answer choice options are: 
Question: In your observation of organizations in this country, boards need 
Directors that contribute: 
“ContWithin” = Work experience within the industry 
“ContOut” = Work experience outside the industry 
“ContGbl” = International experience 
 
These questions are two-outcome (Yes/No), and as such tested against each other, 
with analysis of the relative proportion where the null hypothesis is shown not to 
hold.  
 
I compare CmpDiv against CmpWithin; CmpOut; and CmpGbl. The 
subhypotheses for H6 are: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
5.4.2.7   Directors and Desirable Characteristics 
 
To further develop the picture of a desirable independent director in the eyes of 
both shareholders and directors, respondents were given a list of characteristics to 
rank in terms of preference. 
 
In all the survey years directors were asked to evaluate and rank desirable 
characteristics. I wished to test if directors value experience over formal 
qualifications.  
 
The specific matter of professional qualifications is addressed in question 38 – 
whether directors should be lawyers, business consultants, accountants or other 
professionals (coded as ContLaw), and experience in questions 35-37 (including 
industry, other and international experience respectively). 
Hypothesis Test (rank) 
H6S1 ContDiv < ContWithin 
H6S2 ContDiv < ContOut 
H6S3 ContDiv < ContGbl 
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The question and answer choice options are: 
Question: In your observation of organizations in this country, boards need 
Directors that contribute: 
“ContWithin” = Work experience within the industry 
“ContOut” = Work experience outside the industry 
“ContGbl” = International experience 
 
The contribution questions are two-outcome (Yes/No), and were tested against 
each other. Where the null hypothesis failed (ie the outcomes are NOT the same), 
inspection of the proportion identified which value exceeded the other. The sub-
hypotheses contributing to H7 are: 
 
 
  
 
   
This whole work would be largely moot if firms were unwilling to take advantage 
of independent director contributions in the future. It was important to establish 
whether firms had any plans or desire to have or increase the numbers of 
independent directors on their boards.  
 
Therefore, in the 2009 survey year an extra question was included: “How many 
new external/independent Directors will your organization likely look for in the 
next 5 years” (Question 58, DirExt).  
 
 
5.4.2.8  Independent Director Recruitment 
 
There were a number of possible outcomes, Do Not Know, None, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 
more. Since this question is designed to test the hypothesis that a majority of firms 
are considering a future appointment of at least one independent director, I 
Hypothesis Test 
H7S1 ContLaw < ContWithin 
H7S2 ContLaw < ContOut 
H7S3 ContLaw < ContGbl 
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omitted any response where the participant failed to enter a value, or did not 
know. I coded 
• 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or more => True 
• None => False 
 
I could then calculate the proportion of true outcomes tested against the null 
(proportions of true and false are equal) to determine if a significant majority of 
firms are considering appointing independent directors in the future. 
 
 
5.5    Survey Population, Samples and Responses  
 
5.5.1 Nationwide Surveys 
 
This research project was designed to capture a broad cross-section of responses 
from shareholders, managers and directors throughout New Zealand, across a 
broad spectrum of activity and over a period of several years. The survey 
instrument emphasised that the responses were to be treated as anonymous, with 
individual respondents unidentifiable in any analysis. This anonymity served two 
purposes: (a) It greatly assisted with obtaining ethics approval for this research, and 
(b) it created an environment where participants felt they could answer the 
research questions more openly/honestly. The latter feature was highlighted during 
the test of the survey instrument where participants indicated that if they were 
identifiable, they might not always answer truthfully in areas where a “politically 
correct” answer might be expected. However, and helpfully, some respondents 
indicated their interest in further exploring issues around the survey and its 
questions: these respondents were contacted directly for follow-up interviews.   
 
In order to maximise the reach, the survey was distributed as an email attachment 
to those on the client lists of national organizations and firms (see Appendix 1 for a 
list of these organizations), whose cooperation in this process allowed the creation 
of one of the largest data sets on governance in the country. These ‘distributors’ 
sent a generic introductory email to their clients (pre-selected as owners, 
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executives or directors of incorporated enterprises), recommending the 
completion of the survey, for which a hot-click link was included in the email. The 
distributors’ emails were signed by a partner, CEO or Chair of the distributor 
organization and thus carried assurance that they were sent to 
appropriaterecipients. 
 
Several points should be made about this decision to administer the survey in this 
way. First, although the web-based distribution inherently limits the sample pool to 
those shareholders, managers or directors with access to the internet and 
willingness to complete such a survey on the web, this was not deemed to taint the 
sample pool given the high level of access to the internet in New Zealand. 
 
Secondly, a downside to this method of distribution was the inability to capture 
data on the exact number of surveys distributed, or response rates from this 
distribution, as organizations generally did not wish to share this data. Judging from 
those data sets where distribution details were available, the responses rates 
varied from 1.6% of banking clients to 19% of members of the NZ Shareholders 
Association.  
 
Thirdly, this method of distribution was intended to reduce sample bias.However, 
because of the differing efforts on the part of the various distributors, uneven 
sample sizes occurred throughout the four years of data collection, sometimes also 
skewing the industry and geographic distributions from year to year. For instance, 
in the year the Employers and Manufacturers Association (EMA) of New Zealand 
distributed the survey to their members, a large group of manufacturing firms 
responded, with a commensurate impact on the overall response distribution. To 
address these inherent differences in response rates and preventing year-
specific/sector specific response rates distorting the overall results, no year-by-
year comparisons have been performed. Instead, the data has been  analyzed as a 
whole. 
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Fourthly, it was likely that the addressees may not only be shareholders but might 
also/or be senior managers or directors. To manage this multiplicity of roles, and 
to fight survey fatigue that might result from multiple sub-sets of questions to the 
same addressees, the survey contained three distinct question sets (but with a 
preamble of demographic variables that applied to all respondents). Recipients 
were asked to select the appropriate category.  This “do it once only” distribution 
was also greatly preferred by the distributing organizations that were largely unable 
or unwilling to break down their address lists into the three categories. 
 
As a consequence, greatly varying response rates were recorded for questions in 
the three different subsections. Not all questions received a sufficient number of 
responses to permit analysis by all dependent variables, i.e. age, gender, location 
and industry. 
  
In addition, the total numbers of responses varied considerably between survey 
years. The rather low responses for 2008 and 2009 resulted in tests upon 
questions for these individual years often falling below significant response levels. 
Where possible, the total (pooled years) response has been used in the analysis. A 
separate analysis of data from years with low numbers of responses and a large 
difference in industry represenattions would not have allowed for a meaningful 
statistical review and analysis of the data. 
 
There was a risk of duplicate replies which was mitigated on the following 
assumptions: (a) Different distributors were active in different years including 
different clients on the data base. (b) In the event that clients might have over-
lapped and that clients who received the same survey twice (and might have felt 
compelled to reply to the same survey more than once…), a note was included in 
the email solicitation to disregard any duplicate survey transmission.  
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5.5.2 In-depth Board Reviews  
   
Given the large variation in response numbers, industry representations and 
distribution methodology year-on-year, in early 2010, directors of a group of 10+ 
firms in different industries, size ranges and locations were asked to complete a 
modified shorter version of the large-scale survey instrument by way of validation 
phone calls (this group of respondents had also indicated their willingness in the 
returned survey to be contacted for this purpose). This was intended to 
accomplish two purposes: 
(a) Validate the results of the large-scale, national, longitudinal sample, and 
(b) Interview directors individually to collect qualitative data. 
 
These in-depth Board Reviews included the same survey as sent through the large-
scale distribution with follow-up individual verbal interviews to confirm that all 
questions were understood. The comparison of results showed that there was no 
statistically meaningful difference in the results between this small population and 
the larger population. 
 
 
Those ten are listed below (and described) with the following table (table 4.5.2 T1) 
indicating the actual numbers of participants from each of those organizations.  
 
- A large nationwide non-profit organization (NZ Red Cross) 
- A large national education institution (NZ College of Chiropractic) 
- A large regional construction firm (HEB Construction) 
- A large national retail franchise (FootMechanics) 
- A regional professional service organization (Franklin Vets) 
- Two organizations with local membership (Rotorua Golf Club and Spring Hill 
Golf Club) 
- A national web-based health business (WebHealth) 
- A local non-profit Maori trust (Turanga Health) 
- A national investment firm (GZ2 Holdings) 
- A regional for-profit community agency (Kawerau Enterprise Agency) 
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Table 5.5.2.T1: Participating firms, 2010 survey. 
Company Industry Respondents 
Franklin Vets Professional service 7 
Foot Mechanics Retail 3 
GZ2 Holdings Finance 2 
HEB Construction Construction 6 
KEA Public sector 14 
Red Cross Public Services 10 
ChiroCollege Health 10 
Rotorua Golf Sport 11 
Springfield Golf Sport 6 
Tauranga Health Non-profits 1 
WebHealth Health 7 
 
By way of further information, the following table indicates how the hypotheses 
were reflected in both the nationwide survey and the modified one.  
 Table	  5.5.2.T2:	  Hypotheses	  and	  the	  relevant	  survey	  questions.	  
Hypothesis	   Questions	   Survey	  
Previous	   2010	  
1	   Directors	  are	  motivated	  by	  doing	  good	  rather	  than	  personal	  benefit.	  
ImpGood;	  ImpFee;	  ImpPrestige;	  ImpPublic;	   Present	   Present	  
2	   Independent	  Directors	  are	  considered	  to	  contribute	  positively	  to	  the	  board	  
IndPerform;	  IndMtg;	  IndNetw;	  IndStrategy;	  IndSust;	  IndGov;	  IndBus	   Present	   Present	  
4	   Directors	  consider	  themselves	  more	  than	  average	  competent	  in	  all	  aspects	  of	  contribution	  to	  a	  board.	  
CmpCommit;	  CmpStrategy;	  CmpLegal;	  CmpLead	  ;	  CmpTeam	   Present	   Present	  
5	   Directors	  consider	  their	  level	  of	  commitment	  exceeds	  their	  level	  of	  competence	  
CmpCommit;	  CmpStrategy;	  CmpLegal;	  CmpLead	  ;	  CmpTeam	   Present	   Present	  
7	   Directors	  value	  work	  experience	  above	  formal	  qualifications	  for	  new	  directors	  
ContLaw;	  ContWithin;	  ContOut;	  ContGbl	   Present	   Present	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6	   Directors	  and	  shareholders	  consider	  a	  new	  director’s	  experience	  to	  be	  more	  important	  as	  a	  contribution	  than	  age	  or	  diversity	  
ContDiv;	  ContWithin;	  ContOut;	  ContGbl	   Present	   Present	  
3	   Director	  contributions	  are	  not	  seen	  to	  be	  equally	  important	  by	  directors	  and	  shareholders.	   ContGbl;	  ShrGbl;	  ContRecord;	  ShrRecord	   Present	  
	  
Not	  
present	  
	  
	  
8	   The	  majority	  of	  firms	  surveyed	  intend	  to	  hire	  at	  least	  one	  new	  independent	  directors	  in	  the	  future.	   DirExt	   Present	   Not	  present	  
 
 5.5.3.	  Candidate	  Interviews	  
 
Further qualitative/narrative input was collected from 62 candidates for Ministerial 
appointment to 15 District Health Boards in New Zealand (Northland, Waitemata, 
Counties Manukau, Hamilton, Bay of Plenty, Wanganui, Lakes/Rotorua, MidCentral, 
Hutt Valley, Wellington/Capital and Coast, Nelson, Dunedin, Invercargill, 
Canterbury, Couth Canterbury). District Health Boards in New Zealand are large 
enterprises with an average of $700 Million annual turnover, funded by the 
Government, and under pressure to be commercially responsible.  
 
Access to these candidates was made available during their Ministry of Health 
interview, on direction of the Minister of Health of New Zealand, the Hon. Tony 
Ryall. Interviewees for these appointments therefore are mainly experienced 
corporate leaders or directors, with significant governance experience. Questions 
to these individuals were limited to the reasons why they would want to serve on 
a board, to whom they were accountable and what they wanted to achieve. 
 
The purpose for these interviews was to validate that all questions were well 
understood and to compare results to the respondents in the non-profit/health 
categories from the widely distributed survey set. It was confirmed that the 
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questions were well understood, and there was no statistically meaningful 
difference in the replied between this control group and the larger population. 
 
 
5.6  Survey Analysis, Processes and Methods 
 
Statistical Methods 
Descriptive statistics for individual and organization demographic characteristics 
were summarised by survey year using counts of respondents in the various 
categories, and converted where appropriate to proportion, expressed as 
percentage. Chi-square tests were used to assess whether the categories of these 
characteristics differed by survey year. The results for individual years were 
compared against each other and the pooled outcome by Pearson’s product-
moment correlation, which allows a measure of how similar each year is to the 
others. Where response proportions over years were shown to be significantly 
different, these questions may only be analysed as pooled outcomes, rather than by 
year. In general, all questions showed significant differences year to year, related to 
the different sample sizes that were due to different distributing organizations 
being involved each year. Years 2006 and 2007 each have more than 1700 
participants, whereas 2008 had 59 (due to a large portion of the responses for that 
year being destroyed through a server malfunction at the survey operator) and 
2009 had 310 responses. Due to 2008 having few participants, there were no 
individual outcomes analyzed separately. This research therefore does not offer 
longitudinal year-to-year comparisons. 
 
The survey conducted in the final year of this set (2009) was somewhat different 
than that administered in  previous years. While it included all of the previous 
year’s questions, it extended the question set somewhat both with extra questions 
and answer options to provide the foundation for additional research projects. The 
relevant extended answer set for this analysis is that for the industry group. The 
reduced participant level of the 2009 survey also meant there were 
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correspondingly fewer participants within the interaction groups, and most fell 
below the threshold or 40 participants to be considered significant for analysis. 
 
For almost all comparisons, the question results were pooled over all the survey 
years, before being segregated, as required, for any interactions. The exception to 
this is the questions that were only asked in the 2009 survey year, which 
necessarily were analysed as a separate, single-year, result group.  
 
Spearman correlations were used to assess the strength of correlation and the 
variance explained between items within specific survey questions. These questions 
assessed the following: factors considered important by individuals when offered a 
board position; assessments of individuals’ own and fellow directors’ competence 
in specific areas; assessments by shareholders of the importance of specific 
attributes in directors; assessments of contributions of non-executive/independent 
directors; and directors’ assessments of their own involvement in specific areas. 
The two latter topic areas were addressed only in the 2009 survey. Analysis results 
were summarised using Spearman partial correlation coefficients (r) where data 
was available for multiple years, or using Spearman correlation coefficients (r) 
where data was available only for the 2009 survey.  
 
While adjusting for survey year, Mantel-Haenszel analysis was used to test for all 
associations between demographics (age, gender, region location, market share, 
and market competition) and for each item within the questions addressing factors 
considered important by individuals when offered a board position; assessments of 
individuals’ own and fellow directors’ competence in specific areas; and qualities 
needed in directors for boards of NZ organizations. However, for items within 
questions addressing directors’ assessments of their own involvement in specific 
areas and the contributions of non-executive/independent directors, survey year 
was not adjusted for in the analysis, as these questions were only available in the 
2009 survey. 
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Statistical analyses were performed using SAS version 9.2 (SAS Institute Inc., Cary, 
NC, USA).  
 
 
Pearson’s Product-Moment Correlation 
The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient (typically denoted by r) is a 
measure of the correlation (linear dependence) between two variables, X and Y, 
giving a value between +1 and −1 inclusive. It is widely used as a measure of the 
strength of linear dependence between two variables. It was developed by Karl 
Pearson from a similar but slightly different idea introduced by Francis Galton in 
the 1880’s1,2,3. Since the data I have are a subset of the population (being a survey 
of a relatively small number of participants from a much larger populations), I 
calculate the sample correlation coefficient,  	  
	  
 
 
and r = +1 or r = –1 correspond to a perfect correlation (all the data points would 
lie on a straight line), both ascending or one ascending while the descends 
respectively. A correlation r = 0 shows the two data sets have no relationship 
between themselves. 
 
I can test the significance of the correlation, which is an estimate of the probability 
this sample correlation could have arisen by chance, having been drawn from a 
larger population which did not (in the overall population) have a correlation 
between the two variatbles (X and Y).  
 
The commonly applied test, which I use here, is the Student-t test, typically 
denoted by t. It is known that  
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is distributed normally about zero, with deviation 1, and so I can compare the 
specific result for our case to this distribution and estimate how likely this may 
arise by random selection. I express this likelihood of random outcome by its 
significance,  p = the Student cumulative density function with N-2 degrees of 
freedom. The significance, p, expresses the probability the observed outcome (of 
the t-test) could arise randomly.  
 
 
Mantel-Haenszel Comparison 
In several outcomes discussed below, I contrast participant responses between 
different questions. These question outcomes vary in the allowed answers, and I 
code these answers to binomial either in support of the hypothesis under 
consideration, or otherwise. 
 
This provides a very powerful comparison between the questions, and our analysis 
makes extensive use of  the Mantel-Haenszel statistic (MH), sometimes called 
Odds-Ratio4. MH compares two binary-valued data sets (True/False is usually 
assumed, but any binary value dataset is valid), and tests if the observed difference 
in True/False proportion is significantly different between them. 
 
In its simplest formulation, consider p1 = the probability of a true outcome in the 
first dataset, and p2 = the probability for the second data set. The probabilities of a 
false outcome are q1 = 1–p1 and q2 = 1–p2 respectively, and  
 
 
 
which I test for significance using the chi-square density function, with one degree 
of freedom. The MH statistic is a measure of how different the proportions are, so 
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a smaller MH value denotes better agreement between the two datasets. 
Correspondingly, the significance test is for the two distributions to be consistent, 
and so the outcome is significant when p > 0.05.  
 
Note that in contrast to the Pearson correlation, the p-value for MH increases as 
the agreement between datasets improves. 
 
It is also worth noting that MH measures against the null hypothesis, and as such 
does not provide, of itself, information as to which dataset may have increased 
True outcomes in the case where the null hypothesis is shown NOT to hold. 
Inspection of the actual proportions, once the null hypothesis has been shown not 
to hold, is required to assess which of the datasets shows the enhanced true 
outcome. 
 
 
Significance and Confidence Limit 
Significance, where unqualified, is taken to mean significant at the 95% level, as 
ascertained by the appropriate test. If any other meaning is intended, the specific 
significance level will be stated. 
 
As is common practice, I consider an outcome to be significant where the 
probability of being random is less than 5%. For various reasons this is commonly 
referred to as the 95% confidence limit, and for the comparisons considered here, 
this corresponds to 	  
Test p-value for 95% confidence 
Mantel-Haerszel 0.05 or LARGER 
Pearson correlation 0.05 or SMALLER 
 
 
 
Integrations and Segregations 
For each of the hypotheses I tested, as well as the overall or pooled proof (or 
otherwise) of the hypothesis, I was interested in identifying the contributing 
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factors. The hypotheses were also tested for the response dataset of the 
appropriate question(s) segregated by age, gender, region location and industry. In 
several cases, particularly for the 1999 survey year-only data, the amount of 
response for a given segregated question fell below the established cutoff for 
significance (40), and generally was omitted from the reported analysis. 
 
The survey presented a number of related questions, in very similar format and 
with identical, or at least congruent, allowable answers. This research also includes 
probing the interaction between several questions. These interactions were 
analysed using pooled responses all years the questions were asked, where the 
number of responses were sufficient. 
 
 
5.7 Conclusion to Chapter 5 
 
This chapter has described and justified the empirical research conducted on the 
role and importance of independent directors in corporate governance in New 
Zealand. In addition, it has explained in some detail how the questions in the 
survey and follow-up interviews link back to the hypotheses that emerged from the 
research questions identified in chapter one and that were validated by reference 
to the literature in chapter three, It also identifies and describes the statistical tests 
carried out on the findings and identifies the assumptions on which those findings 
are evaluated. The following chapter reports on those findings and relates them to 
the literature on governance in Chapters 2 and 3 and boards and independent 
directors in Chapter 4.  
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Chapter 6: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
 
This chapter reports on the findings from the empirical research. In the interests of 
consistency, logic and rigour, it discusses the findings by reference to each 
hypothesis and in light of relevant theory. This process involves explaining the 
decisions made in analysis of each relevant question or set of questions in the 
survey, a discussion of further relevant detail extracted in the course of the in-
depth studies and a review of how the findings do or do not reflect relevant 
theoretical constructs as described in chapters two and three. Prior to this 
detailed analysis, it is useful to offer some preliminary remarks on the patterns and 
characteristics of the responses to the survey as these can affect the nature and 
pattern of findings on the substantive questions and consequently the analysis 
carried out.  
 
 
6.1  Survey Responses 
 
The data collected from both the large-scale public survey over the four-year 
period 2006-2009 and from the in-depth validation sample of 10+ firms throughout 
New Zealand, give a general overview of the characteristics of this population. The 
survey introductory text and the survey questions are shown in Appendix A, and it 
must be noted that the ‘real’ survey, as an online survey, displayed the questions in 
a slightly varied form to accommodate the formatting requirements of the 
respective displays used by respondees. Radio-style button were used to display 
answer choices in matrix formats (example below): 
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For several industry groups (Agriculture, Education, and Tourism) this survey did 
not attract sufficient responses to permit meaningful statements to be made. The 
limitations for this work will reflect this lack of applicability. For the remaining 
industry sectors, year-to-year variations are a function of the different distribution 
mechanisms used. In total, even when considering possible shifts in replies year-to-
year, most industry groups are sufficiently represented sufficiently to permit 
specific indications of governance behaviour in those industries 	  Table	  6.1	  T1:	  Industry	  type	  answer	  options	  tests	  by	  survey	  year	  
Industry type Survey Year aCommon 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
n n n n 
AGRICULTURE    1  
EDUCATION    3  
ENERGY/ UTILITY/ 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
42 59 2 15 Yes 
FINANCE/ BANKING/ INSURANCE 66 94 3 10 Yes 
HEALTH 35 57 0 31 Yes 
MANUFACTURING/ PROCESSING 64 183 3 16 Yes 
NON-PROFITS 47 84 5 18 Yes 
PRIMARY SECTOR (AGRIBUSINESS, 
FARMING ETC.) 
85 59 4 2 Yes 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 41 139 8 25 Yes 
PUBLIC SECTOR/ LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT 
24 56 1 9 Yes 
RESEARCH/ SCIENCE 44 18 1 3 Yes 
RETAIL/WHOLESALE 59 106 3 9 Yes 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS/ 
TECHNOLOGY/ MEDIA 
19 90 1 6 Yes 
TOURISM (INCL. HOSPITALITY, 
EVENTS, SPORT, ETC.) 
   3  
TRANSPORT 65 34 0 0 Yes 
Pooled 591 979 31 167  
aIndustry choices common to all years are shown as “YES” 
 Options offered only for the 2009 survey are shown as empty. 
 
The question connected to this table is: “In which industry does your organization 
operate (mark all that apply)” 
 
The response rate peaked in 2006 and 2007, largely because of the interest this 
survey created in New Zealand among distributors, some of whom used the data 
of the first two years to create firm-specific advisory material as part of their 
corporate positioning. This effort had declined after 2 years, and those distributors 
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were replaced with new ones whose efforts were not as effective, especially in 
2008. However, the overall participation of more than 4,000 directors, 
shareholders and executives is sufficient to create a large-scale model for the 
application to New Zealand firms in general.	  	  	  
Table 6.1 T2: Total participants by survey year 
Survey Year Total participants 
2006 1723 
2007 1988 
2008 59 
2009 310 
All years 4082 	  
 
This number of responses equals the total number of returned surveys. The 
analyses included only those responses where the relevant section was completed.. 
By way of example, in 2009 310 surveys were received but only 167 of those 310 
surveys included answers as to the industry origin of the respondent. Therefore, 
only 167 responses would have been included in the industry analysisfor this year. 
 
6.1.1 Gender 
 
This is often an issue discussed in the context of governance, especially given the 
low number of women involved in New Zealand governance. In light of the most 
often cited statistic of 8-9% of women representation in such roles (including 
senior managers and directors of listed firms in New Zealand), the respondents to 
this research include a significantly greater share of women (at 23%) and includes a 
significant number of women not currently involved in governance, but interested 
in governance either as shareholders or senior managers (Table 6.1.1T1).  This 
indicates that women are indeed interested in governance issues to a much greater 
level than historically indicated. This research therefore appears applicable for 
women participants in governance as much as or more than for men. The gender 
distribution does not significantly differ between survey years, except for the 2009 
dataset, which shows significantly more female participants (likely because of the 
more active participation of the Ministry for Women’s Affairs). I may use the 
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pooled relationships for probing effects of gender upon other questions, but it 
would not be appropriate to include effects that were year-specific as testing 
indicates little or no significance of such variation (Table 6.1.1 T2).  
 
Table 6.1.1T1: Responses for Gender by survey year 
Gender Survey Year 
2006 
1n=1723 
n (%) 
2007 
1n=1988 
n (%) 
2008 
1n=59 
n (%) 
2009 
1n=310 
n (%) 
Female 373 (24.1) 399 (22.6) 10 (17.5) 94 (31.9) 
Male 1173 (75.9) 1365 (77.4) 47 (82.5) 201 (68.1) 
1Numbers may not add to totals due to missing data  	  	  Table	  6.1.1T2:	  Significance	  tests	  for	  Gender	  by	  survey	  year	  
 
Survey year 
2007 2008 2009 Pooled 
MH (p) a MH (p) MH (p) MH (p) 
2006 1  (0.295) c 1.3  (0.19) c 7.8  (0) b 0  (0.98) c 
2007  0.8  (0.414) c 11.9  (0) b 1.1  (0.261) c 
2008   4.7  (0) b 1.3  (0.209) c 
2009    9.3  (0) b 
a Mantel-Haenszel statistic 
b Significantly different 
c Not significantly different 	  The	  question	  connected	  to	  these	  tables	  is:	  “You	  are	  Male/Female”	  	  	  	  
6.1.2  Age 
 
Consistently for all survey years, the distribution of age groups shows a healthy 
representation of all ages, with the majority of replies coming from respondents in 
the 46-65 age range. With the New Zealand director age being 52 years on 
average, this response appears to provide sufficient replies from all age groups to 
make age a well-covered variable. 
 
However, survey results show a significant difference between survey years in 
terms of average participant ages. Although 2006 and 2007 are not significantly 
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different (r=1.0, p<0.001); and 2008 and 2009 are not significantly different (r=0.9, 
p=0.030), there is a clear shift as between 2006/7 and 2008/9. This shift correlates 
well with the different distribution pathways used. With the manufacturing industry 
well represented, there was a larger proportion of participants in 56–65 age 
bracket for 2008 (51%) and 2009 (36%) against 2006 (25%) and 2007(25%) (table 
5.1.2 T1). Hence a slight aging in overall participant age became apparent. 
  
As was the case in relation to gender, I may use the pooled relationships for 
probing effects of age-grouping upon other questions, but it would not be 
appropriate to include effects that were year-specific as testing indicates that the 
differences are not significant (table 6.1.2 t2).  
 	  
Table 6.1.2 T1: Responses for Age groups by survey year 
Age Group Survey Year 
2006 
1n=1723 
n (%) 
2007 
1n=1988 
n (%) 
2008 
1n=59 
n (%) 
2009 
1n=310 
n (%) 
≤35 Years 156 (10.1) 153 (8.6) 2 (3.5) 14 (4.6) 
36 to 45 Years 374 (24.2) 429 (24.2) 6 (10.5) 48 (15.7) 
46 to 55 Years 525 (34.0) 608 (34.3) 14 (24.6) 96 (31.4 
56 to 65 Years 384 (24.8) 439 (24.7) 29 (50.9) 110 (36.0) 
>65 Years 107 (6.9) 146 (8.2) 6 (10.5) 38 (12.4) 
1Numbers may not add up to totals due to missing data  
 
Table 6.1.2T2: Significance tests for Age by survey year 
 
Survey year 
2007 2008 2009 Pooled 
r  (p)a r  (p) r  (p) r  (p) 
2006 1  (0) c 
0.5  (0.344) 
b 
0.8  (0.111) 
b 1  (0.001)
 c 
2007  
0.6  (0.335) 
b 
0.8  (0.096) 
b 1  (0)
 c 
2008   0.9  (0.03) c 
0.6  (0.274) 
b 
2009    0.8  (0.07) b 
a Pearson correlation moment 
b Significantly different 
c Not significantly different 	  The	  question	  connected	  to	  these	  tables	  is:	  “Your	  age	  is:”	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6.1.3 Industry 
 
For the survey year of 2009, respondents were provided with a wider range of 
options when selecting their industry type than was the case for 2006 or 2007. 
This broadening coincided with a substantial drop in numbers of responses. 
However, as the new category responses account for only 14% of the 2009 
responses, I may compare year profiles by omitting these responses. Comparison 
of the 12 commonest responses shows no significant differences in industry make-
up over the survey years. I may use the pooled or yearly relationships for probing 
effects of industry group upon the responses to other questions. 
 
 
6.1.4  Company location 
 
Respondents were given the option to self-classify the headquarters location of the 
firm with which they have the most significant contact, either as 
investor/shareholder, senior executive or director. With the distribution of the 
survey being centered on New Zealand, the 99%+ representation of New Zealand 
firms was expected (the non-New Zealand responses apparently came from 
managers working for New Zealand firms but being located overseas).  
 
I may, with no loss of generality, omit these few non-New Zealand locations, 
forming a binomial response (North and South Islands), and test this between years 
using the MH statistic. On this basis the company location shows significant 
differences between survey years, with 2009 being very strongly dominated by 
North Island responses, 2007 and 2008 less so (and not significantly different from 
each other), whereas 2006 was a more evenly balanced split between the two 
islands.  
 
The 71%/29% split of responses from the North Island/South Island respectively for 
2009 is an appropriate representation of corporate populations in new Zealand 
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(Table 5.1.4 T1), with the majority of firms located in the North Island, specifically 
in Auckland and Wellington and the provinces in between (Table 5.1.4 T2).This 
alternating focus on different locations corresponds with the different distributors 
used, i.e. the Chamber of Commerce distributors that generally draw from a 
specific regional pool of respondents as well as the Business New Zealand 
subsidiaries (i.e. EMA Northern, EMA Central and Otago). 
 
I may use the pooled relationships for probing effects of these questions, but this 
research does not explore or identify any year-specific effect.  
 
 Table	  6.1.4	  T1:	  Responses	  for	  Company	  Location	  by	  survey	  year	  
Company Location Survey year 
2006 2007 2008 2009 Pooled 
n  (%) n  (%) n  (%) n  (%) n  (%) 
Australia 0  (0) 0  (0) 0  (0) 2  (1.2) 2  (0.1) 
North America 0  (0) 0  (0) 0  (0) 2  (1.2) 2  (0.1) 
NZ North Island 318  (56.4) 754  (75.7) 31  (77.5) 148  (89.2) 
1251  
(70.8) 
NZ South Island 246  (43.6) 242  (24.3) 9  (22.5) 13  (7.8) 510  (28.9) 
Western Europe 0  (0) 0  (0) 0  (0) 1  (0.6) 1  (0.1) 	  
 	  
Table 6.1.4 T2: Significance testing for Company Location, North and South Island 
locations only. 
 
Survey Year 
2007 2008 2009 Pooled 
MH (p) a MH (p) MH (p) MH (p) 
2006 62.5  (0) b 6.8  (0) b 68.8  (0) b 41.8  (0) b 
2007  0.1  (0.946) c 21.2  (0) b 7  (0) b 
2008   6.8  (0) b 0.8  (0.426) c 
2009    32.5  (0) b 
a Mantel-Haenzsel statistic 
b Significantly different 
c Not significantly different 	  The	  question	  connected	  to	  these	  tables	  is:	  “In	  what	  region	  is	  your	  organization’s	  headquarters	  located?”	  
 
 
Jens Mueller “Movements in the Long White Cloud of Governance”  Page 225 	  
 
Given the characteristics of the respondents to the survey and the decisions that 
have been made on the analysis of the responses, it is now timely to examine and 
analyse the findings by reference to the hypotheses as identified and to the relevant 
research as explored in chapters three and four. This analysis will be conducted by 
reference to each hypothesis in turn. 
 
 
 
6.2 Analysis of Results 
 
 
6.2.1 H1: Directors are motivated by the chance of doing good rather than by 
other benefits of a directorship 
 
In the nationwide surveys, directors were given several choices to indicate what 
would motivate them most in considering whether to serve as a director. In the 
same category of intangible/tangible benefits were the options “Gaining Prestige”, 
“Receiving Fee Income”, “Becoming Known”, “Doing Good”, and “Furthering their 
Career”. There were also choices related to the downside of such service for 
directors in New Zealand, including “Reputation of other Directors” and “Personal 
Risk”. 
 
It is useful to note that the concept of “doing good” was not defined in the survey 
because it was considered important that directors should be able to interpret it in 
the way most appropriate to their circumstances. However, it became clear during 
the pilot that almost all respondents defined “doing good” as being of value to the 
company.  
 
From the comments made in the returned surveys, as well as from the follow-up 
interviews with directors, it is clear that the legal rules in New Zealand (and 
elsewhere) that hold directors personally for damages incurred while trading 
insolvent, created a concern about the personal risk associated with directorships 
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and that the (presumably ‘high’) reputation of the other directors would help 
mitigate this fear. Directors believe that if their fellow directors have a reputation 
to lose they will manage the firm in a way that reduces the likelihood of personal 
liability for themselves, thus protecting the other members of the board by proxy.  
 
This raises concerns over the perceived ability of new independent directors to 
make a difference on their own rather than being tied to the behaviour of other 
directors. It is relevant to remember that one of the major reasons for the push to 
independent directors on the board is that such directors are less likely to be in 
the Executive’s “pocket” (Ryan and Wiggins, 2004, p479) and that independent 
directors have the power and strength to conduct an independent appraisal of 
performance (Fama and Jensen, 1983). However, this assumes that there is either a 
sufficiently high proportion of such directors on the board to enable them to work 
together or that all the independents are willing to act that way. Future research 
might attempt to determine to what extent independent directors are truly acting 
as independents when they make decisions on New Zealand boards or whether 
their decision-making is based on their perception of how the other directors 
behave and vote. 
 
Of greater significance in this context is that director respondents, when given the 
choice of several benefits, were more likely to select “Doing Good” as the most 
important motivator connecting them to the firm (Table 6.2.1T1). 
 
Table 6.2.1 T1: Pooled outcomes for the importance of director motivations 	  
Question Possible answer 
Very 
Important 
Somewhat 
Important 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
Very 
Unimportant 
n  (%) n  (%) n  (%) n  (%) 
ImpPrestige 353  (26.7) 541  (41) 314  (23.8) 113  (8.6) 
ImpPublic 202  (15.1) 424  (31.7) 478  (35.7) 234  (17.5) 
ImpFee 211  (21.2) 402  (40.5) 276  (27.8) 104  (10.5) 
ImpGood 418  (46.6) 234  (26.1) 160  (17.8) 85  (9.5) 
ImpKnown 214  (19) 235  (20.9) 298  (26.5) 379  (33.7) 
ImpRep 564  (53.8) 324  (30.9) 50  (4.8) 110  (10.5) 
ImpRisk 577  (50.3) 422  (36.8) 96  (8.4) 53  (4.6) 
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ImpCareer 542  (44.3) 408  (33.3) 192  (15.7) 82  (6.7) 	  
The question and answer choice options are: 
Question: If you were offered a Board position now, how important would each of 
the following factors be for you?  
Answer Choices (indicating the abbreviations used in the tables below): 
“ImpPrestige” = Status/Prestige of the Organization 
“ImpPublic” = Whether the Company’s Shares are Publicly Traded 
“ImpFee” = Fees and Benefits to the Directors 
“ImpKnown” = Becoming Known/Networking 
“ImpRep” = Reputation of other Directors” 
“ImpRisk” = Level of Personal Risk” 
“ImpCareer” = Opportunity for Personal Career Advancement” 
 
Table 6.2.1 T2 (below) offers further detail as it shows the individual sub-
hypothesis outcomes for the pooled case, where the results suggest that directors 
rank “doing good” as motivation for serving above any fees they might receive, 
prestige or status, the fact the company is publically listed or becoming known in 
the corporate world. 
 	  
 Table 6.2.1 T2: H1 Outcome: Pooled 
 Q1 Q2 N YES (%) MH p Q1>Q2 
    Q1 Q2    
POOLED 
ImpGood ImpFee 897 46.6 21.2 136.3 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPrestige 897 46.6 26.7 93 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPublic 897 46.6 15.1 265.7 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpKnown 897 46.6 19.0 176.9 0 YES 	  There	  was	  no	  difference	  in	  the	  wording	  of	  the	  questions	  for	  pooled	  answer	  sets.	  	  
It is possible then to conclude that hypothesis one, that directors are motivated by 
doing good rather than by other personal benefits offered as choices, is supported. 
This survey finding is supported by recent findings (He, Wright, Evans and Crowe, 
2009) that independent directors may choose to serve for a variety of less than 
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selfish or financial reasons, and the many narrative comments by respondents who 
indicated that they believe there is more to directorships than earning money or 
having a title.  
 
When the influence of such specific characteristics of respondents as gender (see 
app 1, table 2), location (table 3) and age (table 4) are taken into account, it was 
discovered that this hypothesis remained supported. However, and as indicated in 
table 5, the industry grouping had some influence on the findings. For example, it 
appears that in finance/banking/insurance, prestige may be more important than is 
doing good while in health, the fact the firm is publically listed may be a higher 
priority.  For those in the manufacturing/processing industry, becoming known was 
considered of greater importance and in the case of non-profits, prestige 
outweighed doing good. These results are not completely unexpected. It could 
well be assumed that doing good on a non-profit board was an inherent 
expectation and therefore not necessary to mention (while prestige could be 
desired) while in the finance industry expertise is highly likely to be valued. Hence 
it is likely that directors would see service as a path to more directorships and 
greater renown.  
 
However, the questions and the findings raise several important issues: 
 
First, what does ‘doing good’ mean? The phrase itself is ambiguous in the extreme 
and could well include purposeful activities to a standard unique for each person. 
However, in the in-depth discussions with directors, a general theme emerged that 
narrows the definition down two central arguments: 
 
A. Directors wish to be helpful and want to see that their contribution advances 
the goals of the entity. This means the participation is less about duty, 
compliance, audit and legal representation of shareholders, and more about 
the meaningful input of advice into an organization and achieving a tangible 
and better outcome (firm performance - Lockhart, 2007). 
B. Directors believe that organizations should be connected to their community 
surroundings through more than generating profits for shareholders. 
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Interviewees frequently stated that boards should not merely advance the 
position and goals of a narrow group of stakeholders, i.e. the shareholders, 
but reflect on the role the entity has in the eyes of all major stakeholders 
(Freeman, 1984; Millar and Abraham 2006). 
 
Secondly, this infusion of a generalised ‘doing good’ halo that seems to hover over 
directors when they act on boards put them on a straight collision course with 
their duties as historically defined. While the interviewed directors all acknowledge 
that they work for shareholders in the strictest legal sense, they appear to be 
unwilling to see themselves as unidirectional megaphones of the shareholders. 
They wish to act in the interests of what they see as the general good of the firm 
and its position among its stakeholders.  
 
Finally and more generally, the finding seems counter-intuitive to the mainstream 
agency theory assumption of self interest as the main driver of decisionmaking. 
Although this theory as applied to governance commonly refers to control by the 
board of the executive (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen, 1983; Spence and 
Zeckhauser, 1971; Ross, 1973), as mentioned in chapter 2, the underlying premise 
of self interest can also be applied to anyone having power to make decisions 
involving another person’s property or resources, including boards. Consequently, 
the indication that directors are concerned with doing good is more reminiscent of 
the premises underpinning the alternative theories of corporate governance, most 
particularly stewardship theory (that a director (or manager) should look after or 
marshal and manage the resources of the firm for the long-term benefit of all 
interested parties (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997; Mason et.al, 2007; 
Muth and Donaldson, 1998))  and stakeholder theory (that the director (or 
manager) must consider the needs and worth of a range of stakeholders, not just 
shareholders in the interests of sustaining long-term value (George, 2010; Bhimani, 
2008). Also, arguably, if it was assumed by those accepting directorships that doing 
good was the most important and fundamental controlling principle for their 
decisions and acts (Alces, 2008; Mason et. Al. 2007; Wallis, 1997), new institutional 
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theory would serve as a clear theoretical framework in which to evaluate and 
assess this aspect of governance.  
 
Indicatively, the interviewees for District Health Board appointments (refer to 
5.5.3) to a large extent ignored their legal and clearly stated duty to be accountable 
only to the Minister of Health of New Zealand and during their interviews declared 
that they believed their duty lies in working towards the best community 
outcomes (76%), rather than to work as per the wishes of the Minister/sole 
shareholder (24%). Although it is clearly a desirable outcome for District Health 
Boards to achieve positive health outcomes for their respective communities, 
these organizations must stay within their budgets and prioritise care based on the 
economic reality of their capped funding, rising costs, longer life expectancy and 
greater health care demands. In this environment it would be excusable to see 
director candidates confuse their accountabilities, but even when advised that their 
duty is only to the shareholder, many were clearly surprised and uncomfortable 
with that notion. 
 
Similar sentiments were expressed by more than 60% of the survey respondents 
completing narrative comments or when interviewed after they submitted their 
survey.  By way of indication, the following table (6.2.1 T3) shows little difference 
between the relevant 2006-9 results and the verification survey carried out in 
2010. While the proportion of respondents differs in level between the 2006-2009 
population and the verification population, this difference is not significant in terms 
of our hypothesis. It appears clear that aspiring directors are either (a) ignorant of 
their exclusive legal duties of agents of shareholders, or (b) have created their own 
world of accountability in which shareholders feature, but not to the exclusion of 
all other considerations. 
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Table 6.2.1. T3: H1 sub-hypotheses, pooled. Contrasted for the two datasets 
Q1 Q2 2006-2009 Population  Verification Population, 2010 
  N YES (%) MH p Q1>Q2  N YES (%) MH p Q1>Q2 
   Q1 Q2      Q1 Q2    
ImpGood ImpFee 897 46.6 21.2 136.3 0 YES  51 79.8 7.0 54.3 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPrestige 897 46.6 26.7 93 0 YES  51 79.8 11.0 48.1 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPublic 897 46.6 15.1 265.7 0 YES  51 79.8 9.0 51.1 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpKnown 897 46.6 19.0 176.9 0 YES  51 79.8 20.6 35.8 0 YES 
 
The question connected to this table is: “If you were offered a Board position now, 
how important would each of the following factors be for you?”, with the answer 
choices being: 
“ImpFee” = Fees and Benefits to the Directors 
 “ImpPrestige” = Status/Prestige of the Organization 
“ImpPublic” = Whether the Company’s Shares are Publicly Traded 
 “ImpKnown” = Becoming Known/Networking 
 
 
 
6.2.2 H2 = Independent directors are considered to contribute positively to the 
board.  
 
Questions exploring this issue were introduced to the survey in 2009 (specifically 
as indicated in table 6.2.2 T1). Therefore, it is not possible to pool results across 
years. It should also be noted that respondents were asked to answer these 
questions only where they had had some experience of independent directors. It 
should also be noted that directors only were asked for responses on this aspect 
of the survey.  
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 Table	  6.2.2	  T1:	  Relevant	  questions	  from	  2009	  survey	  
Question Short 
Based on your experience, how would you rate the NON-
EXECUTIVE/INDEPENDENT Directors' contribution: 
51 Their contribution to the performance of the organization IndPerform 
52 The quality of their contribution during board meetings IndMtg 
53 Their ability to assist with networking IndNetw 
54 Their ability to provide strategic vision IndStrategy 
55 Creating a sustainable enterprise IndSust 
56 Their understanding of governance issues IndGov 
57 Their understanding of the organization's business IndBus 	  
 
 
As indicated in table 6.2.2 T2, a large majority of the 55 or so respondents 
answering the questions considered that independent directors contribute 
positively over a range of attributes, including networking, strategic vision and 
sustainability. 	  	  
 
 
Table 6.2.2 T2: H2 Outcome: Pooled 
 Q1 N YES (%) MH p Q1>50 
Pooled 
IndPerform 57 95.7 30.2 0 YES 
IndMtg 55 93.8 26.1 0 YES 
InpNetw 55 84.8 15.2 0 YES 
IndStrategy 55 86.6 17.1 0 YES 
IndSust 55 95.5 28.9 0 YES 
IndGov 54 97.3 31.4 0 YES 
IndBus 55 93.8 26.1 0 YES There	  was	  no	  difference	  in	  wording	  for	  pooled	  answer	  sets.	  	  The	  answer	  choices	  were:	  “IndPerform”:	  Their	  contribution	  to	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  organization	  “IndMtg”:	  The	  quality	  of	  their	  contribution	  during	  board	  meetings	  “Ind(p)Netw”:	  Their	  ability	  to	  assist	  with	  networking	  “IndStrategy”:	  Their	  ability	  to	  provide	  strategic	  vision	  “IndSust”:	  Creating	  a	  sustainable	  enterprise	  “IndGov”:	  Their	  understanding	  of	  governance	  issues	  “IndBus”:	  Their	  understanding	  of	  the	  organization's	  business	  	  	  
 
 
Jens Mueller “Movements in the Long White Cloud of Governance”  Page 233 	  
 
There therefore appears little doubt among directors that independent directors 
contribute positively to the board, a finding supported by the verification survey 
conducted in 2010 (see table 6.2.2 T3) 
 
Table 6.2.2 T3: H2 Oucome: Pooled for contrasting datasets. 
 
Q1 2006-2009 Population  
Verification Population, 
2010 
 N 
YES 
(%) MH p Q1>50  N 
YES 
(%) MH p Q1>50 
IndPerform 57 95.7 30.2 0 YES  44 94.4 21.9 0 YES 
IndMtg 55 93.8 26.1 0 YES  44 94.4 21.9 0 YES 
InpNetw 55 84.8 15.2 0 YES  44 90.0 17 0 YES 
IndStrategy 55 86.6 17.1 0 YES  44 92.2 19.3 0 YES 
IndSust 55 95.5 28.9 0 YES  44 92.2 19.3 0 YES 
IndGov 54 97.3 31.4 0 YES  44 94.4 21.9 0 YES 
IndBus 55 93.8 26.1 0 YES  44 98.9 28 0 YES 
 The	  question	  connected	  to	  this	  table	  is:	  “Based	  on	  your	  experience,	  how	  would	  you	  rate	  the	  NON-­‐EXECUTIVE/INDEPENDENT	  Directors'	  contribution?	  (Skip	  this	  if	  you	  have	  not	  experienced	  independent	  directors	  in	  action)”.	  See	  the	  full	  question	  text	  on	  the	  preceding	  page.	  
 
Such an overall appreciation for the contribution of independent directors should 
be good news for shareholders, owner/operators or senior managers of fims in 
New Zealand, including SMEs, who have not yet found a compelling reason to add 
independent directors into the governance structure of their firms. As I know from 
the questions pertinent to H1 (above) that independent directors are not majorly 
focused on directorship fees, there is thus likely to be an opportunity to recruit 
independent directors even where the offered fees are low. 
 
Overall, I consider that hypothesis two is supported : Independent directors are 
considered by their fellow directors to contribute positively to the board.  
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When location is taken into account (determined by mapping the source of the 
returned questionnaires) it appears that the hypothesis remains supported for 
companies in the North Island of New Zealand  
Interactions with Gender (Table 6 in the appendix to this chapter), fall below our 
significance response cutoff of 40, but are included for reference as the outcomes 
have some level of response and support the pooled outcome. However, 
interactions for Age and Industry show quite low individual response levels and are 
omitted. 
 
All these positive results seem to support the message that the presence of 
independent directors on the board is desired by existing members for a wide 
variety of reasons, not only because statutes (such as Sarbanes-Oxley) and 
codes/listing rules increasingly demand it but because they provide benefits to the 
organization in and of themselves due to their delinking from insiders (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; OECD, 1999 and 2004; Ryan and Wiggins, 2004), a breadth of 
expertise and experience (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Hill, 1995; Peterson and Philpot, 
2007; Ruigrok, Peck, Tacheva, Greve and Hu, 2006) and their ability and 
preparedness to look beyond a close profit horizon (Epstein and Roy, 2005) ,  
 
However, these findings do not tell the whole story. Since shareholders and 
directors interact differently with independent directors, it is also important to 
establish whether their presence is valued differently by these two groups. It is 
doubly important to identify such differences in light of the agency theory 
assumption that directors represent the interests of shareholders and independent 
directors do better than insiders in such a role (Bhagat and Black, 2002; Donaldson 
and Davis, 1991; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Borokhovich, 
Parrino and Trapani, 1996). The potential for such differences was explored 
through hypothesis 3. 
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6.2.3 H3: Director contributions are not seen to be equally important by directors 
and shareholders 
 
Table 6.2.3 T1 portrays the results of two of the relevant questions, where the 
analysis indicates that it is supported – director contributions are not seen to be 
equally important by directors and shareholders. It should be noted that the 
shareholder respondents  considered it more desirable than did director 
respondents that an director have a record of business management. This is 
understandable: one of the primary roles for the board is to safeguard the 
shareholder’s investment and to increase the value of the firm (see, for example, 
Bhimani, 2008 and George, 2010 as well as the advocates for the application of 
stewardship and institutional theories in this context).  
 
Table 6.2.3 T1: H3 Outcome: Pooled 
 Q1 Q2 N YES (%) MH p Q1≠Q2 
    Q1 Q2    
POOLE
D 
ContGbl ShrGbl 856 57.9 32.2 99.5 0 NO 
ContRecord ShrRecord 1177 48.4 77.6 151.2 0 NO 
 The	  question	  connected	  to	  this	  table	  is:	  “In	  your	  observation	  of	  organizations	  in	  this	  country,	  boards	  need	  Directors	  that	  contribute:”	  	  For	  pooled	  data	  sets	  no	  difference	  in	  wording	  existed	  between	  data	  sets.	  	  The	  question	  text	  was:	  “ContGbl”:	  International	  Experience	  “ContRecord”:	  Track	  record	  of	  having	  run	  a	  successful	  business	  	  	  
These results further indicate that shareholders value the global experience of 
directors to a slightly lesser extent than directors do, likely because they do not 
have first-hand experience of the contribution of individual directors with such 
expertise to board meetings.  
 
Additional insight on such diversity of perceived value can be obtained when 
industry type, location and gender are taken into account (see Table 6.2.3 T2) 
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(below). Although most cross-tabulations supported the “supported” finding, in 
four instances – health, non-profits, professional services and telecommunications, 
it did not. This result may well be explicable given the predominance of SMEs or 
the equivalent largely volunteer-run non-profit organisations in these areas 
(Carree, van Stel, Thurick and Wennekers, 2002; Clark et. al, 2010; OECD, 2000; 
Steane and Christie, 2001).  
 	  Table	  6.2.3	  T2:	  H3	  Outcome:	  Pooled	  and	  interaction	  summary	  
Test stratum Premise 
Pooled  Supported 
Female  Supported 
Male Supported 
North Island  Supported 
South Island Supported 
<=35 yr   Supported 
36-45 yr Supported 
46-55 yr Supported 
56-65 yr Supported 
>65 yr Supported 
FINANCE/BANKING/INSURANCE Supported 
HEALTH Not Supported 
MANUFACTURING/PROCESSING Supported 
NON-PROFITS Not Supported 
PRIMARY SECTOR (AGRIBUSINESS, 
FARMING ETC.) 
Supported 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES Note Supported 
RESEARCH/SCIENCE Supported 
RETAIL/WHOLESALE Supported 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS/TECHNOLOGY/ME
DIA 
Not Supported 	  
 
 
The issues of accountability stemming from such a lack of understanding is 
recognised: in the follow-up interviews to the survey, the particular issue of 
independent directors was explored. A high 84.9% of shareholders, senior 
managers and directors indicated that a new idirector should have the ability to 
effectively communicate with shareholders. For SMEs in particular, this 
requirement appears at odds with the simple and short communication pathways 
 
 
Jens Mueller “Movements in the Long White Cloud of Governance”  Page 237 	  
that should exist in a smaller firm. Shareholders, however, reported that they do 
not believe they are receiving timely and clearly understandable information.  
 
From the comments supplied by shareholder respondents, they do not seem to 
have major concerns that the directors are incompetent or do not work in the 
best interests of the firm, but there is an uncertainty whether shareholders receive 
information of all of the discussions that occur during board meetings or just a 
carefully edited, sanitised version of the events. In addition, shareholders consider 
that the information they receive is late, several weeks after a board meeting 
(presumably after the minutes have been drafted, edited and produced), and devoid 
of the detail information they apparently wish to better understand why the boards 
are making the decisions they do.Not in all cases is even this information presented 
in a format easily understood by shareholders.  
 
Of relevance to this point, it was noted by several directors during the interview 
sessions that, mainly for legal reasons, board minutes tend to be quite short and 
cryptic, mainly recording decisions made, but largely devoid of any indication of 
discussion and reflection. 	  
 
Given the push in an ever-increasing range of jurisdictions for independent 
directors, largely to further the interests and rights of shareholders, it would seem 
appropriate that shareholders be better linked to governance activities. After all, 
directors are ultimately responsible to shareholders for the firm’s welfare and for 
the accuracy and completeness of investment-relevant information – that is what 
they are there for (Bartholemeusz, 2002; Colley, Stettinius, Doyle and Logan, 2005; 
OECD, 2004). Perhaps one way of achieving this would be via a more transparent 
and inclusive feedback and communication process between board and 
shareholders. 	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6.2.4 H4 - Directors consider themselves more than ‘average’ competent in all 
aspects of contributing to a board. 
 
When directors were asked how they would rank themselves and other directors 
on boards of New Zealand firms in terms of competence, they tended to award  
‘above average’ ratings in overall competence in several categories offered as 
choices. Even in an anonymous submission process this would be expected and 
therefore offers little in the way of new or revealing details. 
 
Thus the more important information from this question set is in which sub-
categories of governance skills do directors believe they excel and in which ones 
do they not. The pooled outcome (Table 6.2.4 T1) shows that overall directors 
consider themselves as better than average competence for all aspects identifed, 
and so this research concludes that H4 is supported for the pooled case although 
in interpreting these results it should be noted that the proportion of respondents 
differs significantly in level between the 2006-2009 population for several sub-
hypotheses.  
 
Table 6.2.4 T1: H4 Outcome: Pooled 
 Q1 N YES (%) MH p Q1 > null 
POOLED 
CmpStrategy 708 58.6 10.6 0 YES 
CmpLegal 705 56.6 6.2 0 YES 
CmpLead 772 70.9 70.2 0 YES 
CmpCommit 709 83.5 179 0 YES 
CmpTeam 769 65.9 40 0 YES 	  The	  question	  connected	  to	  this	  table	  is:	  “How	  would	  you	  describe	  the	  overall	  competence	  of	  the	  Board	  (not	  just	  your	  own	  individual	  competence)	  in	  these	  areas?”	  	  The	  question	  text	  was:	  “How	  would	  you	  describe	  the	  overall	  competence	  of	  the	  Board	  (not	  just	  your	  own	  individual	  competence)	  in	  these	  areas?”	  	  “CmpStrategy”:	  Corporate	  strategy	  and	  the	  principles	  of	  risk/strategic	  change	  “CmpLegal”:	  Legal,	  regulatory	  and	  corporate	  governance	  and	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  directors	  “CmpLead”:	  Leadership	  qualities,	  commanding	  respect	  of	  others,	  displaying	  judgment	  and	  courage	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“CmpCommit”:	  Commitment,	  to	  the	  business	  and	  to	  shareholders	  “CmpTeam”:	  Team	  player	  abilities,	  listening	  and	  influencing	  skills	  and	  awareness	  of	  own	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  
 
The surprising result is that the only skills category in which directors rank 
themselves and their peers as ‘excellent’ more frequently than for any other 
category is, by a wide margin, “Commitment” (49.9%). In cases such as leadership 
(24.1%), strategic planning (14.7%), legal/auditing (17.4%), and team performance 
abilities (19.1%), the directors rank themselves significantly lower. Of all of the 
categories offered, ‘commitment’ would be the softest one in terms of not 
representing a skill that needs training and learning but is more attitudinal and thus 
‘easier’ to achieve.  
 
Regardless of whether the respondents have indicated that their absolute 
competence levels are low, or that there is a need to raise the competence levels 
from the current levels, the important function here is the relative differential 
between “Commitment” and specific skills commonly associated with governance 
and leadership. The consensus here is clearly that there is a differential in skills, and 
if there were indeed this giant sucking sound of new incoming independent 
directors in New Zealand SMEs, skills building will need to be part of the process 
to embed those directors into their new board rooms with a reasonable chance to 
perform their governance jobs satisfactorily. 
 
Cross-tabulation of these results with Gender, Location, Age and Industry reveal a 
less than overwhelmingly positive picture of self and fellow-assessment of 
competence. These details are summarised in Table 6.2.4 T2.(Mantel-Haerszel 
static outcomes are only shown for those interactions with sufficient response 
levels to meet our cutoff criterion). H4 is shown to be supported for Males; North 
Island; Age 56-65; and some industry groups but, more significantly, not supported 
for female director respondents, directors of companies located in the South 
Island, those directors younger than 55 and in industry groups traditionally 
prominent in the New Zealand economic landscape.  
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Table	  6.2.4	  T4:	  H4	  Outcome:	  Pooled	  and	  interaction	  summary	  
Test stratum Premise 
Pooled  Supported 
Female  Not Supported 
Male Supported 
North Island  Supported 
South Island Not Supported 
<=35 yr   Not Supported 
36-45 yr Not Supported 
46-55 yr Not Supported 
56-65 yr Supported 
>65 yr Not Supported 
ENERGY/UTILITY/INFRASTRUCTURE Not Supported 
FINANCE, BANKING, INS Not Supported 
HEALTH Not Supported MANUF,	  PROC	   Supported NON-­‐PROFITS	   Not Supported NZ	  LOTTERIES	  COMMISSION	   Supported PRIMARY	  SECTOR	  (AGRIBUS,	  FARMING	  ETC.)	   Not Supported PROF	  SERVICES	   Supported RESEARCH,	  SCIENCE	   Not Supported RETAIL,	  WHOLESALE	   Not Supported TELECOMM,	  TECH,	  MEDIA	   Supported 
 
 
 
6.2.5 H5 - Directors report that their level of ‘commitment’ exceeds their level of 
competence in other areas. 
 
The prominent ranking granted “commitment” as identified above in relation to H4 
is further borne out by when hypothesis 5 was tested using the same data. The 
pooled results from the two data sets (as presented in table 6.2.5 T1, below) 
indicate that for both, directors ranked themselves higher on commitment 
(CmpCommit) than on any of the other aspects of contribution (these being 
leadership, strategy, professional support, or team-building). This finding is further 
supported by analysis of the verification dataset. 
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Table 6.2.5.T1: H5 sub-hypotheses, pooled. Contrasted for the two datasets 
 
Q1 Q2 2006-2009 Population  Verification Population, 2010 
  
N YES (%) MH p 
Q1 
> 
Q2  
N YES (%) MH p 
Q1 
> 
Q2 
   Q1 Q2      Q1 Q2    
Cmp
Com
mit 
Cmp
Strate
gy 
709 83.5 58.6 106.6 0 YES 
 
51 87.5 42.2 23.1 0 YES 
Cmp
Com
mit 
Cmp
Legal 709 83.5 56.6 121.9 0 YES  
51 87.5 55.9 12.6 0 YES 
Cmp
Com
mit 
Cmp
Lead 709 83.5 70.9 33.2 0 YES  
51 87.5 71.6 4 0 YES 
Cmp
Com
mit 
Cmp
Team 709 83.5 65.9 59.7 0 YES  
51 87.5 63.7 7.8 0 YES 
 
 
The question connected to this table is: “How would you describe the overall 
competence of the Board (not just your own individual competence) in these 
areas?” 	  “CmpStrategy”:	  Corporate	  strategy	  and	  the	  principles	  of	  risk/strategic	  change	  	  “CmpLead”:	  Leadership	  qualities,	  commanding	  respect	  of	  others,	  displaying	  judgment	  and	  courage	  “CmpCommit”:	  Commitment,	  to	  the	  business	  and	  to	  shareholders	  “CmpTeam”:	  Team	  player	  abilities,	  listening	  and	  influencing	  skills	  and	  awareness	  of	  own	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  
 
 
Such ranking of personal commitment, a ‘soft’ skill not requiring training and 
learning but more attitudinal and thus ‘easier’ to achieve higher than the ‘hard 
core’ skills raises questions as to the value New Zealand directors can add to the 
board and to the company. In this, the concept of ‘board capital’ coined by Hillman 
and Dalziel (2003) is important as it implies that a wide range of skills, including 
business competence and expertise, along with strategic planning and vision all go 
to assist the board in improving company performance.  
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The fact directors rank themselves mainly ‘good’ and ‘sufficient’ on those skills 
should therefore be disappointing for shareholders who entrust the long-range 
visionary leadership to their directors and rely upon them to maximize 
performance. By implication, either these directors were of a superior skill set 
when they started and have now gone stale, or they never had the prerequisite 
skills to perform to the standard of ‘excellent’ to start with. If governance is a 
performance area that has begun to move into the position of center stage when 
firms are evaluated and responsibility is attributed for failures, then it would be 
expected that directors have a broad skill set that matches up well with the 
increasingly challenging governance environment.  
 
 
6.2.6 H6 - Shareholders and directors consider a new director’s experience to be 
more important as a contribution than age or diversity 
 
Much is said in the media of the apparent lack of diversity in New Zealand board 
rooms (for example, McGregor and Fountaine, 2006), and while diversity goes 
further than gender, it is the lack of women in governance positions that attracts 
the most attention. Without doubt, an 8% participation of women in governance 
roles in publicly listed firms is appalling for a country that prides itself of having 
been the first in the world to grant women the right to vote, and where not too 
long ago all key roles in government were held by women (Prime Minister Helen 
Clark with a previous Prime Minister being Jenny Shipley, Speaker of the House 
Margaret Wilson, Governor General Sylvia Cartright, Chief Justice Sian Elias).  
 
However, board diversity more generally has been raised and explored for a range 
of national contexts (for example, Burton,1991; Cortese and Bowrey, 2008; 
Minichilli, Zattoni and Zona, 2009; Pass, 2004; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Spencer 
Stuart, 2009; Tyson 2003; van der Walt and Ingley, 2003); research focusing on 
factors of age, race and background in addition to gender.  This research explores 
whether shareholders and directors believe diversity is of greater importance than 
work experience. 
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Consequently, shareholders, directors and senior managers were offered the 
opportunity to select what attributes of an incoming director would be most 
valuable in terms of contributing to the boardroom. These attributes included 
age/gender as aspects of diversity (see question 37 in app C). However, given that 
diversity means different things to different people, and diversity is certainly not 
seen as important to all (see the discussion in chapter 5 in particular) the decision 
was made in this research not to be too specific on defining all aspects of diversity. 
This does offer avenues for further research.   
 
These results were then analysed in light of the value given to other attributes such 
as experience in the industry (ContWithin), experience more generally (ContOut) 
and international experience (ContGbl).The results of analysis of the answers to 
the relevant questions are provided in table 6.2.6 T1 (below). 
 
 
Table 6.2.6 T1: H6 Outcome: Pooled 
 Q1 Q2 N YES (%) MH p Q1<Q2 
    Q1 Q2    
POOLED 
ContDiv ContWithin 758 51.8 73.3 84.6 0 YES 
ContDiv ContOut 758 51.8 66.1 35.8 0 YES 
ContDiv ContGbl 758 51.8 57.9 6 0 YES 	  The	  question	  connected	  to	  this	  table	  is:	  “In	  your	  observation	  of	  organizations	  in	  this	  country,	  boards	  need	  Directors	  that	  contribute:”	  	  For	  pooled	  data	  sets	  no	  difference	  in	  wording	  existed	  between	  the	  data	  sets.	  The	  question	  text	  was:	  “ContDiv”	  =	  Diversity	  “ContWithin”	  =	  Work	  experience	  within	  the	  industry	  “ContOut”	  =	  Work	  experience	  outside	  the	  industry	  “ContGbl”	  =	  International	  Experience	  
 
The pooled outcome shows H6 holds for each sub-hypothesis, and so this research 
concludes that hypothesis 6 is supported – that directors consider a new director’s 
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experience to be more important than the contribution to gender or age diversity. 
More specifically, the pooled result indicates that diversity in the boardroom is not 
considered as important as experience-based contribution. This result is not 
necessarily a pleasing one for those who had hoped that there is a growing demand 
and expectation for age and gender diversity among New Zealand boards. 
However, a closer analysis indicates that the picture is not consistent (see table 
6.2.6 T2). 	  	  
 
 
Table 6.2.6 T2: H6 Outcome: Pooled and interaction summary 
Test stratum N Premise 
Pooled  758 Supported 
Female  121 Not Supported 
Male 631 Supported 
North Island  396 Supported 
South Island 162 Not Supported 
<=35 yr   42 Not Supported 
36-45 yr 158 Not Supported 
46-55 yr 281 Supported 
56-65 yr 221 Supported 
>65 yr 52 Not Supported 
FINANCE/BANKING/INSURANCE 79 Supported 
MANUFACTURING/PROCESSING 95 Supported 
NON-PROFITS 48 Not Supported 
PRIMARY SECTOR (AGRIBUSINESS, 
FARMING ETC.) 
48 Not Supported 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 73 Not Supported 
RETAIL/WHOLESALE 55 Not Supported 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS/TECHNOLOGY/ME
DIA 
46 Not Supported 
 
 
I can dispose of the matter of age and gender quite easily: Overall, gender diversity 
was more likely to be selected as important than was age. However, it is 
interesting to note that although women tended to rank diversity as more 
important than did males, they did not focus on gender diversity. Gender is 
discussed elsewhere (see,for example, 6.1.1).  
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There is some indication that the average age of 52 for New Zealand directors 
might be high for some, but no strong preference was expressed for any specific 
age band. During the interview sessions with younger (<40) senior managers and 
owner/operators it became quickly evident that these individuals not infrequently 
preferred director candidates who were at least 15 years older than themselves, to 
balance a board of much younger people. There generally was no expression of 
desire that directors be younger than the ones currently seen in boardrooms in 
New Zealand.  
 
On one hand, this deals a blow to those who believe company directors in New 
Zealand are an ageing group of individuals (predominantly males), but on the other 
hand, it does also suggest that there is no particular preference for any specific age 
group, thus allowing access to the board roles to people irrespective of age.  
 
When industry sector is taken into account, it appears that only in two of these 
(finance and banking and manufacturing and processing) are contributions other 
than diversity ranked more highly. This is interesting in that it tends to suggest that 
in a range of situations and industrial contexts, diversity is becoming more valued, 
either because of the representative/stakeholder connectivity flavour it provides 
(Bebchuk, 2007; Krohe, 2000, 2004; Peterson and Philpot, 2009 Ray, 2005) or 
because those from a range of backgrounds are increasingly seen to contribute 
value to those boards as argued by Bilmoria and Piderit, 1994; Burgess and 
Tharenou, 2000; Burke, 2000; Campbell and Vera, 2010; Carver, 2002; Daily and 
Dalton, 2003 and van der Walt and Ingley, 2003 amongst others. 
 
When the results of the 2006-9 surveys are pooled and compared to those 
obtained in the 2010 survey (see table 6.2.6,T3 below) , it was found that for 
various of the subhypotheses that not all results from the 2010 survey supported 
the hypothesis. Indicatively, perhaps, is the finding from the 2010 survey that while 
55% considered diversity important (as compared to 52% from the national 
surveys), a much greater 74% indicated that external experience was important. 
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This indicates, possibly as a sobering thought for those who believe that a 
change/upgrade in our governance diversity is absolutely required, that a diversity 
change will likely only occur when the proposed new directors have experiences 
and skills commensurate with what the market wants. The relative indifference to 
diversity changes for the sake of diversity changes, and the focus on transferable 
skills and experiences, would leave our lamentable lack of diversity unchanged, 
unless we could offer fresh director candidates meeting not one but bothcriteria. 
This points, similar to the discussion in H4, to the need for an upskilling and 
training regime without which it is unlikely that changes in board compositions will 
occur any time soon. 
 
Overall, it was concluded that this hypothesis is not supported by this population. 
Without further research establishing a reason for this variation is speculative only: 
however, one explanation may be the increasing attention over time to the 
importance of diversity in the boardroom along with the increased importance in 
listing rules (NZX, 2007), recommendations (NZSC, 2004) and the media on 
independent directors.  
 
Table 6.2.6.T3: H6 sub-hypotheses, pooled. Contrasted for the two datasets 
  
Q1 Q2 2006-2009 Population  Verification Population, 2010 
  
N YES (%) MH p 
Q
1
<
Q
2  
N YES (%) MH p 
Q
1
<
Q
2 
   Q1 Q2      Q1 Q2    
Con
tDiv 
ContWithi
n 
75
8 
51.
8 
73.
3 
84.
6 0 
Y
E
S  
5
1 
54.
8 
56.
7 0 
0.96
9 
N
O 
Con
tDiv ContOut 
75
8 
51.
8 
66.
1 
35.
8 0 
Y
E
S  
5
1 
54.
8 
74.
0 4.2 0 
Y
E
S 
Con
tDiv ContGbl 
75
8 
51.
8 
57.
9 6 0 
Y
E
S  
5
1 
54.
8 
20.
2 
13.
2 0 
N
O 
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The	  question	  connected	  to	  this	  table	  is:	  “In	  your	  observation	  of	  organizations	  in	  this	  country,	  boards	  need	  Directors	  that	  contribute:”	  	  For	  pooled	  data	  sets	  no	  difference	  in	  wording	  existed	  between	  the	  data	  sets.	  The	  question	  text	  was:	  “ContDiv”	  =	  Diversity	  “ContWithin”	  =	  Work	  experience	  within	  the	  industry	  “ContOut”	  =	  Work	  experience	  outside	  the	  industry	  “ContGbl”	  =	  International	  Experience	  
 
 
 
 
6.2.7 H7: Work experience is preferred over formal qualifications, for new 
independent directors. 
 
As indicated by the results reported in table 6.2.7 T1, the majority of respondents 
considered it important that directors have experience in and out of the particular 
industry (ContWithin and ContOut respectively) and internationally (contGbl) and 
such experience outranks formal qualifications such as legal, accounting and others 
Because all the subhypotheses hold for the pooled results I conclude that H7 is 
supported – directors value work experience above formal qualifications for new 
directors. Although these questions did not directly address independent directors, 
it is fair to argue that independent directors may well have a diversity of 
experience that contributes positively to the board. 
 
The question is, what is and indeed should be that experience? Research by Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Kolasinski, 2009 and, Wallison 2006, assume or find that 
independent directors will be experienced in business (in line with the findings in 
this instance) although there are others such as Agrawal and Knoeber (2001), 
Cunningham (2010), Spencer Stuart (2009) and Women on Boards (2006) 
who argue that companies may have quite different purposes in mind when 
identifying potential independent directors (including increasing diversity although 
not necessarily). 
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Table 6.2.7 T1: H7 Outcome: Pooled 
 Q1 Q2 N YES (%) MH p Q1<Q2 
    Q1 Q2    
POOLED 
ContLaw ContWithin 931 50.5 73.3 104.7 0 YES 
ContLaw ContOut 931 50.5 66.1 47.4 0 YES 
ContLaw ContGbl 931 50.5 57.9 10 0 YES 	  The	  question	  connected	  to	  this	  table	  is:	  “In	  your	  observation	  of	  organizations	  in	  this	  country,	  boards	  need	  Directors	  that	  contribute:”	  	  The	  question	  text	  was:	  “ContLaw”	  =	  Professional	  Skills	  (Lawyers,	  Business	  Consultants,	  Accountants,	  etc.)	  “ContWithin”	  =	  Work	  experience	  within	  the	  industry	  “ContOut”	  =	  Work	  experience	  outside	  the	  industry	  “ContGbl”	  =	  International	  Experience	  	  	  
When these results are considered in light of gender, age, location and industry 
group, variations emerge (see table 6.2.7 T2 (below). 
Table 6.2.7 T2: H7 Outcome: Pooled and interaction summary	  
Test stratum N Premise 
Pooled  931 Supported 
Female  143 Not Supported 
Male 776 Supported 
North Island  492 Supported 
South Island 191 Not Supported 
<=35 yr   43 Not Supported 
36-45 yr 185 Not Supported 
46-55 yr 358 Supported 
56-65 yr 267 Supported 
>65 yr 73 Not Supported 
ENERGY/UTILITY/INFRASTRUCTURE 39 Not Supported 
FINANCE/BANKING/INSURANCE 79 Supported 
HEALTH 42 Not Supported 
MANUFACTURING/PROCESSING 112 Supported 
NON-PROFITS 58 Not Supported 
PRIMARY SECTOR (AGRIBUSINESS, 
FARMING ETC.) 
57 Not Supported 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 94 Supported 
RETAIL/WHOLESALE 73 Not Supported 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS/TECH/MEDIA 55 Supported 
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Predictably perhaps, the hypothesis is not supported for females but is for males – 
perhaps this is indicative of the fact that women are only just now entering the 
higher echelons of management, and are often there because of university 
qualifications and a functional qualification rather than because of long experience. 
Indicatively, research findings point to boards preferring those with immediately 
and directly useful attributes (Peterson and Philpot, 2009, Spencer Stuart 2009) 
while others point to women directors as being much younger than the average 
(Cortese and Bowrey, 2008). Men, on the other hand may have traditionally been 
selected due to their connections (Nwabueze and Mileski, 2008) and to fit the 
profile and team fit expected by existing members  (Claringbould and Knoppers, 
2007; Higgs, 2003; Huse, 2007; McCabe and Nowak, 2008).  
 
In addition, for companies in the South Island and respondents in every age group 
bar the two middle ones (46-65) the hypothesis was unsupported. Without further 
research it is speculative to reflect on reasons for these results: it would appear 
that one of the possible explanations - that companies whose head office is located 
in the South tend to be in industries that are dominated by smaller firms where 
education and qualifications could be considered important (such as technology 
and professional services) - is unlikely given that for both of those sectors the 
hypothesis is supported. Finally, those two business sectors with significant levels 
of unskilled or semi-skilled workers (retail and agriculture) reflect results against 
the overall trend. Only in the case of non-profits would it appear that formal 
qualifications are ranked above experience – a result that may reflect the nature of 
people who seek election onto such boards and the nature of the NPO board as a 
resource (in accordance with resource dependency theory (see, for example, 
Pfeffer,1972; Pfeffer and Salancik,1978 and Christopher, 2010 but also the 
issues associated with failure to utilise properly outlined by Taylor, et. al, 
1996) and stewardship, (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson,1997)). 
 
The proportion of respondents differs significantly in level between the 2006-2009 
and the verification populations for each sub-hypothesis. Indeed, for two sub-
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hypotheses the outcome in the 2010 survey (see table 6.2.7 T3 for details and 
comparison) is against the trend in the 2006-9 and cannot be taken to support the 
hypothesis. Formal qualifications (ContLaw) are preferred over experience within 
the industry (ContWithin, MH=4.3, p<0.001) or globally (ContGbl, MH=32.1, 
p<0.001), while there is  no significant difference in preference for  experience 
outside the industry compared to formal qualifications (ContOut, MH=0.1, 
p=0.959). Again, without further research it is difficult to arrive at a clear 
conclusion for this variance: it could be a function of the population questioned or 
accelerating change in attitudes towards what constitutes the desirable director. 
However, some information of value was obtained. 
 
Table 6.2.7 T3: H7 sub-hypotheses, pooled. Contrasted for the two datasets 
  
Q1 Q2 2006-2009 Population  Verification Population, 2010 
  N YES (%) MH p 
Q1<
Q2  N YES (%) MH p 
Q1<
Q2 
   Q1 Q2      Q1 Q2    
Cont
Law 
Cont
With
in 
931 50.5 73.3 104.7 0 YES 
 
51 76.0 56.7 4.3 0 NO 
Cont
Law 
Cont
Out 931 50.5 66.1 47.4 0 YES  51 76.0 74.0 0.1 0.959 NO 
Cont
Law 
Cont
Gbl 931 50.5 57.9 10 0 YES  51 76.0 20.2 32.1 0 NO 
 The	  question	  connected	  to	  this	  table	  is:	  “In	  your	  observation	  of	  organizations	  in	  this	  country,	  boards	  need	  Directors	  that	  contribute:”	  	  The	  question	  text	  was:	  “ContLaw”	  =	  Professional	  Skills	  (Lawyers,	  Business	  Consultants,	  Accountants,	  etc.)	  “ContWithin”	  =	  Work	  experience	  within	  the	  industry	  “ContOut”	  =	  Work	  experience	  outside	  the	  industry	  “ContGbl”	  =	  International	  Experience	  
 
Immediately apparent in this 2010 survey are what are not considered desirable 
attributes for new independent directors. These include holding multiple 
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directorships, being an employee of the firm, and holding a directorship-training 
certificate. 
 
 
Multiple Directorships 
 
Being a director can be a part-time or full-time profession for individuals, who then 
seek multiple directorship mandates and thus practice governance simultaneously 
for several firms. On the positive side, holding multiple directorships might indicate 
that the person has developed better-than-average skills in the area of governance 
and is appreciated for the contribution to boards by several other firms (Ferris, 
Jagannathan and Pritchard 2003; Pass, 2004 and 2008; Spencer Stuart 2009). This 
might lessen the risk for a firm to recruit an under-qualified director. A 
‘professional director’ might also gain current knowledge about governance issues 
in some firms that might be applied to the governance at other firms, thus possibly 
contributing to an effective transfer of knowledge. And, lastly, a professional 
director might have directorship mandates in firms in similar/related fields and thus 
might be able to contribute specific knowledge of value, subject to conflict 
situations. 
 
However, all this does not seem to constitute valid arguments for shareholders, 
senior managers and directors in their search for new directors. Only 2.5% believe 
it is important that a new director holds multiple directorships, while 67% believe 
it is not important. 
 
Following on from individual discussions with directors and owner/operators it 
seems clear that professional directors are not perceived to have current practical 
management/leadership experience and thus are suspected of not to be able to 
contribute in those areas. There also appears to be some sense of mistrust as to 
the commitment a director has to each board if he/she sits on many boards at the 
same time. This is of particular importance in the context of independent directors 
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as such directors are more likely to have a number of appointments than is an 
insider who has more day to day involvement in the company. 
 
 
A Director as an Employee of the Firm 
 
No doubt much to the relief of those pushing for more independent directors on 
boards, 74.1% of shareholders, senior managers and directors do not wish a new 
director to be an employee of the firm (which would make that director non-
independent). Whether there is the awareness that the status of being an 
independent director precludes employment at the firm, or whether there are 
other motivations at work, clearly employees are not seen as adding much value to 
the board. 
 
In the follow-on discussions with directors and owner/operators they clearly 
expressed an appreciation of the ‘independent’ status of directors and also opined 
that employees would not meet this requirement. This allows the cautious 
conclusion that there is a value perceived as associated with independence, a 
finding  in line with that found in other research (such as McCabe and Nowak, 
2008) and that  appears to contradict the argument that outsiders could not 
contribute as directors due to lack of specific firm knowledge (Brody, 1996; De 
Andres-Alonso, et. al, 2009, Pati, 2007). 
 
 
Having a Director Training Certificate 
 
Slightly more than half of the respondents (52.3%) believed holding a Qualified 
Director certificate was important (offered in New Zealand by Directions – 
Understanding Governance Ltd, private provider with a roster of corporate 
leaders as presenters), while only 48.4% thought the same for a certificate from 
the Institute of Directors. For neither institution is this a sign of endorsement by 
the market, and it appears that no great value is placed on the completion of a 
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directorship-training course. As such, this finding appears to be inconsistent with 
the recommendations of the OECD (2004) and the findings of Spencer Stuart 
(2006) that such training programs are appropriate. 
  
In conjunction with the above findings of less-than-excellent skills of directors, this 
situation should sound alarms among educators, regulators and corporate leaders. 
If the current training regimes are not appreciated as being important, then either 
there is a lack of knowledge of the director skills gaps (not knowing what one 
doesn’t know…), or there is a lack of appreciation for the learning a participant 
can take away from these training events.  
 
What do shareholders, senior managers and directors look for in new directors? 
Respondents to the 2010 survey are strongly in agreement with their desire to 
select a director with a good reputation, one who can form and defend their own 
opinions, have a track record of success in business, and have company-specific 
market knowledge and experience. To a lesser degree, such directors should have 
global business experience and be able to communicate effectively with 
shareholders. These desirable characteristics and talents are discussed in more 
detail below. 
 
Good Reputation  
 
Nearly 70% of respondents consider the reputation of directors to be very 
important, and more than 27% consider it somewhat important, making this the 
single most important attribute for directors, a finding in line with D’Aveni’s (1990) 
research in relation to executives. It is not clear what exactly ‘reputation’ means, 
but the in-depth discussions with directors identified several areas included in this 
definition: (a) Absence of public failures such as bankruptcies, criminal/civil 
prosecutions and other scandals; (b) ‘being known’ in the industry specific to each 
firm, and (c) being held in high regard by the current directors (Ruigrok, et. al, 
2006). 
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Strong Opinions 
    
67.7% of respondent consider  it ‘Very Important’ (and a further 28.2% find it 
‘Somewhat Important’) that a director can form opinions and then defend them 
vigorously during a board debate. This outcome seems to indicate the true value 
given to directors, and suggests a belief by the respondents that such a vigorous 
debate does not currently exist on boards (see Le Blanc and Gillies, 2005 for 
support of this view in another context).  
  
In the follow-up interviews, several directors made clear that they believed the 
current boards were ‘closed systems’ where sitting directors were mutually 
dependent on each other’s goodwill for re-elections and an ‘easy life’, a finding that 
seems to reflect the view of . Van den Berghe and Baelden (2005) and that of 
Zablocki, (2007) in relation to selection processes. If the purpose of an director 
(particularly one deemed independent) is to bring an impartial/independent view of 
corporate affairs to the board, then the ability to make and defend controversial 
viewpoints flows naturally from this.  
 
 
Industry Knowledge  
 
95.4% of respondents want directors with industry-specific knowledge presumably 
so that they can overcome the lack of insider knowledge at the firm with 
transferable relevant skills and knowledge from the outside (Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Ingley and McCaffrey, 2007; Peterson and Philpot, 2007). 
 
    
Global Experience  
 
85.4% of respondents consider it somewhat or very important for a new  director 
to have global business experience. With New Zealand being dependent on foreign 
direct investment and exports, to create a trade balance surplus, the connection to 
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a business world beyond New Zealand is important for competitiveness, growth 
and sustainability. In the in-depth interviews, many business owner/operators of 
SMEs expressed concern over their lack of knowledge to take their business onto 
the global scene. There are concerns over the cost and risk of an expansion, 
uncertainty over the appropriate methods of market entry overseas, fears to not 
understand the cultural needs of those markets and the beliefs that expansion 
beyond New Zealand is “too hard”.  
 
Arguably, such a concern also embraces the whole gamut of environmental factors 
with which business must increasingly contend, and which appears to reflect the 
view of the New Zealand Securities Commission (2004) as portrayed in its guide 
to corporate governance. Of additional relevance are the arguments put up by 
Toddi (2001) and Gelb and Strawser (2001) and advocates of the resource 
dependency theory that in the interests of long-term performance and 
sustainability, firms looking to appoint independent directors should look to those 
with that broader experience.  
 
Interestingly, when interviewees were asked whether it would be attractive to 
them were they offered the opportunity to have a director on the board with such 
broader knowledge, considerable interest was expressed. 
 
When asked why they would not just hire a business consultant for the same kind 
of expert advice, the owner/operators expressed concern over the reliability and 
commitment of a consultant to their firm (but those concerns were not voiced in 
the context of bringing a new director on board). 
 
  
6.2.8 H8: The majority of firms surveyed intend to hire at least one new 
independent director in the future. 
 
As indicated in table 6.2.8 T1 (below) the majority of firms (more than 51%) intend 
to hire at least one new independent director within the next 2 years. Hence it is 
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possible to conclude that H8 is supported. It should be noted that this question 
was only introduced into the survey in 2009, making any comparison with earlier 
years impossible.   
 
Table 6.2.8 T1: H8 Outcome: Pooled 
 Q1 N YES (%) MH p Q1>50 
Pooled DirExt 145 65.4 7.1 0 YES 	  The	  question	  connected	  to	  this	  table	  is:	  “How	  many	  new	  external/independent	  Directors	  will	  your	  organization	  likely	  look	  for	  in	  the	  next	  5	  years?”	  	   	  
Only limited further analysis of the responses was considered necessary (see table 
6.2.8 T2) – neither gender nor age was considered relevant given that the question 
focused on intentions of the company. Reponses by industry group fell well below 
minimum levels for analysis and are omitted.  
 Table	  6.2.8	  T2:	  H8	  Outcome:	  Pooled	  and	  interaction	  summary	  
Test stratum Premise 
Pooled  Supported 
Location 
North Island  Supported 
South Island Not Supported 
Gender: Not relevant 
Age: Not relevant  Supported 
Industry: Insufficient response levels Supported 	  
Finally, as indicated in table 6.2.8 T3, only North Island respondents provided 
answers to this question.  
 
Table 6.2.8 T3: H8 Outcome: Location 
 Q1 N YES (%) MH p Q1>50 
NZ NORTH ISLAND DirExt 128 64.7 5.7 0 YES 
NZ SOUTH ISLAND DirExt      	  The	  question	  connected	  to	  this	  table	  is:	  “How	  many	  new	  external/independent	  Directors	  will	  your	  organization	  likely	  look	  for	  in	  the	  next	  5	  years?”	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Even when accounting for the fact the some senior managers or directors would 
consider an independent director initially for an advisory board rather than a full 
board position, this is important information in that these numbers, when 
extrapolated across the country, are astonishingly high. However, they also 
arguably reflect a general drive to independent directors populating boards across 
countries and industries as demanded by legislation (see discussion in chapter 3 
more generally). 
 
It is also apparent that there is a greater willingness among SME directors to 
consider independent directors as additions to their board, possibly because their 
contribution might be cheaper as directors than as consultants. However, the 
implications of this trend is refreshing: the previously quite isolated governance 
environment of privately-owned SMEs in New Zealand will  open up to let fresh 
new faces into the board room. This research needs follow-up work to determine 
whether these SMEs have indeed extended invitations to independent directors, 
and how successful those engagements have been. 
 
This result indicates the need of possibly thousands of independent directors over 
the next decade in New Zealand and thus raises questions as to the search 
mechanisms to match candidates to firms, the upskilling and skills maintenance 
programs for directors, and the development of mechanisms to measure the value 
contribution of independent directors in the assumption that some of the newly 
hired independent directors may be suited to their new high office. 
 
 
6.3   Conclusion to Chapter 6 
 
The table below (table 5.3 T1), summarises the findings relevant to the 8 
hypotheses, in particular comparing the results obtained in 2010 with those 
obtained from previous surveys carried out in the period 2006-9. It indicates that 
although most of the hypotheses are and remain supported, some are not, 
including,  rather surprisingly, H4, 6 and 7. Although these hypotheses were 
deemed supported in prevous years they are no longer so. These changes seem to 
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suggest the range of expectations placed on directors are considered by both them 
and shareholders harder to achive and maintain. In addition, the level and nature of 
training offered to directors is not considered sufficient or suitable. 
 
Hypothesis Survey data 
2006-2009 
Population  
Verification 
Population 2010 
N Outcome  N Outcome 
H1 
Directors are motivated 
by doing good rather 
than personal benefit. 
897 Supported  51 Supported 
H2 
Independent Directors 
are considered to 
contribute positively to 
the board 
54 Supported  44 Supported 
H4 
Directors consider 
themselves more than 
average competent in 
all aspects of 
contribution to a board. 
705 Supported  50 Not supported 
H5 
Directors consider their 
level of commitment 
exceeds their level of 
competence 
709 Supported  51 Supported 
H7 
Directors value work 
 experience above 
formal qualifications 
for new directors 
931 Supported  51 Not supported 
H6 
Directors and 
shareholders consider a 
new director’s 
experience to be more 
important as a 
contribution than age 
or diversity 
958 Supported  51 Not Supported 
 
 
The final chapter (chapter 7) offers an overall summary and conclusion to this 
work and identifies the scope for further research. 
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Appendix to Chapter 6: additional tables referred to in relation to hypotheses one 
and two but not included in the script.  
 
Table 1: H1 Outcome: Gender Profile 
 Q1 Q2 N YES (%) MH p Q1>Q2 
    Q1 Q2    
FEMALE 
ImpGood ImpFee 136 54.4 18.4 38.7 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPrestige 136 54.4 22.8 35.7 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPublic 136 54.4 14.3 61.8 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpKnown 136 54.4 17.6 46.4 0 YES 
MALE 
ImpGood ImpFee 742 45.6 21.9 99.8 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPrestige 742 45.6 27.8 61.5 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPublic 742 45.6 15.2 206.1 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpKnown 742 45.6 19.3 133 0 YES 	  	  
Table 2: H1 Outcome: Location (North or South Island) 
 Q1 Q2 N YES (%) MH p Q1>Q2 
    Q1 Q2    
NZ 
NORTH 
ISLAND 
ImpGood ImpFee 501 51.5 14.6 157.5 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPrestige 501 51.5 21.4 112.7 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPublic 501 51.5 11.6 217 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpKnown 501 51.5 14.0 173.5 0 YES 
NZ 
SOUTH 
ISLAND 
ImpGood ImpFee 190 45.8 24.1 21.1 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPrestige 190 45.8 31.3 10.2 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPublic 190 45.8 17.1 46.7 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpKnown 190 45.8 19.7 33.9 0 YES 	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Table 3: H1 Outcome: Age profile 
 Q1 Q2 N YES (%) MH p Q1>Q2 
    Q1 Q2    
A. <=35 
YEARS 
ImpGood ImpFee 29 55.2 15.8 11.4 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPrestige 29 55.2 26.5 6.3 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPublic 29 55.2 18.0 11.6 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpKnown 29 55.2 13.3 14.6 0 YES 
B. 36-45 
YEARS 
ImpGood ImpFee 164 43.3 18.4 25 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPrestige 164 43.3 26.7 12 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPublic 164 43.3 12.1 50.8 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpKnown 164 43.3 17.5 28.4 0 YES 
C. 46-55 
YEARS 
ImpGood ImpFee 323 51.1 21.4 65.7 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPrestige 323 51.1 25.7 53.5 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPublic 323 51.1 15.5 116.2 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpKnown 323 51.1 19.9 76.7 0 YES 
D. 56-65 
YEARS 
ImpGood ImpFee 288 43.8 22.8 29.9 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPrestige 288 43.8 26.6 22.6 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPublic 288 43.8 16.3 65.7 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpKnown 288 43.8 20.1 43.5 0 YES 
E. >65 
YEARS 
ImpGood ImpFee 81 45.7 23.9 9 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPrestige 81 45.7 32.5 3.5 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPublic 81 45.7 13.7 25.7 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpKnown 81 45.7 15.8 19.3 0 YES 	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Table 4: H1 Outcome: Industry 
Industry designations with less than 40 total responses are omitted. 
 Q1 Q2 N YES (%) MH p Q1>Q2 
    Q1 Q2    
FINANCE/ 
BANKING/ 
INSURAN
CE 
ImpGood ImpFee 79 39.2 21.7 5.9 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPrestige 79 39.2 21.5 0.4 0.661 NO 
ImpGood ImpPublic 79 39.2 12.8 6.3 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpKnown 79 39.2 17.7 16.9 0 YES 
HEALTH 
ImpGood ImpFee 39 51.3 22.7 7.2 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPrestige 39 51.3 27.8 13.6 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPublic 39 51.3 14.8 0.1 0.917 NO 
ImpGood ImpKnown 39 51.3 15.4 23.8 0 YES 
MANUFAC
TURING/ 
PROCESSI
NG 
ImpGood ImpFee 119 54.6 21.6 29.2 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPrestige 119 54.6 21.9 26 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPublic 119 54.6 17.3 8.5 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpKnown 119 54.6 8.0 0 0.983 NO 
NON-
PROFITS 
ImpGood ImpFee 55 61.8 13.3 28.8 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPrestige 55 61.8 20.5 0.4 0.69 NO 
ImpGood ImpPublic 55 61.8 6.6 7 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpKnown 55 61.8 12.5 0 0 YES 
PRIMARY 
SECTOR 
(AGRIBUSI
NESS, 
FARMING 
ETC.) 
ImpGood ImpFee 40 55.0 28.6 7.1 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPrestige 40 55.0 30.9 0 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPublic 40 55.0 18.1 0 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpKnown 40 55.0 12.5 0 0 YES 
PROFESSI
ONAL 
SERVICES 
ImpGood ImpFee 89 58.4 8.2 53.2 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPrestige 89 58.4 21.2 0 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPublic 89 58.4 11.1 0 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpKnown 89 58.4 15.0 0 0 YES 
RETAIL/ 
WHOLESA
LE 
ImpGood ImpFee 80 43.8 13.5 16.9 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPrestige 80 43.8 24.2 0 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPublic 80 43.8 14.9 0 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpKnown 80 43.8 17.1 0 0 YES 
TELECOM
MUNICATI
ONS/ 
TECHNOL
OGY/ 
MEDIA 
ImpGood ImpFee 61 55.7 12.5 23.8 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPrestige 61 55.7 7.7 0 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpPublic 61 55.7 7.8 0 0 YES 
ImpGood ImpKnown 61 55.7 11.7 0 0 YES 	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The	  question	  connected	  to	  these	  tables	  is:	  “If	  you	  were	  offered	  a	  Board	  position	  now,	  how	  important	  would	  each	  of	  the	  following	  factors	  be	  for	  you?	  “	  	  Answer	  Choices:	  “ImpFee”	  =	  Fees	  and	  Benefits	  to	  the	  Directors	  “ImpPrestige”	  =	  Status/Prestige	  of	  the	  Organization	  “ImpPublic”	  =	  Whether	  the	  Company’s	  Shares	  are	  Publicly	  Traded	  “ImpKnown”	  =	  Becoming	  Known/Networking	  	  
Table 5: H1 Outcome: Pooled and interaction summary 
Stratum N Premise 
Pooled  897 Supported 
Female 136 Supported 
Male 742 Supported 
North Island  501 Supported 
South Island 190 Supported 
<=35 yr 29 Supported 
36-45 yr 164 Supported 
46-55 yr 323 Supported 
56-65 yr 288 Supported 
>65 yr 81 Supported 
FINANCE, BANKING, 
INSURANCE 
79 Not Supported 
HEALTH 39 Not Supported 
MANUF, PROCESSING 119 Supported 
NON-PROFITS 55 Not Supported 
PRIMARY SECTOR 
(AGRIBUSINESS, FARMING 
ETC.) 
40 Supported 
PROFESSIONAL SERVICES 89 Supported 
RETAIL, WHOLESALE 80 Supported 
TELECOMM., TECH, MEDIA 61 Supported 	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Table 6: H2 Outcome: Gender Profile 
Note the low response levels for both but especially for female. 
 Q1 N YES (%) MH p Q1>50 
FEMALE 
IndPerform 15 96.9 8.6 0 YES 
IndMtg 15 90.6 6 0 YES 
InpNetw 15 84.4 4.1 0 YES 
IndStrategy 15 90.6 6 0 YES 
IndSust 15 96.9 8.6 0 YES 
IndGov 15 90.6 6 0 YES 
IndBus 15 90.6 6 0 YES 
MALE 
IndPerform 39 93.8 18.6 0 YES 
IndMtg 37 93.4 17.3 0 YES 
InpNetw 37 85.5 10.7 0 YES 
IndStrategy 37 85.5 10.7 0 YES 
IndSust 37 96.1 20.1 0 YES 
IndGov 36 98.6 22.6 0 YES 
IndBus 37 96.1 20.1 0 YES 	  The	  question	  connected	  to	  this	  table	  is:	  Based on your experience, how would 
you rate the NON-EXECUTIVE/INDEPENDENT Directors' contribution?” 
Answer Choices: 
“IndPerform” = Their contribution to the performance of the organization 
“IndMtg” = The quality of their contribution during board meetings 
“IndNetw” = Their ability to assist with networking 
“IndStrategy” = Their ability to provide strategic vision 
“IndSyst” = Creating a sustainable enterprise 
“IndGov” = Their understanding of governance issues 
“IndBus” = Their understanding of the organization’s business 	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Chapter 7:  CONCLUSIONS AND SCOPE FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH	  
 
 
7.1 Summary and Overview 
 
The primary purpose of this work is to offer a foundation for further research into 
governance requirements, needs and prospects in relation to corporate 
governance arrangements and processes. Consequently, it focuses on the current 
state of play on corporate governance in New Zealand and the theoretical 
standpoints of relevance to this issue. Chapter one provides an overview and 
justification for the work and identifies the questions that are explored in the 
course of the research.  
 
Chapter two, intended as a means of providing background for the study on one 
particular aspect of governance – independent directors -  begins with a definition 
of governance (and when it can be considered to be “good”), a section that is 
followed by an overview and appraisal of principles designed to further governance, 
an overview that includes information as to how those principles have been 
incorporated into law, rules and guidelines in various relevant jurisdictions and the 
limitations of those principles in the New Zealand context.  
 
The third chapter follows on from chapter two as it investigates the primary 
theoretical framework for the examination and assessment of governance – agency 
theory- and posits a range of alternative frameworks that have been posed as 
critiques to agency theory and as means of addressing its perceived shortcomings 
in particular contexts and more generally.  
 
Chapter four refers to a large body of research in discussing and analysing the 
roles and functions of the board of directors and the particular place of 
independent directors (as an increasingly valued aspect of good corporate 
governance). Its second main purpose is to provide the theoretical justification for 
the eight hypotheses explored through the empirical research conducted and 
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reported in this work. It begins with an explanation as to the purposes of a board 
of directors and the characteristics of a ‘good” as opposed to a poor. One 
principle point that emerges again and again from the literature is that, generally 
speaking, a board must have independence from the executive: what independence 
means in this context remains subject to debate. Institutional Theory is used to 
illustrate the way in which independence of boards becomes accepted as the norm 
(important given the rapid growth in this as the norm, as reflected in the research 
described in both this chapter and chapter three). The second part of the chapter 
reflects on independent directors in the New Zealand context – important given 
the focus of the empirical research and the purpose of the work – while the third 
offers an exploration as to motivations of directors to serve under various models 
of ownership and in light of the historical and legal context  – important given the 
drive to independence in a myriad of contexts and structures. The final part of the 
chapter examines characteristics of independent directors both in terms of where 
they come from and what they can offer to the firm or other organisation.  
 
Chapter five provides detail of the empirical research. It describes the instrument 
in detail along with information on the populations whose views were sought for 
the purposes of analysis and insight. It should be noted that there were three steps 
to the process: one involved four nationwide web-based surveys distributed to 
shareholders, directors and executives of New Zealand companies over 2006-9, 
the second involved phone interviews on particular aspects of the survey asked of 
individual directors in 10 different organizations and finally, the exploring of views 
held by those appointed to District Health Boards. The purpose of such in-depth 
interviews in steps two and three were verification of findings from step one and 
to permit further study and exploration of ideas not possible in the web survey.  
 
Chapter six reports on the results of these surveys and the extent to which the 
hypotheses put up in chapter four are either supported or not supported. As part 
of that reporting, results are subject to some analysis and comparison with the 
findings from previous research as identified and discussed in chapters three and 
four.  
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Keeping in mind that the major purpose of this work was to provide a foundation 
for the examination of independent directors in New Zealand, most particularly 
for SMEs, the following section is devoted to major implications that arise from 
those findings that are of particular relevance in this context and to an 
identification of further research. 
 
 
7.2  Implications of Findings 
  
7.2.1  Communication and Workload 
 
One of the issues that emerged from the findings, and one of particular importance 
to shareholders of SMEs who are not also on the board (assuming that they have 
boards at all), is communication – what the directors are doing, what is happening 
that could potentially threaten the well-being of the firm and what is the impact of 
decisions. This raises an issue of transparency when directors report back to 
shareholders, to make sure shareholders understand the substance of board 
deliberations, the benefits of vigorous debates and the strong unified leadership 
when the board instructs senior management. When shareholders do not 
understand how directors contribute to the creation and maintenance of an 
effective and resilient governance system in the firm, they likely will be less 
appreciative and understanding of the decisions directors make. 
 
It also seems from the research that the issue of timely and transparent 
communication with shareholders could easily be handled better by directors once 
they know there are issues.  
 
For most firms, the board would meet no more than monthly or bi-monthly, 
minutes of the meeting could be completed within a few days of the meeting, and 
the final minutes could then be distributed immediately by e-mail, or be available 
for download, or on-line viewing with password access, if the minutes are deemed 
confidential or commercially sensitive. Communication about what the board does 
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and how it makes its decisions should be part of the most basic routine of 
connecting to its more important stakeholders, the shareholders. 
 
More specific to boards, one of the concerns that has been raised is the increasing 
workload expected of directors, a function of an over-emphais on the control 
function of the board. An implication of the research is that boards of New 
Zealand’s SMEs could be effective with fewer face-to-face meetings, particularly 
when the firm tracks closely to its business plan and budget. Strategic 
developments that involve major changes for the whole firm or the 
allocation/reallocation of resources do not tend to arise as frequently as every 
month. Thus, it has been proposed that boards of New Zealand SMEs should meet 
quarterly only, a view also supported by this research.  
 
 
7.2.2. The Qualification of Directors 
 
If governance is a performance area that has begun to move into the position of 
center stage when firms are evaluated and responsibility is attributed for failures, 
then it would be expected that directors have a broad skill set that matches up 
well with the more challenging environment of governance in New Zealand.  
 
Not intended as an excuse but as a realistic assessment, it must be said that 
directorship training is not easy to come by in New Zealand. Some membership 
organizations, such as the Institute of Directors, offer directorship training but 
rarely with a focus on needs of SMEs where smaller boards likely mean that 
directors must be multi-skilled in more than one specific category to make up 
sufficient governance abilities in the board room. Some universities offer 
governance papers as part of their public education offering, but largely taught by 
academics rather than practitioners and thus likely perceived as not being 
sufficiently relevant. Other organizations have offered directorship training to their 
members and the public, such as the Employers and Manufacturers Association 
(EMA Northern) in Auckland, a sub-set of the nationwide Business New Zealand 
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group of company members, but these efforts appear isolated, unfocused and not 
in line with the growing demands placed on directors. Only the EMA-operated 
Qualified Director course has a skills assessment at the end that must be passed to 
earn the qualification, and thus it appears that the training for directors in New 
Zealand does not match its stated importance. 
 
This research identifies a significant skills gap of directors that will likely prevent 
boards in New Zealand from being effective governance participants. Whatever the 
reason for poor levels of skill, a campaign to raise awareness might be required to 
drive more directors to upgrade/update skills through some vehicle of formal 
governance education. While the Ministry of Health has developed a 2-day formal 
training session to be offered regionally to all sitting and new board members of 
District Health Boards, only few firms will be able to muster sufficient resources to 
offer such in-house training events for their directors. Therefore, there is a need in 
New Zealand for more directorship training events that are perceived to deliver 
value, and this research shows that it is not only novice directors who would likely 
benefit from training, but that there is a serious skills gap among sitting and 
presumably more experienced directors. 
 
For a small country with a high degree of connectivity and easy access for most to 
the nearest larger city, operating continuous director training, for new directors as 
well as in the form of skills boosters to existing directors, should be logistically 
easy and affordable. This research expresses no opinion which type of provider, 
public or private or a combination, might be the most suitable to address this 
education gap, but if it is not addressed the poor ability of directors to perform to 
the high and increasing expectations of good governance will not improve. 
 
 
7.2.3. Governance: Diversity and Other Characteristics of Independent Directors 
 
Diversity: The research shows that skills and other ‘professional’ characteristics 
are considered more desirable than is the ability of a person to contribute to 
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board diversity. This finding has implications for groups presently poorly 
represented (making it that much harder to gain a foothold in this world). Looking 
at this finding another way has implications also for SMEs. Given that such are 
frequently family businesses controlled by family members who may be from such 
minority groups, these findings may well indicate that such firms continue to lack 
the expertise needed to prosper as a business.  
 
Reputation: Although ‘having a good reputation’ appears to be easily defined, it is 
important that future research better identify the characteristics associated with 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ reputation. For instance, would a director who regularly does not 
go along with a majority of other directors suffer a reputational damage for being 
troublesome? Events such as being a director of an insolvent firm or being 
convicted of criminal acts would justifiably affect the reputation of a director, but 
what about the director of a firm that voluntarily liquidates because it has come to 
the end of its useful corporate life? ‘Reputation’ as a term invites the application of 
a value system that will be subjective rather than objective, and thus care must be 
taken to not adversely affect the eligibility of directors who can effectively 
contributes but might be tainted by irrelevant activities. 
 
Ability to Mount and Support a Good Argument: In general, this sentiment seems 
to indicate a fear of directors banding together for the wrong reasons and thus 
manifests a level of distrust against directors that is disturbing. If it needs a director 
with the stamina to maintain a vigorous defense for his/her argument to succeed, 
does that mean that less strong directors will not be heard? Is there a fear that 
directors’ valid opinions might not be debated if the fervour and fighting spirit are 
missing? It appears that a lack of understanding exists over the operation of board 
meetings. There seems to be a prevailing belief that directors decide based on 
established alliances in the boardroom, and that newcomers would have no chance 
to present alternative viewpoints unless they are able to fight for them. This seems 
to be a naïve interpretation of board routines and often likely to be wrong. A 
remedy for this widespread misconception might be to invite shareholders and 
senior managers to attend board meetings, at least those sessions that discuss 
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matters not commercially sensitive or otherwise not suitable for immediate public 
consumption, so that they get a first-hand impression of the dynamics of a board 
meeting. Re-iterating points made above, in this context it seems appropriate to 
refresh the suggestion that board minutes appropriately reflect any debate and 
intense discussion of issues, so that there can be no doubt that directors have a 
forum in which to debate matters fully and effectively. 
 
Industry Skills and Knowledge: This would intuitively be the fastest way to get 
independent directors up to speed in understanding the business, but does this 
provide for the largest possible pool of director candidates to choose from?  
 
It is encouraging that ‘work experience’, especially within the industry and globally, 
is a key ingredient of the wish list for new directors. Thjis brings in a new pool of 
candidates for independent director roles: Executives currently working in 
positions within the same industry either in New Zealand and with global work 
experience, or overseas. Aside from the advantage in giving these executives a new 
and challenging role, this desire specifics a skill set that is relatively easily available, 
albeit not necessarily in the local town or valley. Replacing the historic preference 
for accountants and lawyers with that of practical work experience and a track 
record should also produce independent directors that can relate to the 
management team of the firm where they join the board, including a greater 
acceptance through their related work roles in their own firms. 
 
If many of the skills required by directors are transferable skills (such as 
understanding the legal obligations of directors, being able to interpret financial 
statements and performing audit function, creating long-range visionary strategic 
plans, communicating strategies to the CEO and management, and communicating 
with shareholders and other stakeholders), why does a new director have to 
understand the minute details of how the operation works? Would this not be a 
skill that can be learned quickly, and be complemented by insiders such as senior 
managers, who can provide specific operational details? 
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There is possibly another reason for this requirement. It appears as if most insiders 
consider their business as ‘special’ and outsiders would be incompetent to 
discharge governance obligations unless they are thoroughly familiar with the 
specific industry. This is a limiting view of the governance world and likely will 
result in an exclusion of competent directors simply because they have not grown 
up in the milking machine industry or do not know how to rebuild engines or lack 
the ability to sell real estate. If the purpose of independent directors is to 
complement the skill sets of the incumbent, likely internal, directors, then 
tindependents would only need to understand the inner workings of the firm. 
More probable than not, the existing board members, the CEO or the 
management team will have a superior grasp on the deep reaches of the firm’s 
operation and can communicate those on demand.  
 
Professional Qualifications: While solicitors and accountants have historically been 
asked to come onto the boards of SMEs, likely as arbitrators of the various owner 
factions and to provide ‘free’ professional advice, shareholders, senior managers 
and directors now are far less likely to be asked to serve. The majority of 
respondents believed that professional degree holders had too narrow a scope of 
expertise to be able to contribute to general management issues. Although 
accountants and solicitors might very well have amassed a lot of knowledge while 
dealing with clients in a wide range of industries and situations, it appears that this 
‘knowledge by proxy’ is deemed insufficient for the current challenges of 
independent directors. This means conversely that it is no advantage for an aspiring 
independent director to hold such qualifications.   
 
Finally, and most importantly, the research suggests that an alternative governance 
framework may suit New Zealand better than one based on agency principles. 
Such a one is described below. 
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7.2.4  Alternative Framework for Board Responsibility 
 
 
Let us take an imaginary but representative small firm with a commercial board, 
and three octogenerian shareholders, the survivors of the founding family, all in 
poor health. If that firm currently drains its working capital to support the three 
owner shareholders in their lifestyle and health needs and thus defers necessary 
investments in plant, equipment, upskilling, etc., clearly the firm suffers and 
eventually, presumably after the death of the owners, becomes unsustainable. The 
independent directors are now in a quandary of what decision to make. If they 
were to adhere strictly to the mandate to represent shareholder interests, they 
would continue to deplete assets to provide for the three shareholders, knowing 
that the firm will no longer be able to invest in the future – unable to maintain its 
market position and technical competence and to attract and retain good staff. 
Legally, their duties are well-described and unambiguous: Look out for your 
shareholders. These directors will know that their decisions in favour of the 
shareholders will ruin the business, destroy its brand and create unemployment 
when it finally and inevitably ceases trading. They would likely decide to not deal 
with that decision and try to sell the business as a going concern, using the 
proceeds to provide for the shareholders. 
 
It is their belief that a director looks out for more than the shareholders’ unitary 
well-being that potentially conflicts with their legal duties as directors. 
 
The research conducted here indicates that this feeling of a more holistic approach 
to board leadership is widespread among New Zealand directors and aspiring 
directors. Unless the shareholders consent to directors taking on a more global 
view of their corporate universe, undoubtedly with the good motivation to 
improve the entity’s position in relation to the many essential stakeholders a firm 
acquires and maintains constantly, this belief of directors may create conflict with 
the shareholders. It requires considerable communication between shareholders 
and directors, to identify the reasons directors apply to their decision-making, to 
mitigate any friction that will eventually arise from these diverging courses. 
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What are the consequences for shareholders/firms? 
If there is a growing demand for independent directors in New Zealand, and if 
those independent directors enter a board room with a commitment to perform 
to a ‘standard of doing good’ that does not center exclusively on the needs of the 
shareholders, firms need to take this into account when they discuss with new 
directors what both firms and directors expect. Directors who join for the 
purpose of contributing to a firm and then are largely unable to do so, will leave 
after a short time. Equally costly, directors who look at a firm to be accountable to 
more than its shareholders and then develop a fractious relationship with those 
shareholders, will eventually be dismissed at the cost of disruption and reputational 
damage. Neither of these outcomes is desirable. 
 
I conclude that shareholders, senior managers and directors consider an 
independent director as an advisor of a special kind. There is a desire to connect 
the consultant tighter into the firm’s fabric, hoping to receive advice less tainted by 
self-interest but more focused on the entity’s needs. Given the low pay for 
directors in New Zealand and the low pay expectation of independent directors in 
New Zealand, it seems that a modified agency theory model might operate better 
for directors in New Zealand, centered along the theme of ‘commitment’. It would 
recognise that additional forces pull directors away from a solitary focus on 
shareholder needs, and that this commitment can energise directors to contribute 
with enthusiasm. Such a governance framework could provide firms with 
committed consultants at a fraction of the cost when they are directors, rather 
than when they remain arms-length advisors. This does not imply that every 
consultant should be invited to become a director, but in areas where the 
knowledge of the director overlaps well with the strategic interest of the firm to 
plug a competence gap at board level, having a director fill this void appears to be 
more palatable to owners and directors, than relying on a consultant for the same 
information. 
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I note that for only 21.2% of all survey respondents ‘fees’ are very important, while 
46.6% report that ‘doing good’ is most important. This would indicate that 
directors in New Zealand might well drop any demand for higher director fees if 
there is a mechanism by which they can contribute along the lines of their desire 
to ‘do good’. 
 
This would impose a duty on a firm to create a board/governance environment in 
which such a positive director contribution is encouraged and rewarded, rather 
than directors being used to rubberstamp management proposals or to accede to 
dominant shareholder wishes. This points to a more complex process of 
embedding a new director into the independent directorship role, including better 
selection criteria, more transparency during the mutual due diligence process by 
firm and director, more involved induction/education and a greater envelope of 
tolerance for the breadth of director contributions. 
 
Linking these conclusions and recommendations back to the various theories, it 
appears clear that for each of the prevailing theories, Agency Theory and 
Stakeholder Theory, the current model does not make room for the inclusion of 
the intangible motivation of ‘doing good’ as part of the connection. This new 
ingredient needs to find a home in the discussion of governance structures and 
their theoretical underpinnings. The existence of such a driver for interest in 
governance would create demands on the part of companies, directors and the 
regulatory framework, to review reward systems, look at upskilling and corporate 
structures in a dynamic context. This area is clearly evolving and likely will 
continue to do so, once more independent directors join boards and begin to 
participate. 
 
 
A final word: This research highlights the necessity to better inform shareholders, 
senior managers and directors about the purpose and benefits of independent 
directors. If the approach by firms is to seek directors with knowledge as close as 
possible to that of the current inside directors, then this will likely reduce the pool 
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of available candidate to those being the mirror image of the existing directors and 
thus be less-than-useful as truly independent contributors to  governance. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 
Organizations that distributed this survey to their data bases were: 
 
- 3 Media Group 
- NZIM 
- NZ Shareholders Association 
- NZ Institute of Rural Health 
- Waikato Management School 
- Sheffield Recruiting 
- Moyle Remuneration Company 
- ANZ 
- BNZ 
- Simpson Grierson 
- NZ Venture Capital Association 
-  
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APPENDIX A: Survey Questionnaire 2006-2009 Population 
 
 
1) 
 
This research tries to obtain information that leads to a better 
understanding of good governance here and globally. Many 
corporations, associations, government organisations and universities 
are participating in this work. If you have any questions at all about this 
research, do not hesitate to contact Associate Professor Jens Mueller 
at m@usainfo.net . This survey is in several short parts and will take 8-
10 minutes to complete. Your responses will be combined with those of 
all other participants to provide total anonymity for you. You can end 
the survey at any time by leaving the screen. We thank New Zealand 
Management Magazine and NZIM for their kind support with our work. 
 
You are likely a present or past company officer/executive, company 
director or investor, and have been carefully selected for the value of 
your contribution to this work. If you are involved with more than one 
organisation, please reply with regard to the organisation where you 
are regularly most engaged. 
 
Thank you for your time and interest. You will have an opportunity to 
indicate that you wish to receive a free copy of the summary report of 
this work or several other benefits. This governance work is widely 
supported by corporates throughout New Zealand, and your 
contribution is essential. 
 
 
This survey automatically branches into 3 sections depending on your 
responses; you may not see all 3 sections. 
 
 
You are: 
 
Male    Female 
 
 
Your age is: 
 
under 18 years  
18 - 24 years  
25 - 34 years  
35 - 44 years  
45 - 54 years  
55 - 64 years  
above 64 years  
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As a token of our appreciation for your time, we have arranged for any 
of the following benefits available to you. Please tick which ones you 
would like and please enter your e-mail address here. The researchers 
will remove your e-mail address from the answers, to guarantee the 
anonymity of your replies. 
 
FREE copy of the results report of this survey  
FREE confidential benchmark performance report for the board on 
which you sit  
FREE 2-year www.finddirectors.com INDIVIDUAL membership  
FREE 1-year www.finddirectors.com CORPORATE membership  
$200 discount coupon for any "Qualified Director" seminar  
Enyer your e-mail address here:    
 
 
Are you currently, or have you been in the past five years, an 
executive of a New Zealand organization? After answering this 
question, please click "Next" below. 
 
Yes   No 
 
 
2) 
 
This section asks questions about your organization and how 
it handles its governance issues. If you are/were a Director or 
Executive in more than one organization, please reply with 
details about the organization where you regularly are/were 
most engaged. 
 
 
In what region is your organization's headquarter located? 
 
Auckland  
Wellington  
Christchurch  
Hamilton  
Dunedin  
Other North Island  
Other South island  
Australia  
Western Europe  
Eastern Europe  
North America  
South America  
Africa  
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In its market, your organization's market share is: 
 
Large (above 30% market share)  
Medium (10-30% market share)  
Small (under 10% market share)  
Does not apply (self-employed, retired etc.)  
 
 
How old is this business? 
 
Younger than 3 months  
3 months - 2 years  
3 years - 5 years  
6 - 10 years  
Older than 10 years  
 
 
Competition in New Zealand in your organization's market is: 
 
Strong  
Not strong  
 
 
Competition outside of New Zealand in your organization’s market is: 
 
Strong  
Not strong  
Not Applicable (we have no activities outside New Zealand)  
 
 
In which industry does your organization operate (mark all that apply): 
 
Manufacturing/Processing  
Finance/Banking/Insurance/Venture Capital/Private Equity  
Energy/Utility/Infrastructure/Construction  
Health  
Transportation/Logistics  
Retail/Wholesale  
Public Sector/Local government  
Research/Science  
Primary Sector (agribusiness, farming etc.)  
Professional services  
Non-Profits  
Telecommunications/technology/media  
Tourism (incl. hospitality, events, sport, etc.)  
Other, please specify:    
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The gross annual revenue of your organization is: 
 
Below $200,000  
$200,000 - $749,000  
$750,000 - $1 1/2 Million  
$1 1/2 - $4 Million  
$5 - $10 Million  
$11 - $20 Million  
$21 - $50 Million  
$51 - $100 Million  
$101 - $500 Million  
Above $500 Million  
Don't know  
 
 
The number of full-time equivalent employees at the organisation is: 
 
No staff  
1 staff  
2 - 4 staff  
5 - 9 staff  
10 - 20 staff  
21 - 200 staff  
201 - 500 staff  
More than 500 staff  
 
 
What type of ownership does your organization have? 
 
Government Organization/Public Services Firm/Crown Corp  
Non-Profit Organization  
Family-Owned Firm (under 25% family-owned)  
Family-Owned Firm (26-49% family-owned)  
Family-Owned Firm (50%+ family-owned)  
Privately-Owned Corporation (not family owned)  
Publicly-Traded Corporation (i.e. stock exchange listed)  
Other:    
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How many Directors are on the Board of your organization? 
 
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10 or more  
There is no formal Board  
 
 
How many of those directors have NO dealings/relationships with 
the organization other than being a director and are neither 
founders nor employees or significant shareholders (10%+)? 
 
None  
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10 or more  
Do not know  
 
 
Your Chief Executive is also 
 
A Director  
The Chair of the Board  
Neither  
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If your firm appointed new directors in the past five years, how did the 
organization find them? (Please mark all that apply) 
 
Referral from Management  
Referral from Law Firm/Accountant/Auditor  
Referral from Bank/Investment Partner/Venture Capital Firm  
Appointed by Government  
Referral from existing Directors  
Recruitment/Search Firm  
Referral from Institute of Directors  
Referral from www.FindDirectors.com  
Do not know  
Other    
 
 
Which of the following training/education does the organization 
provide for directors? (Please mark all that apply) 
 
Outside education at university, etc.  
Formal internal director induction/training program  
Outside non-university director training program (i.e. IOD, Qualified 
Diretor, etc.)  
Informal advice  
None  
Do not know  
Other, describe here:    
 
 
How many new external/independent Directors will your organization 
likely look for in the next 5 years? 
 
None  
1  
2  
3  
4  
5 or more  
Do not know  
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On average, how long have the current Directors of your organization 
been in their Director positions? 
 
Less than a year  
1 - 2 years  
3 - 4 years  
5 - 6 years  
7 or more years  
Do not know  
 
 
Check if your organization (mark all that apply): 
 
Has a formal risk-management system beyond normal insurance cover  
Regularly profiles its risk exposure beyond financial risk  
Fully understands its 'risk appetite'  
Regularly reports formally on its risk management  
Involves the board in risk management decisions  
Involves only the CEO or staff in risk management decisions  
Considers risk management a part of its strategy planning  
Other, describe here:    
 
 
Please share with us, in a sentence or more, how well (or not) 
governance works in your organization: 
 
 
 
Are you, or have you been in the past five years, a member of the 
Board of Directors of a New Zealand organization? (After answering 
this question, please click "Next" below.) 
 
Yes  
No  
 
 
3) 
 
This section asks questions about your organization and how it 
handles its governance issues. If you are/were a Director in more 
than one organization, please reply with details about the 
organization where you regularly are/were most engaged. 
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What is the largest number of corporate boards you served on at any 
one time? 
 
None  
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7 or more  
 
If you were offered a Board position now, how important would each of 
the following factors be for you? 
 
  Very Important 
Somewhat 
Important 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
Very 
Unimportant 
Status/Prestige of 
Organization     
Whether the 
Company’s Shares 
are Publicly Traded 
    
Fees/Benefits to 
the Directors     
The Ability to "Do 
some Good"     
Becoming 
Known/Networking     
Reputation of other 
Directors     
Level of Personal 
Risk     
Opportunity for 
Personal Career 
Advancement 
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How would you describe the overall competence of the Board (not just 
your own individual competence) in these areas? 
 
  
Excellent 
Competence 
 
Good 
Competence 
 
Sufficient 
Competence 
 
Poor 
Competence 
 
Very Poor 
Competence 
  
Corporate strategy and the 
principles of risk/strategic 
change 
     
Legal, regulatory and 
corporate governance and 
the responsibilities of 
directors 
     
Leadership qualities, 
commanding respect of 
others, displaying 
judgment and courage 
     
Commitment, to the 
business and to 
shareholders 
     
Creating a sustainable 
enterprise      
Team player abilities, 
listening and influencing 
skills and awareness of 
own strengths and 
weaknesses 
     
Ability to manage dissent 
among Board members      
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Based on your experience, how would you rate the NON-
EXECUTIVE/INDEPENDENT Directors' contribution? (Skip this if you 
have not experienced independent directors in action) 
 
  
Outstanding 
 
Very Good 
 
Acceptable 
 
Not so 
Good 
 
Poor 
  
Their contribution to the 
performance of the organization      
The quality of their contribution 
during board meetings      
Their ability to assist with 
networking      
Their ability to provide strategic 
vision      
Creating a sustainable enterprise      
Their understanding of 
governance issues      
Their understanding of the 
organization's business      
 
 
Speaking as a director, where should your board spend more or less 
time in the future? 
  
Should 
spend 
MORE 
time 
No 
Change 
Needed 
Should 
spend LESS 
time 
Compliance & Regulatory 
Issues/Auditing    
Risk Management    
Succession Planning for 
Board and Top Managers    
Industry/Competitive 
Analysis    
Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 
Environmental and 
Sustainability Issues (i.e. 
Triple Bottom Line) 
   
Helping CEO and 
Managers operate the 
organization 
   
 
 
Jens Mueller “Movements in the Long White Cloud of Governance”  Page 309 	  
 
How would you describe your own involvement as a director? 
 
  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
  
I can influence the 
outcome of board 
decisions 
    
I am concerned 
about my reliance 
on management for 
information 
    
I am adequately 
rewarded for my 
director contribution 
    
I am concerned 
about my personal 
risk as a director 
    
I find being a 
director personally 
rewarding 
    
I do not experience 
internal politics on 
the board 
    
 
 
How did you hear about openings for your directorships?  
(Please mark all that apply) 
 
From Company Management/Directors  
From Company staff  
From Law firm/Accountant/Auditor  
From Bank/Investment Bank/Venture Capital Partner  
Through the Government, i.e. CCMAU  
From a Recruiter/Search Firm  
You are a Founder of the organization  
You are or represent a large Shareholder  
Through Institute of Directors or FindDirectors.com  
Other, describe here:    
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If your organization has a formal/informal process/policy to handle 
conflicts of interest for directors or Ethics issues, what proportion of 
the directors would know this process/policy? 
 
  
Fewer 
than 
25% 
25% - 
50% 
51% - 
75% 
More than 
75% 
We do not have 
a formal 
process/policy 
Conflict of 
Interest      
Ethics      
 
In your observation of organizations in this country, boards need 
Directors that contribute: 
 
  Yes Maybe No 
Gender Diversity    
Age Diversity    
Work experience within the industry    
Work experience outside the industry    
International Experience    
Professional Skills (Lawyers, Business 
Consultants, Accountants, etc.)    
Track record of having run a successful 
business    
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How would you rate the importance of each of the following tasks for 
the Board? 
 
  
Very Important 
 
Somewhat Important 
 
Not Sure 
 
Somewhat Unimportant 
 
Very 
Unimportant 
 
    
Compliance & Regulatory Issues      
Mentoring the CEO      
Monitoring the strategic health of the 
firm      
Industry/Competitive Analysis      
Ensuring corporate sustainablity      
Challenging Management 
thinking/beliefs      
Managing the Reputation of the 
Organization      
 
 
Please share with us, in a sentence or more, your thoughts about 
governance and directorships in this country: 
 
 
 
Do you own now, or have you owned in the previous 5 years, any 
shares in a New Zealand corporation? 
 
Yes   No  
 
 
4) 
 
Do you own now, or have you owned in the past five years, shares of a 
New Zealand corporation? (After answering this question, please click 
"Next" below. 
 
Yes  No 
 
5) 
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Are you, or have been in the past five years, a member of the Board of 
Directors of a New Zealand organization? (After answering this 
question, please click "Next" below. 
 
Yes  No 
 
 
6) 
 
How well are you informed about the corporate governance policies in 
the companies you invest in? 
 
Very Well Informed  
Well Informed  
Informed  
Not so Well Informed  
Not at all Well Informed  
 
 
As a shareholder, how satisfied are you with the performance of 
directors in your organization? 
 
Highly Satisfied  
Satisfied  
Not Satisfied  
Highly Unsatisfied  
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As a shareholder, how important are these attributes in a director? 
 
  Very Important 
Somewhat 
Important 
Not very 
Important 
Having a good reputation in 
the market    
Having company-specific 
market/product knowledge    
Holding many other 
directorships    
Being an employee of the firm    
Having global business 
experience    
Holding a Certificate from an 
entity that trains directors    
Communicating directly with 
shareholders    
Forming his/her own opinions 
and arguing strenuously if 
there are disagreements 
among directors 
   
Having a track record of 
business successes    
 
 
Speaking as a shareholder, where should your directors spend more 
or less time? 
 
  More Time Needed 
No 
Change 
Needed 
Less Time 
Needed 
Compliance & Regulatory 
Issues/Auditing    
Risk Management    
Succession Planning for 
Board and Top Managers    
Industry/Competitive Analysis    
Corporate Social 
Responsibility and 
Sustainability Issues 
   
Helping CEO and Managers 
operate the organization    
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As an investor, please share with us what changes in Corporate 
Governance you would wish to see in the future? 
 
Thank you for your participation. Please click below to finish. 
 
Finish 
 
 
7) 
 
This section asks questions about your organization and how it 
handles its governance issues. If you are/were a Director in more 
than one organization, please reply with details about the 
organization where you regularly are/were most engaged. 
 
 
In what region is your organization's headquarter located? 
 
Auckland  
Wellington  
Christchurch  
Hamilton  
Dunedin  
Other North Island  
Other South Island  
Australia  
Asia  
Western Europe  
Eastern Europe  
North America  
South America  
Africa  
 
 
In its market, your organization's market share is: 
 
Large (above 30% market share)  
Medium (10-30% market share)  
Small (under 10% market share)  
Does not apply (self-employed, retired etc.)  
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How old is this business? 
 
Younger than 3 months  
3 months - 2 years  
3 years - 5 years  
6 - 10 years  
Older than 10 years  
 
 
Competition in New Zealand in your organization's market is: 
 
Strong       Not strong  
 
 
Competition outside of New Zealand in your organization’s market is: 
 
Strong       Not strong  
Not Applicable (we have no activities outside New Zealand)  
 
 
In which industry does your organization operate: 
 
Manufacturing/Processing  
Finance/Banking/Insurance/Venture Capital/Private Equity  
Energy/Utility/Infrastructure/Construction  
Health  
Transportation/Logistics  
Retail/Wholesale  
Public Sector/Local government  
Research/Science  
Primary Sector (agribusiness, farming etc.)  
Professional services  
Non-Profits  
Telecommunications/technology/media  
Tourism (incl. hospitality, events, sport, etc.)  
Other, please specify:    
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Below $125,000  
$125,000 - $500,000  
$501,000 - $1 Million  
$1.1 - $2.5 Million  
$2.51 - $7.5 Million  
$7.6 - $12.5 Million  
$12.6 - $35 Million  
$36 - $75 Million  
$76 - $500 Million  
Above $500 Million  
 
 
The number of full-time equivalent employees at the organisation is: 
 
No staff  
1 staff  
2 - 4 staff  
5 - 9 staff  
10 - 20 staff  
21 - 200 staff  
201 - 500 staff  
More than 500 staff  
 
 
What type of ownership does your organization have? 
 
Government Organization/Public Services Firm/Crown Corp  
Non-Profit Organization  
Family-Owned Firm (under 25% family-owned)  
Family-Owned Firm (26-49% family-owned)  
Family-Owned Firm (50%+ family-owned)  
Privately-Owned Firm (not family owned)  
Publicly-Owned Firm (i.e. stock exchange listed)  
Does not apply, i.e. self-employed/retired  
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How many Directors are on the Board of your organization? 
 
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10 or more  
There is no formal Board  
 
 
How many of those directors have NO dealings/relationships with the 
organization other than being a director and are neither founders nor 
employees or significant shareholders (10%+)? 
 
None  
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10 or more  
Do not know  
 
 
Your Chief Executive is also 
 
A Director  
The Chair of the Board  
Neither  
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If your firm appointed new directors in the past five years, how did the 
organization find them? (Please mark all that apply) 
 
Referral from Management  
Referral from Law Firm/Accountant/Auditor  
Referral from Bank/Investment Partner/Venture Capital Firm  
Appointed by Government, i.e. CCMAU  
Referral from existing Directors  
Recruitment/Search Firm  
Institute of Directors or www.FindDirectors.com  
Do not know  
 
 
Which of the following training/education does the organization 
provide for directors? (Please mark all that apply) 
 
Outside education at university, etc.  
Formal internal director induction/training program  
Outside non-university director training program  
Informal advice  
None  
Do not know  
Other, describe here:    
 
 
How many new external/independent Directors will your organization 
likely look for in the next 5 years? 
 
None  
1  
2  
3  
4  
5 or more  
Do not know  
 
 
On average, how long have the current Directors of your organization 
been in their Director positions? 
 
Less than a year  
1 - 2 years  
3 - 4 years  
5 - 6 years  
7 or more years  
Do not know  
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Check if your organization (mark all that apply): 
 
Has a formal risk-management system beyond normal insurance cover  
Regularly profiles its risk exposure beyond financial risk  
Fully understands its 'risk appetite'  
Regularly reports formally on its risk management  
Involves the board in risk management decisions  
Involves only the CEO or staff in risk management decisions  
Considers risk management a part of its strategy planning  
Other, describe here:    
 
 
What is the largest number of corporate boards you served on at any 
one time? 
 
None  
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7 or more  
 
If you were offered a Board position now, how important would each of 
the following factors be for you? 
 
  
Very 
Important 
 
Somewhat 
Important 
 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
 
Very 
Unimportant 
 
Status/Prestige of Organization     
Whether the Company’s Shares are Publicly 
Traded     
Fees/Benefits to the Directors     
The Ability to "Do some Good"     
Becoming Known/Networking     
Reputation of other Directors     
Level of Personal Risk     
Opportunity for Personal Career Advancement     
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How would you describe the overall competence of the Board (not just 
your own individual competence) in these areas? 
 
  
Excellent 
Competence 
 
Sufficient 
Competence 
Good 
Competence 
 
Poor 
Competence 
  Very Poor Competence 
Corporate strategy 
and the principles of 
risk/strategic 
change 
     
Legal, regulatory 
and corporate 
governance and the 
responsibilities of 
directors 
     
Leadership 
qualities, 
commanding 
respect of others, 
displaying judgment 
and courage 
     
Commitment, to the 
business and to 
shareholders 
     
Creating a 
sustainable 
enterprise 
     
Team player 
abilities, listening 
and influencing 
skills and 
awareness of own 
strengths and 
weaknesses 
     
Ability to manage 
dissent among 
Board members 
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Based on your experience, how would you rate the NON-
EXECUTIVE/INDEPENDENT Directors' contribution? (Skip this if you 
have not experienced independent directors in action) 
 
  Outstanding Very Good Acceptable 
Not 
so 
Good 
Poor 
Their contribution to 
the performance of the 
organization 
     
The quality of their 
contribution during 
board meetings 
     
Their ability to assist 
with networking      
Their ability to provide 
strategic vision      
Creating a sustainable 
enterprise      
Their understanding of 
governance issues      
Their understanding of 
the organization's 
business 
     
 
 
Speaking as a director, where should your board spend more or less 
time in the future? 
 
  
Should 
spend 
MORE 
time 
No 
Change 
Needed 
Should spend LESS 
time 
Compliance & Regulatory 
Issues/Auditing    
Risk Management    
Succession Planning for 
Board and Top Managers    
Industry/Competitive 
Analysis    
Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 
Environmental and 
Sustainability Issues (i.e. 
Triple Bottom Line) 
   
Helping CEO and 
Managers operate the 
organization 
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How would you describe your own involvement as a director? 
 
  Strongly Agree 
Somewhat 
Agree 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
I can influence the 
outcome of board 
decisions 
    
I am concerned about 
my reliance on 
management for 
information 
    
I am adequately 
rewarded for my 
director contribution 
    
I am concerned about 
my personal risk as a 
director 
    
I find being a director 
personally rewarding     
I do not experience 
internal politics on the 
board 
    
 
 
How did you hear about openings for your directorships? (Please mark 
all that apply) 
 
From Company Management/Directors  
From Company staff  
From Law firm/Accountant/Auditor  
From Bank/Investment Bank/Venture Capital Partner  
Through the Government, i.e. CCMAU  
From a Recruiter/Search Firm  
You are a Founder of the organization  
You are or represent a large Shareholder  
Through Institute of Directors or www.FindDirectors.com  
Other, describe here:    
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If your organization has a formal/informal process/policy to handle 
conflicts of interest for directors or Ethics issues, what proportion of 
the directors would know this process/policy? 
 
  Fewer than 25% 
25% - 
50% 
51% - 
75% 
More 
than 
75% 
We do not have a formal 
process/policy 
Conflict 
of 
Interest 
     
Ethics      
 
 
In your observation of organizations in this country, boards need 
Directors that contribute: 
 
  Yes Maybe No 
Gender Diversity    
Age Diversity    
Work experience within the industry    
Work experience outside the industry    
International Experience    
Professional Skills (Lawyers, Business 
Consultants, Accountants, etc.)    
Track record of having run a successful 
business    
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How would you rate the importance of each of the following tasks for 
the Board? 
 
  
Very 
Important 
 
Somewhat 
Important 
 
Not Sure 
 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
 Very Unimportant 
Compliance & 
Regulatory Issues      
Mentoring the CEO      
Monitoring the 
strategic health of 
the firm 
     
Industry/Competitiv
e Analysis      
Ensuring corporate 
sustainablity      
Challenging 
Management 
thinking/beliefs 
     
Managing the 
Reputation of the 
Organization 
     
 
 
Please share with us, in a sentence or more, your thoughts about 
governance and directorships in this country: 
 
 
 
Do you own now, or have you owned in the previous 5 years, any 
shares in a New Zealand corporation? 
 
Yes    No  
 
8) Page 8 
 
 
Jens Mueller “Movements in the Long White Cloud of Governance”  Page 325 	  
APPENDIX B: On-line web-based survey instrument used for the in-depth 2010 
survey. 
 
 
 
1) 
 
We are assisting your organisation's board with better understanding its 
quality of governance. This research is confidential and no individual's reply 
will be shared with anyone outside the research team. Only a summary 
report will be presented to the organisation's board, to allow the directors to 
assess their effectiveness, when benchmarked against many other NZ 
entities. If you have any questions at all about this research, please contact 
Professor Jens Mueller at 021 516 326, or m@usainfo.net . This survey will 
take 6-8 minutes to complete. Your responses will be combined with those 
of other participants to provide total anonymity for you. You can end the 
survey at any time by leaving the screen. 
 
 
Thank you for your time and interest. Your opinions are very important to us, 
and we know time is precious. We have made this survey easy to navigate 
for you. Your contribution is essential to obtain a comprehensive 
understanding of governance at your organisation. 
 
 
 
 
You are (we need this data to compare your demographics to several 
thousand other directors in New Zealand): 
 
Male Female 
 
 
Your age is (we need this data to compare your demographics to 
several thousand other directors in New Zealand): 
 
under 18 years  
18 - 24 years  
25 - 34 years  
35 - 44 years  
45 - 54 years  
55 - 64 years  
above 64 years  
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Before you became a director in this entity, your professional 
background included experience in (check all that applies): 
 
Small-/Mid-Size Business  
Large Business  
Not for Profit Organisation  
Government/Teaching  
Professional (i.e. law, accounting)  
Other, please tell us:    
 
 
Please enter your telephone number and e-mail, in the event you are 
selected for a follow-up and verification of the survey information. 
Your identity will not be disclosed in any of the results. Without this 
information, your responses must be discarded to maintain the 
integrity of the data base. 
 
 
 
2) 
 
This section asks questions about your organisation and how it 
handles its governance issues. If you are/were a Director in other 
organisations as well, please reply with details about your 
engagement at this entity only. 
 
 
 
 
On how many boards and advisory boards do you currently serve? 
 
None  
1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7 or more  
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If you were offered a Board position now, how important would each of 
the following factors be for you? 
 
  
Very 
Important 
 
Somewhat 
Important 
 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
 
Very 
Unimportant 
   
Status/Prestige of Organization     
Whether the Company’s Shares are Publicly 
Traded     
Fees/Benefits to the Directors     
The Ability to "Do some Good"     
Becoming Known/Networking     
Reputation of other Directors     
Level of Personal Risk     
Opportunity for Personal Career Advancement     
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How would you describe the overall competence of the Board (not just 
your own individual competence) in these areas? 
 
  
Excellent 
Competence 
 
Good 
Competence 
 
Sufficient 
Competence 
 
Poor Competence 
 
Very Poor 
Competence 
  
Corporate strategy 
and the principles of 
risk/strategic change 
     
Legal, regulatory and 
corporate 
governance and the 
responsibilities of 
directors 
     
Leadership qualities, 
commanding respect 
of others, displaying 
judgment and 
courage 
     
Commitment, to the 
business and to 
shareholders 
     
Creating a 
sustainable 
enterprise 
     
Team player abilities, 
listening and 
influencing skills and 
awareness of own 
strengths and 
weaknesses 
     
Ability to manage 
dissent among Board 
members 
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Based on your experience, how would you rate the INTERNAL 
Directors' contribution? (These are directors who also have a 
management role or other interests in the entity, other than being a 
director) 
 
  
Outstanding 
 
Very Good 
 
Acceptable 
 
Not so 
Good 
 
Poor 
  
Their contribution to the 
performance of the 
organization 
     
The quality of their 
contribution during board 
meetings 
     
Their ability to assist with 
networking      
Their ability to provide 
strategic vision      
Creating a sustainable 
enterprise      
Their understanding of 
governance issues      
Their understanding of the 
organization's business      
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Based on your experience, how would you rate the EXTERNAL 
Directors' contribution? (These are directors who do not have a 
management role or other interests in the entity, other than being a 
director) 
 
  
Outstanding 
 
Very Good 
 
Acceptable 
 
Not so 
Good 
 
Poor 
  
Their contribution to the 
performance of the 
organization 
     
The quality of their 
contribution during board 
meetings 
     
Their ability to assist with 
networking      
Their ability to provide 
strategic vision      
Creating a sustainable 
enterprise      
Their understanding of 
governance issues      
Their understanding of the 
organization's business      
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Speaking as a director, where should your board spend more or less 
time in the future? 
 
    
Should 
spend 
LESS 
time 
 
Should 
spend 
MORE 
time 
 
Should 
spend 
ABOUT 
THE 
SAME 
time 
Compliance & Regulatory Issues/Auditing    
Risk Management    
Succession Planning for Board and Top Managers    
Industry/Competitive Analysis    
Corporate Social Responsibility, Environmental and 
Sustainability Issues  
(i.e. Triple Bottom Line) 
   
Helping CEO and Managers operate the organization    
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How would you describe your own involvement as a director? 
 
  
Strongly 
Agree 
 
Somewhat 
Agree 
 
Somewhat 
Disagree 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
   
I can influence the outcome 
of board decisions     
I am concerned about my 
reliance on management for 
information 
    
I am adequately rewarded for 
my director contribution     
I am concerned about my 
personal risk as a director     
I find being a director 
personally rewarding     
I do not experience internal 
politics on the board     
 
 
How did you hear about openings for your directorships?  
(Please mark all that apply) 
 
From friends in the community who are not involved in the entity  
From someone at the organisation's management  
From the Government/CCMAU  
From someone at the organisation's board  
From an advertisement  
I work at the entity  
From a recruiting firm  
Other, describe here:    
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If your organization has a formal/informal process/policy to handle 
conflicts of interest for directors or Ethics issues, what proportion of 
the directors would know this process/policy? 
 
  Fewer than 25% 
25% - 
50% 
51% - 
75% 
More 
than 
75% 
We do not have a 
formal process/policy 
Conflict of 
Interest      
Ethics      
 
 
In your observation, boards in general need Directors that contribute: 
 
  Yes Maybe No 
Gender Diversity    
Age Diversity    
Work experience within the 
organisation's industry    
Work experience outside the 
organisation's industry    
International Experience    
Professional Skills (Lawyers, 
Business Consultants, 
Accountants, etc.) 
   
Track record of having run a 
successful business    
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How would you rate the importance of each of the following tasks for 
the Board? 
 
  
Very 
Important 
 
Somewhat 
Important 
 
Not 
Sure 
 
Somewhat 
Unimportant 
 
 
    
Compliance & Regulatory Issues      
Mentoring the CEO      
Monitoring the strategic health of the firm      
Industry/Competitive Analysis      
Ensuring corporate sustainablity      
Challenging Management thinking/beliefs      
Managing the Reputation of the 
Organization      
 
 
Which of the following training/education does the organization 
provide for directors? (Please mark all that apply) 
 
Outside education at university, etc.  
Formal internal director induction/training program  
Outside non-university director training program  
Informal advice  
None  
Do not know  
Other, describe here:    
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How are the senior managers of the entity involved in board activities? 
 
  
CEO only 
ALWAYS 
 
CEO only 
SOMETIMES 
 
Senior Managers 
ALWAYS 
 
Senior Managers 
SOMETIMES 
 
Other staff 
    
Attend ALL board meetings      
Attend SOME board 
meetings      
Attend SOME PORTIONS of 
board meetings      
Meet with Board Members 
during special 
sessions/retreats 
     
Meet with Board Members 
informally outside of board 
meetings 
     
 
 
Your CEO is a member of the Board 
 
Yes No 
 
 
Your Chair is a manager of the organisation 
 
Yes No 
 
 
Your Chair is also the CEO 
 
Yes No 
 
 
Please share with us, in a sentence or more, your thoughts about 
governance at your organisation: 
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Please share with us, in a sentence or more, your description 
of the THREE most significant threats the organisation faces 
in the upcoming years: 
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APPENDIX C: Questions asked in the survey, and short labels used to refer to 
them 
 
 
Combined dataset: 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 
Question	   Short	  
Personal	  details:	  1	   Survey	  Year	   Year	  2	   Gender	   Gender	  3	   Age	   Age	  
Company	  details:	  4	   Regional	  Location	   Location	  5	   Market	  Share	   Share	  6	   Market	  Competition	   Comp	  7	   Industry	   Industry	  8	   Gross	  Annual	  Revenue	   Revenue	  9	   Number	  of	  full-­‐time	  equivalent	  employees	   FTE	  10	   Ownership	   Owner	  11	   Number	  of	  directors	  on	  the	  Board	   DirNum	  12	   Number	  of	  directors	  who	  have	  no	  dealings	  with	  the	  organisation	   DirDeal	  13	   If	  your	  firm	  appointed	  new	  directors	  in	  the	  past	  five	  years,	  how	  did	  the	  organisation	  find	  them	   DirHow	  14	   Which	  of	  the	  following	  training/education	  does	  the	  organisation	  provide	  for	  directors	   DirTrain	  15	   How	  many	  new	  external/independent	  directors	  will	  your	  organisation	  likely	  look	  for	  in	  the	  next	  5	  years	   DirExt	  16	   On	  average,	  how	  long	  have	  the	  current	  Directors	  of	  your	  organisation	  been	  in	  their	  Director	  positions	   DirTime	  17	   What	  is	  the	  largest	  number	  of	  corporate	  boards	  you	  served	  on	  at	  any	  one	  time	   NumBrd	  
Importance	  of	  the	  Organisation’s	  attributes	  if	  offered	  a	  board	  position	  now:	  18	   Importance	  of	  Status/Prestige	  of	  Organisation	  if	  offered	  a	  Board	  position	  now	   ImpPrestige	  19	   Importance	  that	  the	  Company	  is	  Publicly	  Listed	  if	  offered	  a	  Board	  position	  now	   ImpPublic	  20	   Importance	  of	  Fees/Benefits	  to	  the	  Directors	  if	  offered	  a	  Board	  position	  now	   ImpFee	  21	   Importance	  of	  the	  Ability	  to	  Do	  Some	  Good	  if	  offered	  a	  Board	  position	  now	   ImpGood	  22	   Importance	  of	  Becoming	  Known	  if	  offered	  a	  Board	  position	  now	   ImpKnown	  23	   Importance	  of	  Reputation	  of	  other	  Directors	  if	  offered	  a	  Board	  position	  now	   ImpRep	  24	   Importance	  of	  Level	  of	  Personal	  Risk	  if	  offered	  a	  Board	  position	  now	   ImpRisk	  25	   Importance	  of	  Opportunity	  for	  Personal	  Career	  Advancement	  if	  offered	  a	  Board	  position	  now	   ImpCareer	  
Director	  competence:	  26	   Your	  own	  and	  your	  fellow	  directors’	  competence	  in:	  Corporate	   CmpStrategy	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strategy	  and	  	  the	  principles	  of	  risk/strategic	  change	  
27	   Your	  own	  and	  your	  fellow	  directors’	  competence	  in:	  	  Legal,	  regulatory	  and	  corporate	  governance	  and	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  directors	   CmpLegal	  28	   Your	  own	  and	  your	  fellow	  directors’	  competence	  in:	  Leadership	  qualities,	  commanding	  respect	  of	  others,	  displaying	  judgment	  and	  courage	   CmpLead	  29	   Your	  own	  and	  your	  fellow	  directors’	  competence	  in:	  	  Commitment,	  to	  the	  business	  and	  to	  shareholders	  	   CmpCommit	  30	   Your	  own	  and	  your	  fellow	  directors’	  competence	  in:	  Team	  player	  abilities,	  	  listening	  and	  influencing	  skills	  and	  awareness	  of	  own	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	   CmpTeam	  
Miscellaneous:	  31	   How	  did	  you	  hear	  about	  openings	  for	  directorships	   Hear	  32	   Does	  your	  organisation	  have	  a	  formal	  process	  to	  handle	  conflicts	  of	  interest	  for	  Directors	   DirConflict	  33	   What	  proportion	  of	  the	  people	  on	  the	  board	  would	  know	  the	  code	  of	  conduct	   CmpCode	  
Director	  contribution	  to	  board:	  34	   Boards	  need	  Directors	  that	  contribute:	  Gender/Age	  Diversity	   ContDiv	  35	   Boards	  need	  Directors	  that	  contribute:	  Work	  experience	  WITHIN	  the	  industry	   ContWithin	  36	   Boards	  need	  Directors	  that	  contribute:	  Work	  experience	  OUTSIDE	  the	  industry	   ContOut	  37	   Boards	  need	  Directors	  that	  contribute:	  International	  Experience	   ContGbl	  38	   Boards	  need	  Directors	  that	  contribute:	  Lawyers,	  Business	  Consultants,	  Accountants	  or	  other	  professionals	   ContLaw	  39	   Boards	  need	  Directors	  that	  contribute:	  Track	  record	  of	  having	  run	  a	  successful	  business	   ContRecord	  
Shareholder	  needs	  of	  a	  director:	  40	   As	  a	  shareholder,	  how	  important	  are	  these	  attributes	  in	  a	  director:	  Having	  a	  good	  reputation	  in	  the	  market	   ShrRep	  41	   As	  a	  shareholder,	  how	  important	  are	  these	  attributes	  in	  a	  director:	  Having	  company-­‐specific	  market/product	  knowledge	   ShrSpec	  42	   As	  a	  shareholder,	  how	  important	  are	  these	  attributes	  in	  a	  director:	  Holding	  many	  other	  directorships	   ShrDir	  43	   As	  a	  shareholder,	  how	  important	  are	  these	  attributes	  in	  a	  director:	  Being	  an	  employee	  of	  the	  firm	   ShrEmploy	  44	   As	  a	  shareholder,	  how	  important	  are	  these	  attributes	  in	  a	  director:	  Having	  global	  business	  experience	   ShrGbl	  45	   As	  a	  shareholder,	  how	  important	  are	  these	  attributes	  in	  a	  director:	  Holding	  a	  Certificate	  from	  the	  Institute	  of	  Directors	   ShrCertID	  46	   As	  a	  shareholder,	  how	  important	  are	  these	  attributes	  in	  a	  director:	  Holding	  a	  Certificate	  from	  Directors	  Understanding	  Governance	   ShrCertDUG	  47	   As	  a	  shareholder,	  how	  important	  are	  these	  attributes	  in	  a	  director:	  Communicating	  directly	  with	  shareholders	   ShrComm	  48	   As	  a	  shareholder,	  how	  important	  are	  these	  attributes	  in	  a	  director:	  Forming	  his/her	  own	  opinions	  and	  arguing	  strenuously	  if	  there	  are	  disagreements	  among	  directors	   ShrInteg	  49	   As	  a	  shareholder,	  how	  important	  are	  these	  attributes	  in	  a	  director:	  Having	  a	  track	  record	  of	  business	  successes	   ShrRecord	  
Personal	  Details:	  50	   Are	  you	  currently	  employed	  as	  an	  executive,	  or	  are	  (or	  have	  been)	  a	  Director	  in	  an	  organisation	   Employ	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